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I. INTRODUCTION
Property lies at the heart of the story of the Cuban Revolution. In the
years immediately following the rise of Fidel Castro, Cubans (particularly
in rural areas) who had previously lived in abject poverty found their
situation greatly improved as a result of the redistributive measures
undertaken by the new government. On the other hand, hundreds of
thousands of middle-class Cubans fled to the United States and elsewhere,
leaving behind virtually all of their property: family homes, businesses,
farms, clothes, cars, and photographs. Unable to carry their belongings
with them, most of the Cuban refugees left with, as the Cuban saying goes,
"one hand in front and one hand behind." Many Cuban 6migr6s have
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rebuilt their lives, replacing their lost homes with new ones and
establishing new roots in the United States and elsewhere. Many, however,
retain a strong desire to recover properties that were lost.
In addition to the Cubans who were affected, both for better and for
worse, American companies that had been doing business on the island for
decades suddenly found themselves nationalized or "intervened." The
adverse effects of the Cuban government's reforms on property belonging
to U.S. nationals (largely U.S. corporations), helped to shape the U.S.
policy response to the new Cuban government. The decades-old U.S.
embargo against Cuba, imposed out of anger over the harm to these
property interests on the island, remains in place to the present day, still
justified by the demand that the Cuban government compensate American
citizens who lost property as a result of its reform efforts.'
The study of the Cuban revolution's property reforms, and the
subsequent conflict between the United States and Cuba over
compensation, reveals an area of confusion within the international law.
International law, which has been characterized since the Enlightenment
by its increasing tendency towards positivism, is incapable of giving a clear
answer to the question of whether or not the Cuban government wronged
the U.S. nationals or the Cuban people as a result of its property reforms.
The absence of consensus regarding state practice on the issue of
compensation for expropriated private property, and the resulting lacuna
within customary international law, points towards the desirability of a
different approach to property issues within the international law.
Some might argue that the issue of international standards for property
reform is a moot one. Despite conflicts in the 1970s and 1980s over the
responsibilities of formerly colonized states towards foreign-owned
property,2 the post-Soviet era has seen the growth of a consensus around
liberal markets and property rights. Nevertheless, as the recent economic
crisis in Asia demonstrates, it may be too early for the neoliberals to cry
absolute victory. The sudden and violent dismantling of several years of
economic progress in that region has led some states to question their
commitment to the principles of economic liberalism. 4 A prolonged
economic crisis in the developing world'could quickly reignite the question

1. See Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Helms-Burton) Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-114, 110 Stat. 785 (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
2. The debate within the United Nations over the New Economic Order was typical of these

conflicts.
3. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 458

(1995).
4. See, e.g., Michael Zielenziger, Asian Confidencein Free-MarketWeak, Rise ofNew Era
of ProtectionismFearedbyAnalysts, THEARIZONA REPUBLIC, Sept. 4, 1998, at E3 ("Asia is losing
confidence in the free-market medicine [of] the IMF and the United States .. ").
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of how and when states may expropriate the property of foreign nationals.
This Article compares two different models of international law: the
classical international model, which is characterized by its focus on states,
its lack of concern for how states treat their own citizens, and its pervasive
positivism; and the human rights model, which is characterized by its
interest in entities other than states (especially individuals), its desire to
regulate the way a state treats even its own citizens, and by its embrace of
moral discourse. The rise of the human rights model in the years following
the Second World War represents a direct challenge to the classical
international law model. The former's moral outlook and willingness to
peer within state boundaries finds no precedent within the classical system.
Most analyses of property issues under international law assume the
appropriateness of the classical international law model. This Article will
argue, however, that the human rights model is the correct one for
exploring the problems raised by property redistribution. This human rights
approach takes the form of a set of minimum, international standards for
the state's treatment of private property that can be augmented-but not
reduced-by international consensus. Because they are formulated in the
language of human rights, these minimum standards apply to both
nationals and aliens within the expropriating state. In searching for a
source for the content of the human property rights, this Article opts for the
natural law tradition.5 Not only does the Thomistic tradition of natural law
provide the most secure basis for human rights, it is also able to reconcile
the human rights model to the classical international law model.
A thorough evaluation of the Cuban Revolution's property reforms
requires an understanding of the historical context from which those
reforms emerged. Part II of this Article, therefore, provides a brief
overview of Cuban history, with an emphasis on the patterns of Cuban
property-ownership in the years leading up to the Cuban revolution. It
discusses the content of the various reforms of the property system
undertaken by the revolutionary government and explains the recent
changes promulgated in the wake of the disintegration of the Soviet Union.
While the earlier reforms collectivized most (but not all) Cuban property,
5. By natural law, I refer principally to the Aristotelian tradition of thought developed by
Saint Thomas Aquinas in the 13th century. This notion should be distinguished from the vague, and
often confused, conception of natural law that seems to prevail within international law scholarship.
International law scholars often speak of the history of modern international law as characterized
by a conflict between natural law and positivism. See, e.g., MARTi KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY
TO UTOPIA, at xiv (1989) (describing the tendency of international legal theory to take the form of
debates between "naturalism" and "positivism"); James Boyle, Ideals and Things: International
Legal Scholarship and the Prison-house of Language, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 327, 330 (1985)
(describing the debate between "naturalism" and "positivism"). It is far from clear, however, that
by "naturalism" those international law scholars are referring specifically to the Thomistic version
of that wide category of theories.
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the post-1989 policies have amounted to a significant shift towards the
liberalization of Cuba's property system.
In Part H.A, the process of evaluating the justice of the Cuban
property reforms begins by contrasting two different conceptions of
international law: the classical international law model and the human
rights model. In Part IELB, an exploration of the international law of
expropriation shows that the classical international law model is incapable,
on its own terms, of producing a non-arbitrary set of international norms
to govern property reform. This inability points towards a deeper problem
within the positivistic model of classical international law: its impotence
when confronted with ambiguity within its identified "sources." As a
result, this Article adopts the human rights model as a promising means for
developing the norms required for an evaluation of the Cuban property
reforms.
In Part s.C, I argue that the human rights model is most at home
within a natural law conception of international law. This argument begins
with an overview of the Thomistic theory of natural law. It continues with
the historical observation that the modem conception of international law,
including the notion of universal human rights, emerged from within the
context of a natural law ethic. It argues that the positivistic notion of
international law is unable to bear the normative weight required to
rationally justify international obedience to its terms and is, in fact,
somewhat incoherent. The positivistic model of international law is a
particularly weak basis for the construction of a system of universal human
rights. Finally, the argument concludes by discussing why other ethical
theories are unable to do the job of serving as the foundation for either
international law in general or human rights law in particular and
explaining why the traditional objections to natural law are unpersuasive.
The natural law theory is able to justify both an obligation to respect
customary international law and a determinate set of universal human
rights. A natural law approach to international law would posit a series of
universal human rights derived from the natural law, overlaid by a
structure of norms rooted in international custom, the ius gentium.
After thus laying the groundwork, Part BI.D proceeds to analyze the
problem of expropriation from the natural law perspective. The first step
in this undertaking requires the elaboration of a natural law theory of
human rights in property. After setting out the basic structure of a natural
law theory of property-based upon the notion of human dignity-the
Article applies the theory of property for dignity in Part IV to the three
groups most affected by the Cuban property reforms: Cubans who
remained in Cuba after the revolution, Cubans who left Cuba, and North
Americans who owned property in Cuba at the time of the revolution. The
result is a mixed one, with some of the Cuban property reforms (for
example, those taking property from U.S. corporations) largely falling
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within the bounds of the minimum standards mandated by natural law and
others (for example, those eliminating small businesses) going beyond
what the natural law permits.
I. PROPERTY IN CUBAN HISTORY

A. Introduction
The story of the Cuban revolution begins long before 1959. As with
so many historical events, it is impossible to interpret the abrupt changes
of that year without a clear understanding of the preceding history.
Developing such an understanding will allow an evaluation of the Cuban
reforms that is sensitive to the Cuban context and that avoids overly
simplistic answers. Although obviously limited by constraints of space,
this Part seeks to provide an outline of the historical context necessary for
a sufficiently nuanced assessment of the justice of the reforms in Cuban
property relations that followed Fidel Castro's rise to power.
The most striking feature of the 1959 Revolution, when studied within
the broader context of Cuban history, is its ultimate continuity with earlier
movements for change in Cuban society. Indeed, the causes of the Cuban
revolution stretch back into the Spanish colonial era; they were nourished
by decades of bloody struggle for independence and over a half-century of
neo-colonial domination by the United States. From this story emerge three
recurring themes that characterize Cuban history prior to the revolution:
first, constant foreign domination (up to 1898, Spanish, and after 1898
North American); second, striking inequality in the distribution of wealth;
and finally, repeated frustration by the United States of attempts to alter
either of these two conditions. The interplay of these three themes strongly
influenced the course of Cuban history, affecting many of the decisions
taken early in the years following the triumph of the 1959 Revolution.
B. The ColonialEra
Cuban economy and life have always been dominated by the rhythms
of its agricultural system.6 No other sector of the Cuban economy has had
as profound an influence on the structure of Cuban society. The social
system that Cuban revolutionaries set out to reform in 1959 had its
ultimate origins in the agricultural and economic policies of the Spanish
colonial regime.
Over the century prior to the Cuban war for independence, Spanish
colonial policy encouraged the formation of large agricultural estates and

6. See DUDLEY

SEERS ET AL., CUBA: THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVOLUTION 67 (1964).
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helped to destroy small-scale farmers.7 In the province of Matanzas,
Havana-based absentee landlords forced small tobacco farmers from their
land to establish large-scale sugar monoculture.' Land ownership
throughout Cuba became extremely concentrated, leading to the creation
of an enormous population of landless agricultural workers. 9 A large
number of farmers worked the land in lease arrangements, called the
colono system, whereby they agreed to pay a fixed percentage of their
agricultural output (usually in sugar) to the landowner in exchange for the
right to work the land.10 Although scholars have hesitated to assign the
label of "latifundia"to the land regime under Spanish rule, Laird Bergad
argues that extreme concentration of land ownership was well underway
prior to Cuban independence."
The benefits of Cuban agricultural development were quite unevenly
distributed. Small planters, who made up nearly three quarters of the
population of Matanzas, for example, earned only one to two percent of the
total income in the province. Instead, most of the income from sugar
production flowed to elites, who tended to live in urban areas, particularly
Havana. 3 This steady draining of profits from the rural to the urban areas
of Cuba helped to create a deep urban-rural divide in the standard of living
which continued to characterize the Cuban social structure until the 1959
revolutionary reforms. 14 As Bergad observes, "Sugar may have generated
fortunes for the elite of Havana, but by the end of the nineteenth century
most of the people in [rural] Matanzas... entered the twentieth century
having enjoyed few improvements in their collective condition."' 5

7. See LAIRD W. BERGAD, CUBAN RURAL SOCIETY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: THE

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC HISTORY OF MONOCULTURE IN MATANZAS 12-13 (1990). Technological
factors, such as the use of steam power in sugar mills and the establishment of railroads, also
encouraged the development of large-scale agricultural production to achieve economies of scale.
See LOwRY NELSON, RURAL CUBA 88 (1970); SEERS ET AL., supra note 6, at 75.
8. See BERGAD, supranote 7, at 14, 141,159. According to Bergad, elites did not rest "until
every area of... [Matanzas] was under their control." Id. at 15.
9. See id. at 281-83.
10. See id. at 264, 278-80. Landowners typically retained close to 50% of the agricultural
output of such colono land. See id at 280.
11. See id. at 289-92 (admitting that the concentration of land ownership achieved under
Spanish rule did not rise to the level of /at/fundia, but arguing that the Spaniards created the
necessary preconditions that allowed such a system to emerge under U.S. economic domination in
the 20th century).
12. See id. at 163.
13. See id. at 159,337 (arguing that sugar money was steadily siphoned out of the Matanzas
province to the Havana-based elite).
14. See SEERS ET AL, supranote 6, at 95-97 (describing the gap between Cuba's urban and
rural populations).
15. BERGAD, supra note 7, at 337.
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C. The Cuban Warfor Independence
Cuba's status as the last Spanish colonial possession in the Western
Hemisphere served the dual role of creating a heightened sense of Cuban
nationalism and strengthening the resolve of the Spanish government to
retain control of Cuba at almost any cost.16 The second half of the
nineteenth century was punctuated by repeated, and often bloody, attempts
to free Cuba from Spanish colonial rule. 7 Unlike the leaders of other Latin
American independence movements, the leaders of the Cuban War for
Independence sought not only to free Cuba from foreign rule, but also to
transform the structure of Cuban society.18 Louis A. Pdrez observed that
the belief "that the sources of oppression in Cuba were more internal than
external, and, further, that the forms of oppression were more social than
political, served as the central premises around which armed separation
took definitive shape between the 1880s and 1890s."' 19 Local elites, as
much as Spaniards, were the targets of the revolutionaries, who sought to
remake Cuban society into a nation of small landholders through a
deliberate policy of land redistribution.20
The social goals of the revolutionary leaders sparked fears among local
elites about their ability to retain a privileged position within an
independent Cuban society. This fear, which had distinctive racial
overtones, led them to appeal to the United States for protection. 21 In 1896,
one year after the outbreak of the war, 100 planters, lawyers, and

16. See Louis A. PtREZ, JR., CUBA: BETWEEN RErORM AND REVOLUTION 103 (1988)

[hereinafter CUBA] (noting that the independence of the continental Spanish possessions increased
the symbolic importance of Cuba within the dwindling Spanish empire); RAMON EDUARDO RUIZ,
CUBA: THEMAKINGOFA REVOLUTION 19 (1968) (discussing the role of Spanish rule in the creation
of a tradition of Cuban nationalism).
17. See CUBA, supranote 16, at 158.
18. See Roberto Ferdndez Retamar, The Modernity of Mart, in JoSt MARTI:
REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRAT 1, 6 (Christopher Abel & Nissa Torrents eds., 1986) [hereinafter
MARTI] (describing South American independence leaders as conservatives and Cuban
revolutionary leaders, particularly Martf and Maceo, as "radicals"); CUBA, supra note 16, at 160.
Some Cuban scholars have sought to portray Martf, the ideological father of the Cuban war for
independence, as a sort of proto-Marxist. See Jorge Ibarra, MartlandSocialism, in MARTI, at 83.
However, his social vision seems to have been more properly characterized as corporatist. See
Gerald E. Poyo, Jos6 Marti: Architect of Social Unity in the AmigrA Communities of the United
States, in MARTI, at 16, 20 ("Martf's vision of the new revolutionary movement, then, brought
together all classes and races behind amovement dedicated to an independent Cuban republic based
on principles of social justice for all."). Thus, Martf was able to attract adherents from among both
workers and factory-owners, the poor and the affluent. See id. at 21, 23; CUBA, supra note 16, at
160 (discussing the revolutionary movement's broad appeal).
19. CUBA, supra note 16, at 159.
20. See id. at 161-64.
21. See id. at 174. Many of the leaders of the revolutionary army were men of color. See id.
at 160.
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industrialists in Cuba petitioned the United States government to
intervene.22 They hoped that the United States would be better able to
protect their property-interests than had the Spaniards,23 and many overtly
hoped for the U.S. annexation of Cuba.' Their hopes were fulfilled in
1898, and the United States intervened when all signs pointed towards an
imminent Cuban victory.' Although U.S. involvement was brief and the
United States forces lost only around 100 soldiers 6 (as compared to tens
of thousands of Cuban dead27 ), the United States claimed responsibility for
the victory and sought to discredit the Cuban revolutionaries as incapable
of either winning or exercising their own sovereignty.28
There were many motives for the U.S. intervention in the Cuban
independence struggle. The United States had long harbored desires to
annex the island, which it saw as a natural extension of its own territory.29
Although annexation of Cuba was politically impracticable 0 (and, for
many Americans, racially undesirable31 ), the United States saw true Cuban
self-government as out of the question and instead favored a tutelary
regime under U.S. domination.32 Cuban independence was seen as beyond
the abilities of an inferior race,33 and U.S. imperial domination over the

22. See id. at 174.
23. See id.
24. See JULES R. BENJAMIN, THE UNITED STATES AND THE ORIGINS OF THE CUBAN
REvoUrMON 46 (1990).
25. See CUBA, supra note 16, at 175. But see JAIME SUCHCIU, CUBA: FROM COLUMBUS TO
CASTRO AND BEYOND 79 (1986) (implying that the Cuban forces were at a stalemate with the
Spaniards at the moment of U.S. intervention in 1898). Although they disagree on the ability of the
Cuban army to win independence without the assistance of the United States, both Suchlicki and
Pdrez agree that the motives for U.S. intervention were less than altruistic. See CUBA, supra note
16, at 177-78; SUCHutCKI, supra,at 79.
26. See RUIZ, supra note 16, at 21.
27. See CUBA, supra note 16, at 167.
28. See id.at 179. Leaders of the Cuban independence movement were even excluded from
Spain's surrender ceremonies in Santiago. See BENJAMIN, supra note 24, at 53.
29. See Benjamin, supra note 24, at 7-9. John Quincy Adams had earlier said, that
if an apple severed by the tempest from its native tree cannot choose but to fall to
the ground,Cuba,forcibly disjoined from its unnatural connection with Spain...
can gravitate only toward the North American Union, which by the same law of
nature cannot cast her off from its
bosom.
Id. at 8.
30. See id. at 50 (discussingthe Senate's passage ofthe Teller Amendment,which stated that
the United States disclaimed any desire to exercise sovereignty over Cuba).
31. See id. at 17.
32. See CUBA, supra note 16, at 177.
33. See id. at 180. United States General Samuel B.M. Young said of the Cubans, that they
"are a lot of degenerates ....They are no more capable of self-government than the savages of

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2000

9

Florida Law Review, Vol. 52, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 3
FLORIDA LAWRYI EW[

[VoL 552

Caribbean was practically considered a given.34 Thus, the United States
occupied Cuba militarily, refusing to withdraw until Cuba amended its
constitution to include a provision, the infamous Platt Amendment,
allowing the United States to intervene whenever it thought intervention
necessary to protect Cuban independence."
The U.S. decision to intervene in the Cuban War for Independence had
several long-term effects on the subsequent course of Cuban history. First
and foremost, it laid the groundwork for continued U.S. colonial
domination of Cuba. Second, it served to preserve the extant colonial
social order.36 Third, it facilitated the penetration of the Cuban economy
by U.S. capital.37 Finally, the U.S. denial of true independence to Cubans
created, among Cubans, a heightened sense of nationalism that tended to
express itself in harshly anti-American terms.3
D. Era of NeocolonialDomination (1902-1959)
The period between the end of the U.S. occupation of Cuba in 1902
and the Cuban Revolution in 1959 was one of consistent U.S. domination
of events on the island. Historians in Cuba often refer to this as the period
of the "pseudo-republic." The half-century between occupation and
revolution saw an entrenchment of economic inequality in Cuban society
and an extension of U.S. domination into almost every sphere of Cuban
life.
The concentration of land ownership that began under Spanish

Africa." Id. at 180. In contrast, the United States believed that "[t]he 'better classes,' the propertied,
the educated, the white... wanted close and permanent ties with the United States." Id. at 181. This
interpretation of elite sentiment was probably fairly accurate, because white propertied elites did
in fact view U.S. intervention as a deliverance from expropriation at the hands of reform-minded
revolutionaries. See id. at 182. This perception tended to breakdown along racial lines, with whites
far more in favor of U.S. intervention than blacks. See RUIz, supra note 16, at 25.
34. See WALTER LAFEBER, THE AMERICAN AGE: UNITED STATES FOREIGNPOuCY AT HOME

AND ABROAD SINCE 1750, 196-97 (1989).
35. See id. at 197. Cubans rightly interpreted the Platt Amendment as a denial of true
sovereignty. See RUIZ, supra note 16, at 33 (noting that the Platt Amendment reduced Cuba to a
state of vassalage). In response, the Cubans marked its adoption with a torch-light protest. See
PtREZ, supra note 16, at 187.
36. See BENJAMIN, supra note 24, at 71 (arguing that Washington D.C. served as the
guarantor for Spanish property rights after 1898, preventing the achievement of any of the
independence movement's social goals); see also CUBA, supranote 16, at 192 ("The United States
had not only rescued and revived the moribund colonial order, it had also assumed responsibility
for its protection and preservation.").
37. See BERGAD, supra note 7, at 324; NELSON, supra note 7, at 94; CUBA, supra note 16,
at 195-97; RUIZ, supra note 16, at 40; Louis A. Prez, Jr., Insurrection, Intervention and the
Transformationof Land Tenure Systems in Cuba, 1895-1902, 65 HISPANIC AM. HIST. REV. 229,
254 (1985).
38. See Ruiz, supra note 16, at 39.
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colonial rule continued after 1902. As sugar production increasingly
dominated the Cuban agricultural economy, land ownership became
concentrated in fewer and fewer hands.3 9 Small landowners sold their land
to centrales(large sugar-mills) and became tenant farmers or landless rural
laborers.40 By the mid-1920s, centralesowned twenty percent of the total
area of Cuba.4 By the eve of the revolution, land ownership had been even
further concentrated, such that 0.1% of all Cuban farms accounted for
twenty percent of agricultural land, and eight percent of the farms
controlled 70% of the land.42 If historians hesitated to assign the label of
"latifundia"to the colonial land-tenure system,43 few failed to do so with
the regime that evolved in the years leading up to the 1959 revolution.'
A high percentage of the land in the hands of large-landholders was
severely underutilized and farmed using inefficient methods. The largest
estates cultivated only about ten percent of their acreage, while the smallest
tended to cultivate a higher percentage. 45 Much of the uncultivated land
was simply held in reserve by large landholders for times when sugar
prices rose.46 Scant resources were dedicated to agricultural research and
sugar planters made few investments in technical improvements that would
increase agricultural output.47
In addition to extreme inequality in land tenure patterns, prerevolutionary Cuban society was characterized by highly unequal
distribution of wealth and resources, especially along a rural-urban axis.
Although on the aggregate level, Cubans were among the wealthiest people
in Latin America, the numbers hid an enormous divide between the
standard of living of the wealthiest and the poorest Cubans, with the latter
concentrated in rural areas.48 Conditions for rural Cubans before the

39. See id. at 42 (discussing the emergence of sugar monoculture in the period after
independence and its dominance by American bankers, managers, and technicians).
40. See NELSON, supra note 7, at 94-103. Cuban economic organization has been described
as agrarian, but on a "capitalist" model. See BERGAD, supranote 7, at 21-22. The landless laborers
who emerged in the wake of the concentration of land-ownership have thus been categorized as a
rural wage-workers, rather than subsistence farmers. See RUIZ, supra note 16, at 44.
41. See NELSON, supra note 7, at 94.
42. See id. at 167.
43. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
44. See, e.g., BERGAD, supra note 7, at 289 (contrasting the colonial land regime with the
"lat/fundia" that emerged under U.S. domination); NELSON, supra note 7, at 116 (describing the
sugar economy as one characterized by "latifundia");CUBA, supra note 16, at 301-02 (describing
that vast areas of Cuba's rural land was held in latifundiaform).
45. See SEERS ET AL, supra note 6, at 84.
46. See id. at 85-86. Additionally, centralesoften left cultivated land unharvested if there was
not sufficient demand at harvest time. See id. at 86.
47. See id. at 90-93.
48. See CUBA, supra note 16, at 302 (describing the difference in standard of living between
urban and rural areas in Cuba prior to the revolution).
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revolution have been described as "squalid."'4 9 Most rural dwellings had
dirt floors, 90% lacked electricity and running water; two-thirds of family
expenditures were on food; only 11% of rural residents had routine access
to dairy products, only 4% ate meat, and only 2% ate eggs.5" Thirty percent
of rural Cubans suffered from parasites, close to half were illiterate, and
almost 90% failed to study beyond the third grade.51 Rural laborers
suffered from chronic seasonal unemployment that followed the pattern of
the sugar crop.52 Although poverty was most severe in rural areas, even in
urban areas, the poor lived in miserable conditions.53
In the period before 1959, U.S. domination of Cuba took the form of
repeated interventions, both in the form of overt military invasion and

behind-the-scenes manipulations of political events within Cuba. Overt
political and military intervention was accompanied by increasing North
American penetration of the Cuban economy. North American
corporations, such as the United Fruit Company, came to control an
enormous proportion of Cuban agriculture, at one point owning 60% of
Cuba's rural land'4 and 75% of its sugar industry.55 Further, U.S.
corporations acquired most of the Cuban industries and utilities.56 The
United States likewise dominated Cuban trade, buying most of its sugar
output and supplying in exchange (under preferential tariff agreements)
most of its imported goods.57

49. SEERS ET AL, supra note 6, at 97.
50. See id at 95-97.
51. See id. at 97.
52. See CUBA, supra note 16, at 299.
53. See RuiZ, supra note 16, at 46. "The majority of rural and urban workers enjoyed a thin
slice of prosperity ...They were ill-fed, ill-housed, poorly schooled, and indifferently governed."
Id. Although Cubans were relatively wealthy by Latin American standards, at least in terms of
aggregate data, a comparison of Cuba to other Latin American nations is inapt. See id. at 10. Cuba
operated within the North American economic sphere and Cubans, therefore, tended to compare
themselves to North Americans. See id. at 8-9. Further, the cost of living in Cuba was much closer
to that in the United States than in other Latin American nations. See id. at 10; see also CUBA,
supra note 16, at 297 (comparing the per capita income of Cubans to that of residents of the United
States and Mississippi and noting that life in Havana was more expensive than in many North
American cities); Louis A. P&ez, Jr., The Circleof Connections: One Hundred Years of Cuba-U.S.
Relations, in BRIDGES TO CUBA/PUENTES A CUBA 161,175-78 (Ruth Behar ed., 1995) (describing
pre-Revolutionary Cuba's tendency to identify and compare itself with Noth American rather than
Latin America).
54. See CUBA, supra note 16, at 197.
55. See MORRIS H. MORLEY, IMPERIAL STATE AND REVOLUTION: ThE UNITED STATES AND
CUBA, 1952-1986, at 32 (1987).
56. See id. By 1929, American investment in Cuba accounted for 25% of total U.S.
investment in Latin America, dominating Cuban industry in the areas of sugar, tobacco, railroads,
iron ore, copper, manganese, telephone, telegraph, banking, docks, fruit, warehouses, publicutilities
and hotels. See id.
57. See BENJAMIN, supra note 24, at 69.
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Just as North American control of large segments of the Cuban
economy gave the United States strong incentives to pay close attention to
political events in Cuba, so too U.S. economic penetration of the island
(along with the Platt Amendment's provisions) gave U.S. policymakers
powerful tools for enforcing their will on the island. The United States
wielded its power in defense of its interests, frustrating the efforts of local
reformers to realize the goals of the 1895 revolutionaries. In 1933, when
reform-minded students and workers brought down the Machado
dictatorship and replaced him with university professor Grau San Martin,
the United States grew alarmed. Sumner Welles, U.S. ambassador to Cuba,
reported that "American properties and interests are being gravely
prejudiced... . The United States began a program of diplomatic
maneuvers to isolate and destabilize the new regime.59 It refused to
recognize the Grau government and was extremely supportive when he was
overthrown by a military coup led by Fulgencio Batista in early 1934.
Despite these U.S. efforts, the Cuban Constitution of 1940 reflected
the views of the 1933 revolutionaries more than it did those of the
conservative forces in Cuban society.61 It outlawed latifundia62 and placed
limits on the foreign ownership of Cuban property. 63 The 1940
Constitution was seen by Washington as dangerous to its property interests,
but, under a series of corrupt governments that ruled Cuba between
1940
64
and 1959, its more progressive provisions were never enforced.
E. The 1959 Revolution
The initial goals of the 1959 revolution were roughly the same as those
of both the independence movement and the 1933 revolutionaries, although
with a more radical orientation. 65 Broadly speaking, the goals were a

58. CUBA, supra note 16, at 270. For a description of the goals of the anti-Machado
movement, and U.S. opposition to its success, see RUIZ, supra note 16, at 80-89.
59. See CUBA, supra note 16, at 270-71.
60. See id.
at 275. As a favor to the new Batista government, the United States agreed to
abrogate the Platt Amendment in 1934. See id.at 279.
61. See id. at 281.
62. See CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBUC OF CUBA (1940) art. 90, reprinted in THE
CONSTrITIONS OF THE AMERICAS 226, 245 (Russel H. Fitzgibbon ed. 1948) ("Latifindia are
outlawed, and in order to effect their disappearance the law shall stipulate the maximum extent of
property that each person or corporation may possess for each type of exploitation for which the
land may be employed.").
63. See i.("The law shall restrictively limit acquisition and possession of land by foreign
persons and companies, and shall adopt measures tending to revert the land to Cuban ownership.").
64. See BENJAMIN, supranote 24, at 97 (describing the negative reaction of the United States
to the 1940 Constitution); CUBA, supra note 16, at 281-82; Ruz, supranote 16, at 105-10.
65. See, e.g., Ruiz, supra note 16, at 168-69 (discussing the broad social goals of Castro's
movement before 1959 and noting its similarity to earlier revolutionary movements); see also

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2000

13

Florida Law Review, Vol. 52, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 3
FLORIDA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 52

redistribution of property (particularly in rural areas), political reform, and
greater independence from U.S. domination. 6 Thus, although the 1959
revolution must be seen as something fundamentally different from
anything that had come before in Cuban history, 67 it also shared a certain
continuity with earlier movements.6
The U.S. reaction to the Cuban revolution was also consonant with its
earlier efforts to block change in Cuba. As it had in 1933, the United States
sought to control the development of the situation through behind-thescenes manipulation. Thus, even before Castro came to power, the United
States, through the CIA, funneled money into anti-Batista, anti-Castro
groups, hoping to find a moderate alternative to a Castro government. 9
Although later framed in terms of anticommunism, the consistency of the
U.S. reaction to the 1959 revolution with its reaction to pre-Cold War
attempts at revolutionary change within Cuba belie anticommunism as the
true (or at least only) cause of U.S. opposition. Instead, the primary
concerns of the United States were initially with the protection of the
sizable U.S. investments and property interests in Cuba.70
MONA ROSENDAHL, INSIDE THE REVOLUTION: EVERYDAY LIFE IN SOCIALIST CUBA 108 (1997)
(describing how 1959 revolutionaries were inspired by the thinking of earlier Cuban movements,
particularly by Jos6 Martf).
66. See, e.g., CUBA, supra note 16, at 317 (discussing the promises of social and political
reform made by the 1959 revolutionaries prior to taking power); RUIz, supra note 16, at 169
(describing the anti-American content of Castro's revolutionary goals). Each element of this agenda
had been present, although often in more moderate manifestations, in earlier movements for change
in Cuban society. The independence struggle had sought land redistribution and an end to foreign
domination. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text. Likewise, the 1933 reformers were
concerned with ending latifundiaand reforming Cuba's political system. See supranotes 58-64 and
accompanying text.
67. See CUBA, supra note 16, at 313-15 (describing the success of the 1959 revolution as the
taking of Cuba "over a threshold never before crossed").
68. There was also a self-conscious effort on the part of Castro and his allies to portray
themselves as "the fulfillment of unmet aspirations and unfulfilled promises of the past." Id. at 314.
69. See BENJAMIN, supra note 24, at 163.
70. See id. at 148; MORLEY, supra note 55, at47-61. This interpretation of the U.S. reaction
to the Cuban revolution (i.e., as concerned primarily with the protection of U.S. property) is also
consistent with U.S. responses to other efforts at property reform, both communist and noncommunist, in the Third World. For a broad overview of such responses and a theory that sees
within them a consistent desire to retain U.S. hegemony, see generally THOMAS MCCORMICK,
AMERICA'S HALF CENTURY: UNITED STATES FOREIGNPOuCYiNTHE COLD WARAND AFrER (1989).

Of particular relevance to the Cuban revolution was the U.S. response to a moderate property
reform in Guatemala in the early 1950s. In that case, a clearly noncommunist agrarian reform led
the United States, through the CIA, to organize a coup against the elected Guatemalan government
in 1954. See Jim Handy, "The Most PreciousFruitof the Revolution": The GuatemalanAgrarian
Reform, 1952-54, 68 HISPANIC AM. HIST. REV. 704-05 (1988). For a thorough history of the
Guatemalan revolution and the U.S. reaction, see generally PIERO GLEUESES, SHATrERED HOPE:
THE GUATEMALANREVOLUTIONANDTHEUNTED STATES, 1944-1954 (1991). The Guatemalan case
is of particular importance because Ernesto "Che" Guevara, a key participant in the Cuban
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There is debate among scholars as to the precise date when the United
States began to work actively to overthrow the Castro government,71 but
it is beyond question that U.S. opposition to the policies of the
revolutionary government began well before Castro embraced the Soviet
bloc. 72 The United States protested, for example, Cuba's first agrarian

reform, a fairly moderate reform law passed in early 1959, because it
feared the law would adversely affect American-owned property on the
island. 73 Regardless of the precise date at which U.S. policy switched from
simple opposition to active subversion, it is obvious that the central goal
of U.S. policy towards Cuba since the 1960s has been the overthrow of the
Castro regime.74 Cuba's reforms of property law have played a key role in
maintaining this steady policy of U.S. opposition.75

revolution and in the formulation of the revolutionary government's early policies, was present in
Guatemala at the time ofthe U.S.-sponsored coup against the reformist government there. See COLE
BLASIER, HOVERING GIANT: U.S. RESPONSES TO REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICA,
1910-1985, at 177-78 (1985). Thus, through Guevara, the U.S. response to property reform in
Guatemala may have helped to shape the strategies of the Cuban revolutionaries after 1959.
71. Some scholars have argued that the United States began to plan for the overthrow of the
Castro regime as early as the middle of 1959, well before Castro displayed any overt tendency
towards Communism. See, e.g., Piero Gleijeses, Ships in the Night: The CIA, the White House, and
the Bay of Pigs,27 J. OFLATIN AM. STUD. 1,3 (1995) (arguing that by June 1959, the United States
reached the conclusion "that it was not possible to achieve [its] objectives with Castro in power").
Other scholars have argued, however, that the U.S. decision to overthrow Castro did not come until
his actions had clearly communicated his embrace of Communism. See Alen H. Luxenberg, Did
EisenhowerPush Castrointo the Arms ofthe Soviets?, J. INTER-AM. STUD. &WORLD AFF., Spring
1988, at 37, 50 ("[lIt would appear... that Eisenhower waited until the evidence was in.").
72. See Jules R. Benjamin, Interpretingthe UnitedStates Reactionto the CubanRevolution,
1959-1960, 19 CUBAN STUD. 145, 152 (1989) (criticizing the traditional Cold War explanation of
U.S. opposition to the Cuban revolution as ignoring the fact that the shift towards opposition to the
Castro government came before the Cuban embrace of the Soviet Union or the nationalization of
U.S. properties).
73. See BENJAMIN, supra note 24, at 179-80.
74. See MORLEY, supra note 55, at 72.
75. See Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Helms-Burton) Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-114, 110 Stat. 785 (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.). This is not to say that opposition
to Cuban property reforms is the only basis of U.S. hostility. Also crucial to the maintenance of a
adversarial relationship has been Cuba's insistence on new terms for the U.S.-Cuban political
relationship. See David Bernell, The Curious Case of Cuba in American Foreign Policy, J. OF
INTER-AM. STUD. & WORLD AFF., Summer 1994, at 65, 74. Furthermore, a well-organized and
financially powerful anti-Castro Cuban-American lobby contributes to the ongoing tension. See
Jorge I. Dominquez, U.S.-Cuban Relations: From the Cold War to the Colder War, J. OF INTERAM. STUD. & WORLD AFF., Fall 1997, at 49, 62. Nevertheless, disputes over property have played
an important role in the continuing U.S.-Cuba hostility.
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F. PropertyRefonns of the Cuban Revolution
This Part will provide an overview of the various property reforms
undertaken by the Cuban revolutionary government after 1959. It will
avoid going into a level of detail that is unnecessary for the ethical
evaluation that is to begin in the next Part. Instead, it will provide the
broad outlines of the reforms and discuss how they affected various sectors
of Cuban society.
The Revolution's property reforms can be broken down into two
eras.76 The first era runs from the 1959 overthrow of the Batista
government to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The subsequent collapse
of the Soviet Bloc and the end of substantial Soviet subsidies to the Cuban
economy led the Cuban government to undertake a new set of property
reforms in the early 1990s that has fundamentally changed the nature of the
Cuban property system. This Part will discuss each of these eras, and their
respective property reforms in turn.
1. 1959-1989
The property reforms of the Cuban Revolution sought a fundamental
reorganization of Cuban society. Thus, the Revolution's reforms affected
all types of property, rural and urban, commercial and personal. This Part
will provide a brief overview of the most important property reforms of the
pre-1989 era, dealing in turn with agricultural, residential, and then
industrial and commercial properties.
a. Agricultural Property
The first important property reform enacted by the revolutionary
government was the First Agrarian Reform Law of May 17, 1959. The law
sought to eliminate the latifundiathat had characterized Cuban agriculture
since independence. Thus, the prologue to the law cited statistics
demonstrating the extreme maldistribution of agricultural property and the
under-cultivation of land on larger farms as the motivation for undertaking
the reform. 77 The law was not socialist in character, but was rather in the
reformist tradition of the 1952 Guatemalan agrarian reform.7 8
The reform affected approximately 85% of the land in farms, but of

76. This is not to say that policies during these two eras were completely static, but only that
the approach undertaken during each of these eras differed in quite fundamental ways.
77. See PrimeraLey de Reforma Agraria, 17 de Mayo de 1959, reprintedin DR. Luis E.
CANToNBLANCO,CONFERENCLASDEPROPIEDADYDEREcHOSREALEs 624,624(1982) [hereinafter
PrimeraLey de Refonna Agraria].
78. See JostLuIsRODRIGuEzGARcIAETAL,CUBA: REVOLUCI6NYECONOMIA, 1959-1960,
at 51 (1985).
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the land covered, 75% of it was owned by only 2873 owners. 79 The law
prohibited holdings of over 30 caballer(as(approximately 403 hectares),
with exceptions for cattle ranches and farms that functioned at high levels
of productivity, and designated parcels exceeding 30 cabellerias for
confiscation and redistribution. 0 The law also banned sharecropping and
sought to prohibit the colono system in cane cultivation."'
Confiscated land was to be redistributed to those owning less than a
"vital minimum" of two caballer(as, free of charge.82 First priority for
redistribution would be given to those already occupying land as tenants,
colonos, and squatters.8 3 Tenants cultivating less than two caballer(as
would be granted additional lands up to the vital minimum, while tenants
cultivating more than two caballerfas would be allowed to keep their
additional lands (up to five caballerias),but would be expected to pay for
the lands beyond two caballerfas&IRestrictions were placed on the transfer
and subdivision of redistributed parcels.8 5 Recipients of redistributed land
were to be encouraged to form private agricultural cooperatives,86 and
those who failed to cultivate redistributed land were to have their titles
rescinded.'
Compensation for expropriated land was to take the form of twentyyear government bonds paying an annual interest of 4.5%.88 The amount
of compensation would be fixed according to declarations of the value of
the land for tax purposes for 1958.9 This use of tax declarations was
similar to provisions in the Guatemalan agrarian reform of 1952, although
the Cuban bonds matured faster and paid a higher rate of interest than their
Guatemalan counterparts. 90
Because the law did not generally discriminate between property
owned by foreigners and property owned by Cubans, the first lands
affected by the law were Cuban-owned cattle ranches. 9 Nevertheless,
North American corporations, who owned large holdings in Cuban

79. See SEERS ET AE., supra note 6, at 102.
80. See PrimeraLey de Reforma Agraria,supra note 77, art. 2,3.
81. See id. art. 11, 12, 13. In order to prevent colono-type cultivation arrangements, the law
prohibited the operation ofcane plantations by non-Cuban corporations and by Cuban corporations

owned by persons or firms engaged in the manufacture of sugar.
82. Id. art. 16, 18.
83. See id. art. 5.
84. See iL art.18, 19, 21.

85. See id. art. 34, 35.
86. See id. art.43.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

See SEERS ET AL, supra note 6, at 102.
See PrimeraLey de Reforma Agraria,supra note 77, art. 31.
See id. art.29.
See Handy, supra note 70, at 684.
See MORLEY, supra note 55, at 81.
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agricultural land, protested to the U.S. government that the compensation
provided for in the law was insufficient (because tax declarations did not
reflect the true value of the land). As a result, the U.S. State Department
sent the Cuban government a note demanding "prompt, adequate, and
effective" compensation.' Historian Morris Morley argues that the United
States, dissatisfied with the response of the Cuban government and upset
by the implication of a "structural rearrangement of the Cuban economy in
which all foreign property interests would be endangered... began to
give serious consideration to various courses of action.., that might bring
down the Castro government." 93 Thus, the promulgation of the First
Agrarian Reform played an important role in the creation of a policy of
overt hostility by the United States against the Castro regime.
The Second Agrarian Reform Law, enacted on October 3, 1963, was
much more far-reaching than the first. While the first law left mediumsized private farms more or less intact, the second law sought a wholesale
nationalization of virtually all Cuban agriculture. The reach of the second
reform law reflected the radicalization of the revolution that occurred in
the period between 1959 and 1963.' 4
The Second Agrarian Reform Law established a much lower
maximum size for agricultural land. It limited farms to five caballer(as(67
95
hectares), nationalizing the land of all farms in excess of that limit.
Excepted from the law were farms that the government determined to be
functioning at an extremely high level of productivity and farms cultivated
by brothers, so long as each brother did not have in excess of five
96 The law did not make explicit provision for the redistribution
caballerias.
of nationalized farms, and thus it is more properly characterized as a
straight nationalization of agricultural land than as an agrarian reform.97
Compensation for the land nationalized under the Second Agrarian
Reform was to be paid according to the size of the plot taken. Owners were
to receive fifteen pesos monthly for each caballeriaof land expropriated
for a period often years, as long as the owner had been cultivating the land

92. BENJAMIN, supra note 24, at 179-80.
93. MORLEY, supra note 55, at 84-85.
94. See RODRIGUEZ GARCIA ET AL, supra note 78, at 81 (describing 1959-60 as a period
during which the Cuban revolution underwent a process of rapid radicalization).
95. See SegundaLey de ReformaAgraria,3 de Octubre de 1963, art. 1,reprintedin CANTON
BLANCO, supra note 77, at 681 [hereinafter Segunda Ley de Reforma Agraria].
96. See id. art. 2, 3.
97. After the Second Agrarian Reform, over 75% of Cuban agricultural land was in state
hands, although land continued to be distributed to landless peasants and 50,000 peasants received
land titles in the two years following the promulgation of the Second Agrarian Reform. See
DHARAM GHAI ET AL, LABOUR AND DEVELOPMENT INRURAL CUBA 14 (1988). Overall, by 1965
there were 200,000 peasant-owners, owning a total of about 200,000 caballeras,usually of very
high quality lands. See id.
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prior to expropriation.9" If the owner had not been cultivating the land, then
he would receive ten pesos monthly per caballerla for a period of ten
years. 9 By the time of the Second Agrarian Reform, all U.S. property on
the island had already been confiscated, so those affected by the law were
primarily Cubans owning mid-sized farms that had not been touched by the
first land reform.
The process of radical reform in the agricultural sector resulted in the
establishment of three basic forms of land tenure in rural Cuba prior to the
fall of the Soviet Bloc: small private farms, state farms, and private
cooperatives. 1" Small private farms are governed by legal provisions
requiring farmers to cultivate their land in a way that contributes to social
consumption and the national economy.101 The transfer of the land
belonging to small farmers is restricted by law; thus, farmers must obtain
state permission to sell their land, and the state has the right to buy the land
from the farmer for a price fixed by law. 2 Likewise, transfer of a private
farm by inheritance is restricted to family members who have been
working on the land for a period of time. 13 Small private farms made up
about 17% of farmland in the mid 1980s. °4
State farms became the dominant sector of Cuban agriculture in the
early 1960s.'0 5 By the late 1980s, state farms accounted for 83% of the
land, 80% of the agricultural workforce, and 78% of agricultural output."°
State farms were large, state-rn enterprises with salaried workers.
Workers on such farms enjoyed a much higher standard of living than their
pre-revolution counterparts, but state farms were characterized by stagnant
output and lower efficiency than their private sector counterparts.1 7
In the mid-1970s, the Cuban government began to encourage private
farmers to merge their small plots into farm cooperatives.10 ' Farmers who
did so received compensation for their land-contribution over a period of
time out of the cooperative's earnings. In addition, they received a share of
the cooperative's profits, with the size of the share determined by the
amount of work undertaken. In addition, farmers on cooperatives were
allowed to set aside a small parcel of land for cultivation for their own

98. See Segunda Ley de Reforma Agraria,supra note 95, art. 6.
99. See id. art. 6.
100. See DEBRA EVENSON, REVOLUTION IN THE BALANCE 189 (1994).

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

See id. at 191.
See CANTON BLANCO, supra note 77, at 381.
See EVENSON, supra note 100, at 191.
See GHAI Er AL, supra note 97, at 83.
See id. at 53.
See id.

107. See id.; JORGE F. PIREZ-LOPEz, THE ECONOMIcS OFCUBAN SUGAR 29 (1991).

108. See GHAI ET AL, supra note 97, at 70.
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consumption.' °9 The cooperatives are run by a general assembly and a
management board and are permitted to hire outside, seasonal labor.
Agricultural Production Cooperatives (CPA's) increased in number
from forty-four in 1977 to 1414 in 1984.110 The cooperatives have tended
to be quite large, with an average size of over 750 hectares."' The
agricultural yield on private cooperatives has tended to be higher than on
state farms, and private cooperatives have tended to get more work out of
laborers and machinery, with machinery lasting longer than on state
12
farms.
b. Residential and Personal Property
On October 14, 1960, the revolutionary government promulgated the
Urban Reform Law, the objective of which was to eliminate speculation in
the housing market and extend home-ownership to a broader segment of
the Cuban population. In order to accomplish this goal, the law prohibited
all rental of housing; it expropriated rental properties and offered them for
sale to their inhabitants through monthly payments over a period of time
at prices fixed by the state. "3 Owners of expropriated properties were to be
compensated at prices fixed by the law. 1 4 The law also canceled mortgages
on urban properties. Owners occupying mortgaged properties were to
continue making payments on the principal to the state but without interest
payments." 5 The right to buy, sell, or trade urban properties acquired under
the law was severely limited. All persons interested in making such
transfers were required to obtain prior approval of the state." 6 The law left
housing occupants more or less as they were (although with obvious
changes in legal status), but under the Urban Reform Law, the state became
the primary landlord in Cuba." 7
Although Debra Evenson denies that the Cuban government engaged
in direct housing redistribution or nationalization, I 18 the need for such
measures was significantly reduced by the confiscation of properties

109. See EVENSON, supranote 100, at 193.
110. See GHAI ET AL., supra note 97, at 70-71.
111. See id. at 70.

112. See Brian H. Pollitt, The Cuban SugarEconomy: Collapse,Reform and the Prospects
for Recovery, 29 J. OF LATIN AM. STUD. 171,190 (1997).
113. See Ley de Reforma Urbana, 14 de Octubre de 1960, art. 2, 15 reprintedin CANTON
BLANCO, supra note 77, at 691 [hereinafter Ley de Reforma Urbana].
114. Seeid. art. 21.
115. See id. art. 31, 32.
116. The state also had the right of first refusal in such proposed transfers. See id. art. 29.
117. See EVENSON, supra note 100, at 179.
118. See id.
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belonging to Batista and his collaborators19 as well as by Ley 989,
promulgated on December 5, 1961. The latter provision declared that all
properties belonging to people who left Cuba permanently were to be
confiscated. 120 Properties confiscated under these provisions were available
to be redistributed as the government saw fit. Three quarters of a million
Cubans have left Cuba since 1959, almost a quarter of a million between
1959 and 1962 alone.' Most of those who left in the first few years after
12 2
1959 were from the upper and middle classes of Cuban society.
Although certainly not all of these people left behind empty homes to be
confiscated, the massive departure of affluent and middle class Cubans and
subsequent confiscation of many of their homes amounted, in effect, to a
nationalization and redistribution of housing.
Faced with a severe and chronic housing shortage, in 1984 the Cuban
government passed the General Housing Law, the purpose of which was
to encourage private home ownership and stimulate construction in
housing through the establishment of greater market flexibility in the
housing laws. 2 3 The law declared that all Cubans have a right to own the
home in which they live as well as one vacation home.124 The law allowed
those occupying state-owned homes to purchase them from the state for a
for the relatively free sale
price fixed by the law."z The law also allowed
26
homes.
vacation
and
homes
of primary
When the law was promulgated, approximately half of Cubans owned
their own homes. 2 7 By 1988, the rate of home ownership had increased to
87%."~ When the provisions of the 1984 law allowing the free sale of
homes led to housing speculation, the government reversed course,
imposing in 1988 severe restrictions on the sale of property 29 Although

119. These confiscations were authorized by the Ley Fundamentalde Febrerode 1959. See
Juuo A. CARRERAS, HISTORIA DEL ESTADO Y EL DERECHO EN CUBA 507 (1985).

120. See Ley 989 de 5 de Diciembre de 1961.
121. See MARIA CRISTINA GARCIA, HAVANA USA: CUBAN EXILES AND CUBAN AMERICANS IN
SOUTH FLORIDA, 1959-1994, at 13 (1996).,
122. See id.
123. See JUANVEGAVEGA, COMENTARIOS ALALEYGENERALDELAV1VIENDA45-46 (1986).
124. See id. at 56.

125. See id. at 70.
126. See id. at 135-39.
127. See id. at 69.
128. See RODOLFO DAVALOS FERNANDEZ, LA NUEvA LEY GENERAL DE LA VIVIENDA 29

(1990).
129. See, e.g., id, at x (discussing the government's desire to eliminate housing speculation);
EVENSON, supranote 100, at 180 (citing the desire to eliminate speculation in the housing market

as a motivation for the 1988 restrictions on the sale of homes); see also Ley No. 65, 23 de
Diciembrede 1988, Ley Generalde la Vivienda, art. 70 (requiring government approval, with right
of first refusal at a state-set price, for the sale of houses). Although the 1984 housing law contained
similar provisions, the author was told by a law professorat the University of Havana that before
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the sale of houses is now almost never permitted, permutas,or the trading
of homes, has become a very common way to transfer property. 30
Many Cubans have found ways of circumventing the laws restricting
the transfer of residential properties. Two (illegal) methods in particular are
worthy of note. First, many Cubans engage in unequal permutas,whereby
two people exchange houses of unequal value. The party receiving the
house of greater value augments her portion of the trade with an agreed
amount of cash. A second means of circumventing the law is the creation
of "phantom apartments" which then become the subject of a permuta for
the purposes of transferring title. In all other respects, however, this latter
mechanism amounts to a simple sale of residential property.
Under the 1988 General Housing Law, Cubans have the right to inherit
homes and vacation houses from family members, but the rules for such
inheritance are quite complex.131 The rules allow some freedom to choose
who will inherit the property in question, but they also seek to protect those
who have lived in the home for a long time. Thus, heirs enumerated in a
testamentary document can only be certain of inheriting the property
covered by the will if they reside in the house or the house becomes vacant
upon the death of the owner. If "specially protected" persons reside in the
house at the time of the owner's death, however, the right to transfer the
property by will is seriously abridged. 1 2 Owners likewise have the right to
rent out rooms in their homes for money,"3 but the law makes it quite
difficult 13to4 dislodge tenants once they have begun to occupy the
property.
c. Industrial and Commercial Properties
Some of the earliest actions of the revolutionary government
concerned industrial properties owned by American corporations. These
"interventions," as they were called, were piecemeal attempts to extend
utility services to the poorest Cubans.135 For example, on March 3, 1959,
the government "intervened" the Cuban Telephone Company, whose rates

1988 the state virtually always granted permission for sale, while after 1988 permission was always
denied.
130. See EvENSON, supranote 100, at 182. Pernutasare discussed in articles 68 and 69 of the
General Housing Law of 1988. See Ley No. 65, 23 de Diciembre de 1988, Ley General de la
Vivienda, art. 68-69.
131. See id. at 183.
132. Ley No. 65,23 de Diciembrede 1988, Ley Generalde la Vivienda, art. 75-85; DAVALOS
FERNANDEZ, supra note 128, at 203.
133. See Ley No. 65, 23 de Diciembre de 1988, Ley Generalde la Vivienda, art. 74.
134. See EVENSON, supra note 100, at 182.
135. See BLASIER, supra note 70, at 187.
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it saw as exorbitant, and lowered prices for telephone service. 36
Massive expropriations of American property did not begin until
relations between Cuba and the United States began to strain in late 1959.
In December 1959, the State Department hinted that the United States
might cut the Cuban sugar quota, upon which Cuba relied for a great deal
of its export earnings. 137 In early 1960, the three foreign-owned oil
refineries in Cuba, with the encouragement of an increasingly hostile U.S.
government, refused to refine crude oil from the Soviet Union.1 38 In
response, the Cuban government nationalized the refineries in the first
large-scale nationalization of industrial property. 139
Tension quickly escalated over the first half of 1960. Castro claims to
have learned about U.S. plans for the Bay of Pigs invasion in May 1960,
and in July 1960, the United States eliminated the Cuban sugar quota.' In
response, the Cuban government passed Ley 851, authorizing the
government to nationalize American businesses and property, with
compensation to be paid out of money earned on sugar sales to the United
States.1 41 As historian Cole Blasier observes, most of the Cuban
nationalizations of U.S. property were taken in response to (and therefore
not a cause of) the sugar quota cut. 2 By late 1961, virtually all U.S.
properties in Cuba had been nationalized, and 85% of Cuba's industrial
production was under the control of the government. 43
Small Cuban-owned enterprises were left largely untouched
throughout the earliest years of the revolution. During the so-called
"Revolutionary Offensive" of 1968, however, almost all remaining private
businesses in Cuba (with the exception of small farms) were
nationalized.'" The nationalization of close to 57,000 small Cuban-owned
businesses had adverse effects on the availability of goods, as state
enterprises proved unable to keep up with demand. 4 5
2. Post-1989 Reforms
Despite frequent tinkering with the property regime over the course of
the revolution, the basic ideological outlines of Cuban property law
remained fairly steady throughout the three decades after 1959.

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

See Ley 122, 3 de Marzo de 1959.
See BLASIBR, supra note 70, at 192.
See id at 191. Such arefusal represented a serious challenge to Cuban national security.
See CUBA, supra note 16, at 325-26.
See id. at 326.
See Ley 851, 6 de Julio de 1960.
See BLASIER, supra note 70, at 193-94.
See CUBA, supra note 16, at 328.
See GHAI ET AL, supra note 97, at 21.
See CUBA, supra note 16, at 344.
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Agricultural property represented a mix of state and private ownership,
with the state sector predominating. Private ownership of homes and
personal property was widespread, albeit with varying degrees of
restriction placed on the exchange of such property. Commercial and
industrial property was, with few exceptions, entirely state-owned.
With the disintegration of the Soviet Bloc, beginning in 1989,
however, the Cuban economy entered into a period of acute crisis.
Although the precise causes of the crisis and its extent remain a matter of
debate among scholars, 146 no one disputes that the Cuban economy
underwent a profound shock between 1989 and 1993.147 The economic
crisis of the early 1990s forced the Cuban government to enact a series of
economic reforms, the most dramatic of which have been reforms in the
property regime.141 In particular, Cuba has begun to allow private
ownership of commercial and industrial property and has significantly
reduced the role of the state in the agricultural sector. Strangely, while the
government has opened up the property regime in the areas of commerce,
industry, and agriculture, it has not shown the same willingness to reform
in the area of private residential property.
a. Reforms of Agricultural Property
The most significant reform in the area of agricultural property has
been the semi-privatization of state farms in the form of Basic Cooperative
Production Units (UBPCs). 149 Beginning in September 1993, the
government began to convert state farms into semi-private cooperatives in
which worker/members were given a usufruct right to the land making up
146. The accuracy of official Cuban economic data has been impugned by some American
scholars. See, e.g., Alan Abouchar, Measuring Cuba'sEconomic Growth, 20 CUBAN STUD. 157,
157 (1990) (callingthe official Cuban economicdataunreliable). But see, e.g., CLAESBRUNDENIUS,
REVOLUTIONARY CUBA: THE CHALLENGE OF ECONOmic GROWTH WrrH EQurrY (1984) (reaching

conclusions regarding growth that closely matched the claims of the Cuban government over the
period prior to publication); Claes Brundenius & Andrew Zimbalist, Cubanology and Cuban
Economic Peformance,in CUBANPOumCALECONOMY: CONTROVERSIES NCUBANOLOGY 39,3962 (Andrew Zimbalist ed., 1988) (disputing the methodology of studies that have found the Cuban
government to paint a rosy picture of its economic performance).

147. Cuban economists estimate that the economy contracted approximately 38% between
1989 and 1993. See, e.g., JUuo CARRANZA VALDES ET AL, CUBA: RESTRUCTURING THE
ECONOMY-A CONTRIBUTIONTOTHE DEBATE 9 (1996); Lic. Julio Carranza Vald s, Las Finanzas
ExternasylosLimitesdelCrecimiento,in LaEconomiaCubanaen 1996: Resultados, Problemas,
y Perspectivas (1996) (unpublished working papers, on file with the Center for the Study of the
Cuban Economy, Havana, Cuba). Other estimates of the decline range as high as 50%. See, e.g.,
Jorge Pdrez-l6pez, The Cuban Economy in the Age of HemisphericIntegration,J. OF INTER-AM.
STUD. & WoRL AF., Fall 1997, at 3,5-6.
148. See Lilia Ndfiez Moreno, Mds Ald del Cuentopropismo en Cuba, TEMAS, July-Sept.
1997, at 41, 41.
149. See Decreto-Ley No. 142, 20 de Septiembre de 1993.
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the cooperative. UBPCs are intended to be self-managed cooperatives on
the model of CPAs, which had consistently outperformed state farms in
terms of efficiency and productivity.' s UBPC workers own the produce of
their farms. Although they are required to sell specified quantities of
enumerated goods to the state, they are allowed to sell excess production
in farmers markets, which have been reopened as a result of the crisis."'
By 1996, virtually all of the state farms were converted into UBPCs, with
varying levels of economic success." 2 Thus, the direct role of the state in
Cuban agricultural production has been significantly reduced.5 3 In addition
to the UBPCs, the state has granted state-owned land for cultivation by
private tobacco producers5 4 and has granted usufructs in small,
underutilized plots to private farmers.'
b. Reforms of Commercial/Industrial Property
Post-1989 reforms have also affected Cuba's system of commercial
and industrial property. Most of the reforms have been targeted at foreign
investors, as the government has sought to replace Soviet assistance with
direct foreign investment. Some reforms, however, have been focused on
Cubans themselves.
The largest changes in Cuba's commercial and industrial property
have been undertaken with the goal of attracting direct foreign investment
in the Cuban economy. Although joint ventures have been allowed in Cuba
since 1982, very few existed prior to the crisis. 5 6 Since the advent of the

150. See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
151. See CARRANTZA VALDtS ET AL., supra note 147, at 22-23. Farmers' markets, in which
farmers can sell excess produce at market prices, have had a checkered history in Cuba. They were
opened in the early 1980s, only to be shut in the late 1980s as part of the "Rectification" process.
See Susan Eckstein, The Rectificationof Errorsor the Errorsofthe RectificationProcessin Cuba,
20 CUBAN STUD. 67,69-70 (1990). As a result of the economic crisis of the 1990s, however, they
have been allowed to reopen. See Decreto No. 191, 19 de Septiembre de 1994.
152. Most UBPCs operated at significant losses through 1998, and many farmers complained
about continued interference in the management of UBPCs by administrative agencies. See Dr.
Benjamfn Gonzdlez Jorddn, La Agricultura Cubana: Un Balance Critico, ECONOMIA Y
DESARROLLO, Dec. 1995, at 81,91; Pollitt, supranote 112, at 202; Msc. OMAREVERLENY PtREZ
VRIANUEVA, CUBA: LA EvOLUcI6N ECONOMICA RECmNTE 13 (1998) (study undertaken by the
Center for the Study of the Cuban Economy, Havana, Cuba, on file with the author).
153. Nevertheless, as the only real customer, the state remains the most important actor in the
performance of Cuban agriculture. See Santiago Rodriguez Castell6n, UBPC: Una Innovaci6n en
la Agricultura Estatal (1998) (study undertaken by the Center for the Study of the Cuban Economy,
Havana, Cuba, on file with author, describing the state as the main purchaser of UBPC production).
154. See CARRANzA VALDs ET AL, supra note 147, at 10.
155. See Resoluci6n No. 356/93, 28 de Septiembre de 1993 (Ministeriode Agricultura).
156. See Marfa Dolores Espino, Tourism in Cuba:A Development Strategyfor the 1990s?,
in CUBA AT A CROSSROADS: POLincs AND EcONOMICs AFrERTHE FOURTH PARTY CONGRESS 148,
154 (Jorge F. Pdrez-L6pez ed., 1994).
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crisis, however, the government has undertaken a variety of legal reforms
to attract foreign capital, particularly in the tourist industry, mining,
biotechnology, and for import substitution (for example, petroleum). It
amended the 1976 Constitution to provide greater protections for private
property; 157 expanded the 1982 foreign investment law to allow majority
(and even exclusive) foreign ownership in joint ventures; 158 provided
attractive tax incentives to foreign investors, 59 and created a series of freetrade zones covered by less burdensome tax and customs standards.16" As
a result, direct foreign investment in Cuba increased from a negligible
amount before the crisis to around two-billion U.S. dollars in 1995.61
With respect to Cubans, the government has made two crucial
changes. First, it has decriminalized the possession of U.S. dollars. 62 At
the same time, it has opened up various stores that operate only in hard
currency. Cubans tend to use these stores to purchase the necessities that
cannot be acquired through rations or purchased with pesos.1 63 The
dollarization of the economy has created striking inequalities between
Cubans who have access to dollars, approximately half the population, and
Cubans who do not.164
The second important reform aimed at Cubans has been the widening
of opportunities for self-employment. 165 Since 1993, the categories of work

157. See Jorge F. Pdrez-L6pez, Islandsof Capitalismin an Ocean ofSocialism:JointVentures
in Cuba'sDevelopment Strategy, in CUBA ATA CROSSROADS, supranote 156, at 190, 192-94. The
Constitution was amended to include recognition of the property of joint ventures, see
CoNsTrrucI6N DE LA REPtBucA DE CUBA, art. 23, to acknowledge that only the "fundamental"
means of production are to be maintained under socialist ownership, see id. art. 14, to allow for
transfer of state property to the private sector, see id. art. 15, and to soften the provision of the 1976
Constitution giving the state a monopoly on foreign commerce. See id. art. 18.
158. See Espino, supra note 156, at 146. Since 1995, the Cuban government has allowed
100% foreign ownership of enterprises within Cuba. See CARRANZA VALDIAS Er AL., supra note
147, at 16.
159. The average tax burden on foreign earnings in Cuba is around 10.7%. See Oscar U.
Eschevarria Vellejo, Regulaci6n, Plan y Mercado: El Caso de Cuba, CUBA: INVESTIGACI6N
ECONOMicA, July-Sept. 1996, at 55, 65.
160. See Ley No. 77, 5 de Septiembre de 1995, art. 50 (authorizing the creation of free trade
zones and industrial parks).
161. See CARRANZAVALDtS ETAL, supranote 147, at 12. This growth, while impressive, is
still insufficient to make up for the decline in Soviet aid. See id.
162. See Decreto Ley No. 140, 13 de Agosto de 1993.
163. See Hiram Marquetti Nodarse, La Economfa deID61ar:Balancey Perspectivas,TEMAS,
July-Sept. 1997, at 51,54. Most visits to dollar stores result in total purchases of less than $10. See
id. Dollar stores operate at extremely high margins and are thus enormously profitable to the state,
rivaling tourism as a source of income. See id.
164. See id. at 53; Angela Ferriol Muruga, Politica Social Cubana: Situaci6n y
Transformaciones,TEMAS, July-Sept. 1997, at 88, 90. The recent Cuban film, Guantanamera,
provides a strikingly realistic, albeit comical, look at life in the dual Cuban economy.
165. See DecretoLey No. 141, 8 de Septiembre de 1993.
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open to self-employment have been steadily expanded, standing in 1996 at
157 different activities.' 66 Self-employed Cubans may also take advantage
of new open markets for artisanal goods in order to sell their products
directly to customers. 67
University-educated professionals, who were previously not allowed
to engage in self-employment, are now allowed to do so, although they
may not work on their own behalf in the area of their professional
training.168 Thus, ironically, an engineer or doctor may undertake selfemployment-and earn substantially more-as a seamstress or a taxi
driver, but not as an engineer or doctor. Those engaging in selfemployment are required to pay a high monthly licensing fee as well as
income tax on their earnings. 169 Self-employment has grown rapidly over
the past several years, from 1% of the workforce in 1988 to over 7% in
1995.170

c. Residential Property
While the post-1989 crisis has sparked a limited opening in the
regulation of commercial and industrial property in Cuba, reforms in the
residential property system have been more limited. The government has
made moves to allow foreigners to purchase residential property within
Cuba. For example, apartments have been constructed in the Miramar
neighborhood of Havana for exclusive sale to foreigners (who are then
allowed to resell the property to other foreigners).
With respect to Cubans, however, the government has moved to
increase restrictions on the use of private residential property. For
example, the rental of private rooms has been made more difficult than it
was prior to the crisis. 171 The sale of houses by Cubans is still largely
nonexistent, and permutas are governed
by detailed regulations intended
72
to prevent exchanges for profit.

166. See Resolucidn Conjunta No. 1-96, 18 de Abril de 1996 (Ministerio de Trabajo y
Seguridad Social-Ministerio de Finanzas y Precios). Joint Resolution 1-96 allows selfemployment in such diverse activities as animal grooming, tire repair, sale of used records, driving
instruction, and the sale of food and beverages. See id.
167. See Decreto No. 192, 21 de Octubre de 1994.
168. See Resoluci6n Conjunta No. 1-96, 18 de Abril de 1996 (Ministerio de Trabajo y
SeguridadSocial-Ministeriode F'.anza y Precios).
169. See id.
170. See Nifiez Moreno, supra note 148, at 45. The actual number could be as high as 25%,
as some studies have indicated that for every licensed self-employed worker there are approximately

3.5 unlicensed workers. See id. at 46.
171. See, e.g., DecretoLey No. 171,15 de Mayo de 1997 (requiring property-owners who wish
to rent rooms to register with a local housing authority and prohibiting those who rent rooms from
engaging in other forms of self-employment).
172. See, e.g., Resoluci6n No. 381, 25 de Septiembre de 1989 (Instituto Nacional de la
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G. Conclusion
In order to facilitate the evaluation of the Cuban Revolution's property
reforms, this Article will simplify the foregoing history in the following
way. It will divide the parties affected by the reforms into three groups: (1)
Cubans who remained in Cuba and whose property was affected by the
series of nationalizations and redistributions undertaken by the Cuban
government; (2) Cubans who left Cuba and therefore lost all the property
they could not take with them, under Law 989; and (3) United States
enterprises that lost property as a result of interventions, redistributions and
retaliatory nationalizations. After the discussion of international law and
property theory in the next Part, this Article will evaluate, from the
perspective of international law, the reforms undertaken by the Cuban
government with respect to each of these three groups.

III. EVALUATNG THE CUBAN REVOLUTION'S
PROPERTY REFORMS

A. Introduction:Two Models
When considering a government's actions under international law, one
may draw upon two different models, or paradigms, of international
legality: the classical international law model and the human rights
model.173 The two models are related to each other through a common
language of international norms and are often employed by the same
international bodies. Nevertheless, they are conceptually distinct.174
First, according to its classical understanding, international law is not

Vivienda) (requiring parties seeking to exchange houses to apply for permission to a local housing
authority, which has the right to refuse permission if it suspects that the exchange is motivated by
a desire for profit).
173. It should be acknowledged at the outset that the portrayal of these perspectives is
admittedly simplified and stylized in the interests of ease of discussion. Moreover, these two models
are not intended to be exclusive. Other means of assessment of actions within the international
sphere are certainly possible. Further, it is possible to identify positions that straddle the two
models, as would, for example, someone committed to a positivist notion of human rights. Indeed,
scholars sometimes seem to switch back and forth between the two models as they change topics.
They embrace a notion of human rights that is clearly prescriptive and then shift to positivistic
discussions of the source of international law as if these two positions fit together quite nicely. For
a discussion of the problems with such alternating positions, see infra notes 347-59 and
accompanying text.
174. See, e.g., HENRYJ.STEINERETAL,TRANSNAIoNALLEGALPROBLEmS 337(4th ed. 1994)
(discussing how international law concerning property has followed a different path from
international human rights law, because it is lodged within the distinct paradigm of classical
international law).
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concerned with individuals per se, but rather with the nation state. 175 The
idea of the sovereign state stands at its heart, 176 with individual persons
only part of the equation, to the extent that wrongs against them are
perceived to represent slights against the states of which they are
citizens. 177 Although the twentieth century has seen a move towards greater
concern for individuals in international law, the idea of states as the
7
primary agents and subjects of international law remains vital. 1
Under the human rights model, on the other hand, international law is
concerned fundamentally with the treatment of individuals by states. 179 The
human rights model sees the individual as the primary entity of importance
and subjects the state's freedom of action to a set of minimum standards
in its treatment of persons. 8 Under this view, a state's violation of an
individual's rights is an illegal act perpetrated against that individual, not
just against that individual's home state.181 The human rights model thus
reverses the priorities of classical international law, subjugating the notion
of state sovereignty to that of individual rights.
Second, classical international law has not tended to take cognizance
of how a state treats its own citizens. Such issues have traditionally been
seen as falling within the domestic domain, inside of which sovereign
states had a virtually plenary right to non-interference.' Instead, classical
international law has focused on issues involving more than one state or
the treatment of nationals of one state by another. In contrast, human
rights law is precisely concerned with how a state treats its own citizens

175. See The Lotus Case (France v. Turkey), P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 10 (1927), 18; RICHARD B.
LILucH, THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF AuENS IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1984).
176. Cf. MYRES S. MCDOUGAL ET At., STUDIES IN WORLD PUBUC ORDER 363 (1960)

(observing that the notion that international law concerns states and not individuals is a product of
nineteenth-century positivism).
177. See ANTHONYD'AMATO,INTERNATIONALLAW: PROCESS AND PROSPECT 194-95 (1987);

FRANCK, supranote 3, at 458-59. This notion that"whoever uses a citizen ill, indirectly offends the
State, which is bound to protect this citizen," goes back to Emmerich de Vattel, an eighteenth
century theorist of international law, and is known as the Vattel principle. EMMERICH DE VATrEL,
THE LAW OF NATIONS 161 (1833), quoted in LIWLCH, supra note 175, at 9.

178. The Vattel principle has been reaffirmed in the 20th century by the Permanent Court of
International Justice. See id. at 13.
179. See, e.g., JACKDONNELLY, UNIVERSALHUMAN RIGHTS INTHEORY AND PRACTICE 69-70

(1989) (arguing that the notion of human rights requires a certain view of the relationship between
the individual and the state in which the rights of individuals are morally prior to and superior to
society and the state); LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OFRIGHTS 5 (1990) (describing human rights as the

rights of the individual, not the rights of the collectivity or community, or, presumably, the state).
180. See DONNELLY, supra note 179, at 69.
181. See FRANCK, supra note 3, at 458.
182. See FERNANDO R. TES6N, HUMANrIARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND
MORALrY 3 (1988).
183. See STEINER ET AL supra note 174, at 348.
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within its own borders.' 84 It seeks to establish universal minimum
standards for the treatment of any individual by any state.' 85
Finally, classical international law has tended to favor a purely
positivistic approach to the determination of what constitutes law: 86 the
international law is what it is, and there is little room to ask what it should
be. The content of the international law may be discerned by a careful
study of commonly accepted indicia, often defined as the factors listed in
Article Thirty-eight of the statute of the International Court of Justice: (a)
international conventions; (b) international custom; (c) general principles
of law recognized by civilized nations; and (d) judicial decisions and the
this last
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists (although
187
category is considered to be a "subsidiary" source of law).
Human rights law, on the other hand, is often expressed in the moral
language of universal rights, rather than the backward-looking "sources"
of classical international law.188 Thus, for example, the Universal
Declarationof Human Rights locates the sources of the rights it declares
in the "inherent dignity" of the human person, rather than in the indicia
outlined in Section 38.189 Similarly, the preamble of the 1948 American
Declarationof the Rights and Duties of Man asserts that "[a]ll men are
born free and equal, in dignity and in rights."'90 These founding documents
of human rights law describe human rights as inherent and universal. ' 9'
The human rights model does not seek merely to restate what is
already the customary standard of behavior among nations, but rather to
exhort or even force nations to abide by a standard of conduct dictated by
a deeply moral vision of what the customary standard of nations should
become. Donnelly, for example, describes human rights as less about how
human beings actually behave and more about "how people might live."'"
184. See, e.g., Filartigav. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876,881 (2d Cir. 1980) ("[I]n this modem age

a state's treatment of its own citizens is a matter of international concern.").
185. See HENKIN,supra note 179, at 27,52.
186. See STEiNERETAL, supra note 174, at 316.
187. See id. at 232. The last category admittedly moves beyond mere description and leaves

some room for law-creation.
188: See generallyMICHAELJ. PERRY, THE IDEA OFHUMAN RIGHTS: FOUR INQummS (1998)

(arguing that human rights talk is inherently moral and religious).
189. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. Doe. A/810, at 71
Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
(1948); c.f
Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 23 (Advisory Opinion, May 29, 1951).
190. American Declarationof the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX, O.A.S. Off.
Rec. OEA/Ser LV/I.4 Rev. (1965), reprintedin BASIC DOCUMENTS ININTERNATIONALLAWAND
WORLD ORDER 293 (Bums H. Weston et al. eds., 1980).
191. See, e.g., InternationalCovenant on CivilandPoliticalRights, art. 6,10, G.A. Res. 2200,
U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967), reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967)
(describing the right to life as "inherent" and asserting an "inherent dignity of the human person").
192. DONNELLY, supra note 179, at 18. Donnelly speaks of human rights as a"social project"
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Thus, rather than a retrospective approach appropriate to positivism,
human rights law is often blatantly prospective and ethical in orientation.
Proponents of human rights sometimes try to present human rights law
as conforming to the positivistic model of classical international law (for
example, by pointing to widespread international acceptance of human
rights, at least in word, as the basis for international obligation to respect
human rights). Attempts to do so, however, are often fraught with
contradictions. It is clear that human rights norms did not appear in the
traditional sources of international law until after the Second World War.'93
Thus, they have a dubious pedigree according to the positivistic
methodology of customary international law. 194 Moreover, to the limited
extent that human rights norms are supported within the sources,
positivists may only rely on such sources as evidence of broad acceptance
of human rights by ignoring the reality of widespread human rights
violations in actual state practice. 95
To say that human rights only create obligation insofar as they are
supported in the traditional source material is to misunderstand the very
notion of human rights. By definition, these rights are inherent in a
person's very humanity and universal in the scope of obligation they
create. Michael Perry says "the idea of human rights... [is based on the
notion that] every human being is sacred."' 96 Perry goes on to observe that,
because every human being is sacred, the notion of human rights involves
the belief that "certain choices should be made and certain other choices
rejected, in particular, certain things ought not to be done to any human
being and certain other things ought to be done for every human being." '9 7
Perry thus outlines two essential features of human rights: (1) their
inherence in humanity as such and (2) their resultant universality. A human
right that inheres in a person only as a result of some body of positive
international law or that inheres in only some human beings but not others
and correctly observes that "[tihe Universal Declaration of Human Rights tells us little about what
life is like in most countries." Id. Thus, he concludes that human rights represent "a utopian ideal
and a realistic practice for implementing that ideal." Id. at 19.
193. See TEs6N, supranote 182, at 155 (citing I OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONALLAW 640-41,
736-38 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955)).
194. See Martii Koskenniemi, The Pull of the Mainstream, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1946, 1948
(1990) (noting that there is little actual support for the notion of human rights as customary
international law).
195. See D'AMATO, supra note 177, at 90 (noting that some scholars have accused human
rights advocates of over-stating the status of human rights law within international law); HENKiN,
supra note 179, at 29, 32 (discussing human rights law's attempts to clothe itself in the legitimacy
of positive law, but recognizing that gross human rights violations are still widespread); see also
STEINER ET AL, supra note 174, at 341-42 (observing that the modern human rights movement
claims to be based on consensus and consent).
196. PERRY, supra note 188, at 29.

197. Id.
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is not a human right at all.
In some instances, commentators have drawn upon the notion of /us
cogens in a similarly ill-conceived attempt to bypass the obvious problems
of trying to root human rights in the traditional sources of international
law. Ius cogens, often translated as "peremptory norms," have been defined
as non-derogable principles of international law that may only be modified
by new peremptory norms. 98 There is a close connection between ius
cogens and human rights law. Both arose in the wake of the horror of the
Second World War,19 9 and common examples of ius cogens include the
duty to respect human rights and the prohibition of genocide. 2°° By turning
to ius cogens, scholars have tried to imbue a positivistic notion of human
rights with the universality and relative immutability lacking in everyday
rules of international law. Unfortunately, advocates of the concept of ius
cogens have often sought to ground them in the traditional, positivist
methodology of the classical international law model.2"' As with human
rights, however, the attempt to derive ius cogens from custom flounders in
a sea of inconsistencies.2t 2
To summarize, it is possible to distinguish in international law
between two models or paradigms. First, there is the classical international
law model. In this model, the primary subject is the state. The classical
model is concerned solely with "international" questions, which it defines
as questions involving more than one state or a state and the citizens of
another state (which amounts to the same thing, according to the Vattel
principle). Finally, this model is positivistic in its orientation, eschewing
questions of what the law should be, and focusing instead on what,
according to a certain set of criteria, the law actually is.20 3

198. See Vienna Conventionon the Law of Treaties,art.53, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, at 289
RESTATEMENT ('MiRD) OFFOREIGNRELATIONS § 102, cmt.

(1969) reprintedin 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969);
k (1987).

199. See Andreas Zimmermann, Sovereign Immunity and Violations of InternationalJus
Cogens-Some CriticalRemarks, 16 MICH. J. INT'LL. 433,437 (1995).
200. See LAURI HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY NORMS (JUS COGENS) IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

317 (1988).
201. See id. at 12 (arguing that content of peremptory norms is determined according to the
same source-methods as other rules of positive international law).
202. There appears to be an implicit contradiction in the desire of ius cogens advocates to
imbue ius cogens with the immutability and moral force of principles ofnatural law while deriving
the content of is cogens from the traditional sources of the classical international law model. The
crucial problem is in justifying how norms that evolve from nothing more than custom can
themselves "trump" subsequent developments within that custom such that they block the creation
of new international rules. See Prosper Weil, Towards RelativeNormativity in InternationalLaw?,
77 AM. J. INT'LL. 413,421-23 (1983). As Weil observes, it is difficult to justify such a hierarchy
of levels within international law without averring to higher moral principles, like the natural law.
See id.
203. Of course, such positivism often masks significant uncertainty as to how to apply the
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Second, there is the human rights model. This model differs from that
of the classical international law in conceiving of the individual as the
primary subject of international norms. Further, because the rights of
concern to the human rights lawyer are thought to be universal in nature,
the human rights model does not distinguish between a state's treatment of
nationals and foreigners. That is, the human rights model ventures into
areas that would, under the classical international law model, be considered
subject to domestic law alone. Thus the human rights model redefines the
area of interest to international law as including a state's treatment of its
own citizens. Finally, although the human rights model makes frequent
gestures in the direction of positivism, it cannot help but to be
fundamentally moral in its orientation. It has a clear vision of what
international standards should be, and wishes to bring those standards into
reality, regardless of what the prevailing practices among states actually
are.
B. ClassicalInternationalLaw Treatment of
the Expropriationof Property
Human rights law has tended to neglect issues of property rights;
human rights related to economicjustice have been labeled the "stepchild"
of the human rights movement.2" Thus, the issues of concern to this
Article (i.e., thejustice of revolutionary property reform) have traditionally
been left to the norms associated with classical international law. A more
focused exploration of that model's approach to the protection of property
is therefore the concern of this Part.
There is widespread agreement that sovereign states have the right to
expropriate property within their borders, 5 but such expropriations are
limited within international law by certain principles regarding how they
can be carried out. First, it is generally agreed that expropriations must be
for some public purpose. 6 This "public purpose" requirement is not very
demanding and states have substantial leeway in determining what it

criteria for determining what the law is. For an example of such confusion, see the discussion below
on the state of the international law concerning compensation for the expropriation of alien-owned
property.
204. See STEINER ET AL, supra note 174, at 337, 361.
205. See ADEoYEA. AKINSANYA, THE EXPROPRIATION OFMULTINATIONALPROPERTY INTHE
THIRD WORLD 17 (1980). In the United States, for example, the right of the state to expropriate is
implicit in the Federal Constitution in the language of the Takings Clause, which presumes that the

state may take property from its citizens by eminent domain. See U.S. CONST., amend. V ("[Nior
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.").
206. See, e.g., AKINSANYA, supra note 205, at 19-20; Robert E. Freer, Jr., Expropriation:
United States Claimant'sRights and the Future of Cuba, 4 U. MIAMI Y.B. INT'L L. 169, 169

(1995).
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requires. 2° 7 Second, expropriations are to be carried out in a
nondiscriminatory fashion. That is, the expropriating state should not
discriminate against property held by citizens of a particular state.0 8 This
does not appear to mean that states may not discriminate against aliens as
a group, but only that they may not discriminate against particular
nationalities within the larger subset of aliens .2' Finally, it has traditionally
been said that expropriations must be accompanied by compensation for
the property taken. Of the three requirements, it is the third that has
aroused the greatest controversy, both among states themselves and among
international law scholars.210
The various positions on the appropriate standard of compensation for
expropriation of alien-owned property can be placed into three broad
categories. First, there are those who believe that the appropriate standard
is the classic formula of "prompt, adequate, and effective"
compensation.211 Second, many believe that states need only treat aliens the
same as nationals with regard to compensation for expropriated property.
This second position is often called the "national treatment" position.
Finally, some believe that there is a general duty to compensate, but that
the level of compensation required is somewhat flexible, varying with the
circumstances.
This last position will be called the "partial compensation"
212
standard.
1. Prompt, Adequate, and Effective
The view that expropriation of alien-owned property must be
accompanied by "prompt, adequate, and effective" compensation evolved
over the course of the nineteenth century213 in the context of an
international law system characterized by the exclusive intercourse of
colonial powers.214 Prior to the First World War, there was a consensus

207. See AKINsANYA, supra note 205, at 20, 202-03. In the United States, property
redistribution has been held by the Supreme Court to constitute a "public use" sufficient to satisfy
the requirements of the Takings Clause. See Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240
(1984). This conclusion is opposed by Richard Epstein, who considers land reform to run afoul of
the public use requirement. See RIcHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE

POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 181 (1985).
208. See AK1NSANYA, supranote 205, at 20-25, 203-04.
209. See id. at 204-03.
210. See id. at 25 (noting the discord that has been provoked by disagreement as to the
appropriate standard for compensation of alien-owned properties).
211. Throughout this Article, I will also refer to this standard as "full" compensation.
212. See Li Hao-p'ei, Nationalization and InternationalLaw, in JEROME A. COHEN &
HUNGDAHCHIU, PEOPLE'SCHINAANDINTERNATIONALLAW720 (1973) (quotedin STEINERETAL,

supra note 174, at 469).
213. See AKNSANYA, supra note 205, at 41.
214. See B.A. WORTLEY, EXPROPRIATION

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol52/iss1/3

IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 58

(1959)

34

Penalver: Redistributing Property: Natural Law, International Norms, and th
REDISTRIBUTING PROPERTY" CUBAN REVOLUTION

within this colonialist international law that the "prompt, adequate, and
effective" standard was the correct one.2" 5 This consensus began to
disappear, however, with the Russian and Mexican revolutions early in the
twentieth century.2 6 The breakdown became even deeper in the wake of
the decolonization of the Third World that followed the end of the Second
World War, as the dozens of new, predominantly capital-importing nations
began to challenge the traditional formulation. 1 7 Within the United States,
courts and commentators have questioned the claim to authoritative status
for the "prompt, adequate, and effective" standard. 2 8 In Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Sabbatino,2 9 the Supreme Court questioned the existence of an
international consensus in favor of full compensation.220 After surveying
the evidence, Rudolf Dolzer observed that "the conclusion is inescapable
that the existence of the... ["prompt, adequate, and effective" standard]
as a rule of present law is not sustained by the prevailing doctrinal
opinion."2 1 Although the existence of a world-wide consensus over the
standard is doubtful, "prompt, adequate, and effective" compensation
remains the hands-down favorite, for obvious reasons, of the United States
and the other capital-exporting nations of the First World.222

(describinghow, before theFirst World War, massiveamounts of capital flowed from Great Britain,
the United States, and the European continent, who could rely upon "vigorous diplomatic support
for their just demands for compensation for property seized," and who could "expect their
governments to make use, if need be, of such measures as embargo, or pacific blockade, or naval
demonstrations ...to obtain specific restitution").
215. See TS6N, supra note 182, at 157 ("During the height of European colonialism,
capitulatory regimes were the most remarkable but not the only evidence of a system which made
virtually inviolable the persons and property of Europeans and Americans abroad."); STEINER ET
AL, supranote 174, at 446 (arguing that prior to the First World War there was a consensus around
the prompt, adequate, and effective standard); Patrick M. Norton, A Law of the Future or a Law
of the Past?Modern Tribunalsand the InternationalLaw of Expropriation,85 AM.J.INT'LL. 474,
475-76 (1991).
216. See Rudolf Dolzer, New Foundationsof the Law of ExpropriationofAlien Property,75
AM. J. INT'LL. 553,558 (1981).
217. See WORTLEY, supra note 214, at 61-62; Norton, supra note 215, at 478.
218. See Oscar Schachter, Compensationfor Expropriation,78 AM. J. INT'L L. 121, 124
(1984) (quoting Wolfgang Friedmann, NationalCourtsandthe InternationalLegal Order,34 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 443, 454 (1966) (calling the claim to authoritative status for the Hull formula
"nothing short of absurd")).
219. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
220. See id. at 428-29 ("There are few if any issues in international law today on which
opinion seems to be so divided as the limitations on a state's power to expropriate the property of
aliens."). The Court went on to cite the practice of Soviet Bloc and formerly colonized nations as
evidence that many states refuse to submit to the full compensation standard. See id.
221. Dolzer, supra note 216, at 565.
222. See, e.g., BLASIER, supra note 70, at 81 (describing consistent U.S. support for the
"prompt, adequate, and effective" standard); STEINERETAL, supranote 174, at447 (describing the
position in favor of"extensive protection... of private property" as that of the "capital-exporting
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The "prompt, adequate, and effective" standard is rooted in an
ideology of international law that had much more currency in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries than it does today. It developed
during the height of colonialism, when international law was viewed as the
servant of the colonial European powers and the means by which they
maintained their positions of authority.223 Thus, it is unsurprising that the
standard caters to the self-interests of the nineteenth-century colonialists
and their desire to retain advantages achieved within the formerly
colonized world. Adeoye Akinsanya, a Nigerian political scientist,
concludes: "[1]t is small wonder why some scholars and international
lawyers have seen the traditional law.., as the legal garb that merely
served to 22protect
the imperialistic interest of the capital-exporting
4
countries."
Moreover, in the context of a nation emerging from foreign colonial
or neo-colonial domination, the idea that the state must pay full
compensation before it may reform its property system seems to
presuppose two things: first, that the institution of private property is in
some way ethically more fundamental than the state;2' and, second, that
justice demands that the state refrain from interfering with distributions of
property that result from the operations of the free market.1 6 It is
somewhat ironic that this radical laissez faire philosophy, known within
the United States as "substantive due process" and rejected as a
requirement of justice in the context of economic regulation by American
courts since the New Deal, continues to be forcefully endorsed by the
United States in the international sphere.227

countries").
223. See Benedict Kingsbury & Adam Roberts, Grotian Thought in InternationalRelations,
in HUGo GROTTS AND INTERNAnTONALRELAIONS 1,48-49 (Hedley Bull et al. eds., 1990) (noting
that in the 18th and 19th centuries international law was seen as the exclusive purview of the
European powers and the United States); see also STEINER ET AL, supra note 174, at 315-16
(discussing the development of classical international law and its relationship to the viewpoint and

interests of colonial powers).
224. AKINSANYA, supra note 205, at 212.

225. See, e.g., WORTLEY, supra note 214, at 14 (endorsing the idea that property is ethically
more fundamental than the state).
226. If the state must compensate full value for property taken as part of a redistribution
scheme, it is obvious that the state is severely constrained in its attempts to redistribute overall
wealth. This standard does allow the state to alter the distribution of specificforms of property, such
as land.
227. See, e.g., Nicchiav. New York, 254 U.S. 228,231 (1920) (describing alaw that involves
the "taking of one man's property and giving it to another" as the paradigm of due process
violation); Pacific Live Stock Co. v. Lewis, 241 U.S. 440,455 (1916) ("make from one and give
to another is ...offensive to a right conception of due process."); Ochoa v. Hernandez y Morales,
230 U.S. 139, 160 (1913) ("Whatever else may be uncertain about the definition of the term 'due
process of law,' all authorities agree that it inhibits the taking of one man's property and giving it
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Like "substantive due process," the "prompt, adequate, and effective"
standard is politically conservative, rendering a state virtually incapable of
restructuring society. Countries emerging from a position of colonial
domination or rule by a corrupt regime often found that their economic
infrastructure had been sold off to foreigners. Acceptance of the "prompt,
adequate, and effective" standard would have made it impossible for such
post-colonial governments or governments replacing corrupt regimes to
undertake the reforms needed to reverse the policies of their predecessors.
Put another way, the "prompt, adequate, and effective" standard denied the
possibility of revolutionary social change for states in which a large
proportion of productive property was foreign-owned.
2. National Treatment
Over the course of the twentieth century, the "prompt, adequate, and
effective" standard came under increasing fire from both scholars and
developing nations. Many developing nations have advocated the
viewpoint that international law only requires that an expropriating state
provide the same compensation for the expropriation of alien-owned
property that it provides for the expropriation of property owned by its
nationals.22 This "national treatment" position was eloquently advocated
in the nineteenth century by Argentine theorist Carlos Calvo and has come
to be known as the Calvo Doctrine.229 So popular is this position among
Latin American states that statements of the doctrine have been
incorporated into numerous constitutions in the region.23 °
The national treatment position involves the interplay of two
principles: the noninterference principle and the equal treatment

to another.... ."); St. Louis, Iron Mt. & S. Ry. v. Wynne, 224 U.S. 354, 360 (1912) (stating that
a law violates due process when "it takes property from one and gives itto another"); see also, e.g.,
Carolene Prod. Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 18, 31 (1944) (applying the post-New Deal version
of due process analysis); cf.CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIALCONSTrrUTION40-41 (1993) (noting
that under the pre-New Deal understanding, the government violated its duty to neutrality if it

sought to alter existing distributions of property). For a theory of U.S. foreign policy that seeks to
explain that continuing role played by the laissezfaire,see generally MCCORMIcK, supra note 70,

at 1-16.
228. For a brief history of the national treatment doctrine, see Richard B. Lillich, The Current
Status of the Law of State Responsibilityfor Injuriesto Aliens, in INTERNATIONAL LAW OF STATE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURiES TO ALENS I (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1983).
229. See DONALD R. SHEA, Ti CALVO CLAUSE: A PROBLEM OF INTER-AMERICAN AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DIPLOMACY 17-19 (1955).
230. See, e.g., CONSTrrUCI6N POLICA DE Los ESTADOS UNIDos MEXIcANOs, art. 27,
reprintedin THE CONSTrruTIONS OFTHE AMERICAS, supra note 62, at 498, 505 (requiring foreign
nationals to agree to be treated as Mexicans in order to be able to acquire property within Mexico);
SHEA, supra note 229, at 24 (discussing attempts by Latin American nations to impose the Calvo
Doctrine on foreign nationals by incorporating it into their constitutions).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2000

37

Florida Law Review, Vol. 52, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 3
FLORIDA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 52

principle.231 The noninterference principle is based on the presupposition
of the equality of nations and their right to noninterference at the hands of
colleague states.232 Calvo complained that
in more than one case it has been attempted to impose on
American states... [the rule that] foreigners merit regard and
privileges more marked out and extended than those accorded
even to the nationals of the country where they reside. This
principle is intrinsically contrary to the law of equality among
nations.... 233
The equal treatment principle states that foreigners are, under international
law, only entitled to be treated the same as a country's nationals. Calvo
argued that "the responsibility of governments towards foreigners cannot
be greater than that which these governments have towards their own
citizens." 2 4
Although the Calvo doctrine had its birth in Latin America, the idea
that foreigners are only entitled to national treatment resonated strongly
with former colonized peoples and became a popular position among
newly independent states after the Second World War.235 The doctrine has
been consistently rejected, however, by the capital-exporting states of
Europe and by the United States. 3 6 Capital exporters have instead clung
tightly to the standard they developed over the course of the nineteenth
century.
The differences in the positions of the two groups is exemplified
nicely in the 1938 dispute between Mexico and the United States over
expropriated property belonging to North Americans. After its 1910
231. See id. at 19.
232. See Lillich, supra note 228, at 4.
233. CARLOS CALVO, LE DRorrINTERNATIONALTHEORIQUEETPRATIQUE 140 (5th ed. 1896)

quoted in SHEA, supra note 229, at 18. Calvo's argument derives much of its power from the
specific context of neocolonial domination of Latin America in which it was written. The notion
that foreigners (meaning citizens of colonial powers) must be granted protections beyond those
given them in local law looks much more sinister when the norms granting them the additional
protections (as well as the very content of those protections) are defined exclusively by the same
colonial powers, as was the case at the time Calvo was writing. Such an imposition amounted to
nothing less than simple extraterritoriality. Within such a context, the practice of diplomatic
protection deeply offended the nationalist sentiments of Latin Americans. It may legitimately be
asked, however, whether Calvo's proposals focused on the correct target or whether, as Lillich
argues, they reflect a mistaken tendency to throw out the baby (minimum standards of conduct in
international relations) with the bathwater (colonial interventionist foreign policy). See Lillich,
supra note 228, at 3.
234. CALVO, supra note 233, at 138, quoted in SHEA, supra note 229, at 19.
235. Cf.Norton, supra note 215, at 478 (showing that newly independent states rejected law
which they did not help create in the 1950s and early 1960s).
236. See SHEA, supra note 229, at 20.
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revolution, Mexico began a long process of land redistribution and
industrial nationalization that brought it into direct conflict with the
property interests of U.S. citizens. Several agrarian properties owned by
U.S. citizens were expropriated, prompting Secretary of State Cordell Hull,
on July 21, 1938, to write a harshly-worded note to the Mexican
ambassador in Washington:
The taking of property without compensation is not
expropriation. It is confiscation. It is no less confiscation
because there may be an expressed intent to pay at some time
in the future.
If it were permissible for a government to take the private
property of the citizens of other countries and pay for it as and
when, in the judgment of that government, its economic
circumstances and its local legislation may perhaps permit,
the safeguards which the constitutions of most countries and
established international law have sought to provide would be
illusory. 3 7
The Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs responded with a note on
August 3, 1938, in which he argued that "there is in international law no
rule universally accepted in theory nor carried out in practice, which makes
obligatory the payment of immediate compensation nor even of deferred
compensation, for expropriations of a general and impersonal
character ...
,,23 Hull rejoined with what has become the classic
formulation of the full compensation position: "[U]nder every rule of law
and equity, no government is entitled to expropriate private property, for
whatever purpose, without provision for prompt, adequate, and effective
payment therefor." 9
Since the Second World War, developing countries have sought to
embody the national treatment principle in a series of United Nations
resolutions. On several occasions, overwhelming majorities in the U.N.
General Assembly have passed resolutions endorsing what amounts to a
national treatment standard for compensation of alien-owned properties.
Resolution 3171, passed in 1973, "implies that each State is entitled to
determine the amount of possible compensation and mode of payment" for

237. Letter from Cordell Hull, U.S. Secretary of State to Mexican Ambassador in Washington
(July 21, 1938), reprinted in GREEN HAYWOOD HACKWORTH, 3 DIGEST OFINTERNATIONALLAW

656 (1942).
238. Letter from the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs to U.S. Secretary of State Cordell
Hull (Aug. 3, 1938), reprintedin HAcKWORTH, supra note 237, at 657.
239. Letter from Cordell Hull, U.S. Secretary of State to Mexican Ambassador in Washington
(Aug. 22, 1938), reprintedin HACKWORTH, supra note 237, at 658-59.
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expropriated property!m In 1974, the General Assembly passed Resolution
3281, also known as the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States
(CERDS). Article 2(2)(c) of CERDS endorses the national treatment
doctrine as the international standard for compensation for expropriated
alien-owned property.41 Unsurprisingly, however, these resolutions have
failed to gain support among capital-exporting nations. CERDS, for
example, passed by a vote of 120 to 6, with 10 abstentions. 2 The
abstentions and negative votes were largely from the United States,
Western Europe and industrialized countries. u3
Just as the "prompt, adequate, and effective" standard is based upon
an ideology of colonialism and the laissezfaire, the national treatment
standard has its own ideological underpinnings. First, national treatment
is very much at home in the heightened nationalism produced by the
humiliations of colonial "gunboat diplomacy" and interventionism. 2'
Further, the national treatment doctrine reflects a more limited
understanding of property rights, one in which property ownership is
susceptible to modification by the state, in which simple wealth
redistribution is unproblematic.
Of the two ideological bases for the national treatment doctrine, the
first is far more troubling. The heightened nationalism displayed in the
Calvo doctrine opposes any international interference in the domestic
operations of the state. Such a view is, however, completely antithetical to
any substantial notion of human rights. After all, without the ability to
intervene in the operations of a state to prevent or punish violations of

240. AKINSANYA, supra note 205, at 57-58 (discussing G.A. Res. 3171, U.N. GAOR, 28th
Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973), reprintedin 13 I.L.M. 238 (1974)).
241. See G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1974), reprintedin 14 I.L.M. 251, 255 (1975). Resolution 3281 declares that each state has the

right
tonationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign property, in which case
appropriate compensation should be paid by the State adopting such measures,
taking into account its relevant laws and regulations and all circumstances that the
State considers pertinent. In any case where the question of compensation gives
rise to a controversy, it shall be settled under the domestic law of the nationalizing
State and by its tribunals, unless it is freely and mutually agreed by all States
concerned that other peaceful means be sought on the basis of the sovereign
equality of States and in accordance with the principle of free choice of means.
Id.
242. See STEINER ET AL, supra note 174, at 488.
243. See id.
244. Cf. LIuiCH, supranote 175, at 14 (discussing how the classical international law position

was associated with military intervention, leading to the formulation of the national treatment
standard in response).
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human rights, there can be no enforcement of international norms, however
they may be defined.' Perhaps for this reason, a more moderate position
has been developed that seeks to retain a limited view of property rights
without negating the notion of international law altogether.
3. Partial Compensation
The partial compensation position represents a compromise between
the extremes of "prompt, adequate, and effective" compensation and
national treatment. It admits the possibility of international minimum
standards that limit the freedom of action of sovereign states in their
expropriation of alien-owned property. It also acknowledges, however, the
freedom of states to engage in redistribution of property and wealth by
allowing less than full compensation to affected property-owners.2 46
Associated with the partial compensation position is the view that
systematic attempts to reform a distribution of property (for example, land
reform) should be treated differently from isolated instances of takings
(such as, the taking of land to build a highway).247 Some scholars have
seemed to argue for specific exceptions to the "prompt, adequate, and
effective" compensation requirement for nations that are seeking to undo
the effects of corrupt or colonial regimes.24 One Cuban scholar has
implied, for example, that the Cuban expropriations were a unique
event,
2 49
necessary to reverse the effects of the corrupt Batista regime.
The partial compensation position is not in complete opposition to the
principle of national treatment. National treatment can be conceived in one
of two ways: (1) a state is only required to treat foreigners the same way it
treats nationals and has no substantive international law constraints on its
actions whatsoever; or (2) a state is required to treat foreigners no better
than it treats its own nationals, but there are certain restrictions on its

245. See Lillich, supra note 228, at 5.
246. See, e.g., Schachter, supra note 218, at 122-23, 128-29.
247. See, e.g., I.N.A. Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 8 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 373 (1985)
(advocating a standard of "appropriate" compensation, with the "appropriate" compensation level
determined in part by the scale of the expropriation); Dolzer, supranote 216, at 576 (displaying a
sensitivity to the relevance of the size of an expropriation on the ability of an expropriating state
to pay full compensation).
248. See AKINSANYA, supra note 205, at 241-43 ("Ain argument can be advanced... [to]
reduce the compensation to a fraction of that demanded or even to zero, particularly for foreign

investments made in a colonial or semicolonial situation or concession rights acquired through
fraud, force, threat of force, or downright robbery."); see also Norton, supra note 215, at 478.
Norton observes that the law of compensation for expropriation earned the special dislike of newly
decolonized nations because "it purported to place strict limitations on how they could deal with
foreign investors in control, at the time of independence, of the many of the new states' natural
resources." Id.
249. See OLGA MIRANDA BRAVO, CUBA/USA: NACIONAUZACIONES Y BLOQUEO 87 (1996).
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freedom of action that act as a minimum standard for its behavior towards
both foreigners and nationals. This latter interpretation would allow a
person to hold both the national treatment standard and the partial
compensation standard simultaneously. Such a combination would amount
to the view that states are restricted by a set of minimum standards of
behavior that apply to their treatment of both nationals and foreigners
alike.250 Beyond this minimum standard, however, a state is not required
to treat foreigners any better than it treats its own citizens. 25 ' Thus, this
position combines a respect for state sovereignty with the belief in the
existence of system of international law restricting the freedom of
sovereign states to do whatever they please.
4. The Lack of Consensus on the
Correct International Standard
There is presently no international consensus, among either states or
scholars, as to the precise standard for compensation of alien-owned
property. The 1938 exchange of notes between the Mexican and U.S.
governments as well as the conflict between developed and developing
nations in the United Nations over the correct standard provide ample
evidence for the lack of unanimity behind either the "prompt, adequate,
and effective" or the national treatment standard. If the customary
international law from the nineteenth century is rejected by the great
majority of twentieth-century nations (representing most of the world's
population), as occurred in the U.N. General Assembly in the 1970s
resolutions, one can only wonder whose "custom" is referred to by those
who insist that "prompt, adequate, and effective" compensation remains
the "customary international law. ' z 2
Although developing and developed nations have differed over the
international law of compensation for expropriated alien-owned property,
the scholarly discussion has provided little relief from the conflict.
Scholars have proved unable to come to any agreement as to either the
state of the international law or even the methodology for determining
what the international law in this case is. This confusion derives in large

250. Human rights provide an example of such minimum standards in the present system of
international law.
251. This third position is the one recommended by the natural law approach to international
law endorsed in this Article. For a discussion of natural law, see infra Parts III.B.2 and M.B.3.
252. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875, 892 (2d Cir. 198 1)
(concluding that the standard for compensation under international law is "appropriate"
compensation); I.N.A. Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 8 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 373 (1985)
(arguing that the standard for compensation in international law is "appropriate" compensation);
cf.RESTATEMENT (THRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 712 cmt. c (1987) (acknowledging a lack of
consensus behind the "prompt, adequate, and effective" standard).
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part from the positivistic nature of modem international law. Positivistic
international law scholars claim to find "the law" in the "practice of
States," 3 but if there is no one practice on which all nations
unambiguously agree and no universally accepted methodology for
determining what the practice of states actually is, then such positivism is
bound to be inconclusive." a This is precisely what one observes in the case
of the international law of compensation for expropriated property.
Scholars argue over the significance of the various possible pieces of
evidence for determining customary international law of compensation.
They disagree, for example, as to the significance of the 1970s' United
Nations General Assembly resolutions. Some scholars argue that U.N.
resolutions should only be considered evidence of customary international
law in this area when they reflect a consensus of both capital-exporting and
capital-importing nations. 5 Under this conception, none of the 1970s
resolutions favoring the national treatment doctrine have any weight, no
matter how lopsided their support in the General Assembly, because they
were consistently opposed by capital-exporters. Other scholars have
argued, however, that the only cause for ignoring the 1970s resolutions is
a "dogmatic distortion" by scholars who oppose the content of the
resolutions.256
Scholars who oppose the traditional doctrine have also tried to draw
attention to the common practice of lump-sum settlements, among states
with disputes over compensation for expropriated property, as evidence of
a standard of compensation that is significantly less demanding than full
compensation. The United States and Mexico, for example, reached a
global settlement of their outstanding property disputes in 1941, under
which expropriated oil companies eventually received $24 million out of
their original claims for $500 million."z 7 According to a study conducted
by Richard Lillich and Bums Weston, 95% of claims for property are
settled through similar lump-sum agreements.2 8 Cuba has, for example,

253. Dolzer, supra note 216, at 555.
254. See id. at 556-57 (arguing fora clear rethinking of the methodology of international law).
Dolzer says: "mhe mechanical application of old doctrines of sources may lead today to distorted
answers, or to no answer at all, as to which norms govern a given situation." Id. at 557. Dworkin
converts this problem of ambiguity into a more general observation about the positivistic enterprise
as a whole. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 87,96-98 (1986). Positivistic interpretation, he
argues, must occur within an interpretive theory. See id.; see also TES6N, supra note 182, at 146
(applying Dworkin's jurisprudence to the context of international law).
255. See, e.g., Norton, supra note 215, at 478 (noting that there has not been a consensus in
the U.N. General assembly on the topic of compensation for expropriation of alien-owned property

since the 1960s).
256. Dolzer, supra note 216, at 563-64.
257. See BLASIER, supra note 70, at 86.
258. See RICHARD B. LunIcI & BURNS H. WESTON, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR
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settled property claims with a number of nations through the use of lumpsum arrangements. 219 Most of the time, lump-sum settlements call for less
than full compensation.2 ° On the other hand, the argument has also been
made that lump-sum settlements reflect largely political considerations,
rather than assessments by states of the law or of their legal obligations. 26'
Shunning the U.N. General Assembly resolutions and lump-sum
settlements, scholars who favor the traditional standard have instead
embraced arbitration decisions as the most important source for evidence
of customary international law in this area. Citing a string of decisions
favoring what they claim to be the equivalent of a "prompt, adequate, and
effective" standard of compensation,262 these scholars have argued that
such decisions amount to convincing evidence that the traditional standard
remains the predominant viewpoint of international tribunals.263 Of course,
there are many reasons for disregarding the arbitral decisions as well. In the
case of the Iran and Lybia tribunals, for example, the arbitrators were often
faced with bilateral investment-guarantee treaties that determined their
decisions .2 4 Further, the language of the opinions favoring "full"
LUMP-SUM AGREEMENTS PART I: THE COMMENTARY 43 (1975).
259. See BRAVO, supra note 249, at 69. Cuba has reached such agreements with France,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Spain. See id.
260. See Dolzer, supra note 216, at 560.
261. See id. at 559.
262. S~e, e.g., SEDCO, Inc. v. National Iranian Oil Co., 10Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 180 (1986)
(endorsing full compensation as the standard under international law); American Int'l Group, Inc.
v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 96 (1983) (holding that full compensation
was required without stating the basis for the holding); Norton, supra note 215, at 479-88
(discussing arbitral decisions dealing with the Lybian government's nationalizations of oil
properties in the early 1970s and the decisions of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, which was created
at the end of the hostage crisis).
263. See Norton, supra note 215, at 488 ("Every recent arbitral tribunal that has considered
the issue has affirmed that customary international law requires a state expropriating the property
of a foreign national to pay the full value of that property, measured, where possible, by the market
price."); see also Juan C. Consuegra-Barquin, Cuba'sResidentialPropertyOwnership Dilemma:
A HumanRightsIssueUnderInternationalLaw,46 RuTGERsL. REV. 873,886 (1994) (arguing that
currently "there is no doubt that the traditional compensation rule of 'fair, adequate, and effective'
compensation has regained broad acceptance" as evidenced by, in part, arbitral decisions like those
of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal).
264. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Case No. 39, Award No.
425-39-2 (Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib., June 29, 1989) ('The Tribunal has consistently held that the
applicable law for the purpose of determining the compensation owed by the Islamic Republic of
Iran... is the 1955 Treaty of Amity."); Amoco Int'l Fin. Corp. v. Islamic Republic ofIran, 15 IranU.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 189 (1987) (relying on the 1955 U.S.-Iran Treaty of Amity in order to justify
full compensation); Starrett Housing Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Case No. 24, Award No.
314-24-1 (Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib., Aug. 14, 1987) (justifying full compensation); Phelps Dodge Corp.
v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 10 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 121 (1986) (justifying full compensation);
Payne v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 12 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 3 (1986) (justifying full
compensation); Norton, supranote215, at 479-83 (stating that arbitrators emphasized the presence
SETLEMENT BY
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compensation rarely use the traditional language of the Hull formula, often
expressing themselves, instead, in terms of "appropriate" compensation.26
Finally, as Norton points out, the arbitrators from developing nations
usually dissented from the decisions in favor of "full" compensation. 2"
Thus one could also argue that the arbitral decisions reflect the same lack
of consensus about the standard of compensation as the U.N. resolutions
on the subject.267
Another indicia appealed to by scholars in favor of the traditional
standard of "prompt, adequate, and effective" compensation is the
proliferation of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) that call for full
compensation in the event of expropriation. These scholars have argued
that the increasing acceptance by developing nations of full compensation
as a term of such treaties indicates that the traditional standard has gained
adherence even among those nations that had previously opposed it.2 68
Again, however, others have argued that BITs do not reflect evidence of an
emerging consensus in favor of the "prompt, adequate, and effective"
standard. As Schachter points out, in order for BITs to count as evidence
of a growing belief that full compensation is required by international law,
the compensation provisions within BITs would have to be viewed by the
parties to the agreement as an "obligatory" component of the treaty.269 In

of written investment treaties in both the Iran and Lybian tribunals).
265. See Ebrahimi v. Islamic Republic ofIran, Case No. 44,46,47, Award No. 560-44/46/473 (Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib., Oct. 12, 1994) ("The Tribunal believes that, while international law
undoubtedly sets forth an obligation to provide compensation for property taken, international law
theory and practice do not support the conclusion that the 'prompt, adequate, and effective'
standard represents the prevailing standard of compensation."); I.N.A. Corp. v. Islamic Republic
of Iran, 8 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 373 (1985) (opinion ofJudge Lagergren) (endorsing the position
that an exception to full compensation is allowed in cases of large-scale nationalizations); Texas
Overseas Petroleum Co. v. Libyan Arab Republic, 53 I.L.R. 389 (1979) (applying an "appropriate"
compensation standard); see also Schachter, supranote 218, at 127-28 (noting the absence of the
Hull formula from the Texas Overseas PetroleumCo. case); cf.Libyan Am. Oil Co. v. Libyan Arab
Republic (1977), 20 INT'L LEG. MAT. 1, 86 (1982) (qndorsing "equitable" as the standard of
compensation, with "prompt, adequate, and effective" as a useful guide).
266. See, e.g., Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 10 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 121
(1986) (Hamid Bahrami dissenting); Norton, supranote 215, at483 (statingthat in most significant
decisions, Iranian arbitrators sided against the majority ruling).
267. See, e.g., I.N.A. Corp. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 8 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 373
(1985) (demonstrating disagreement among judges favoring full compensation in this case as to the
correct international standard for other cases of expropriation).
268. See, e.g., Consuegra-Barquin, supra note 263, at 883 (claiming that BITs represent state
practice in conflict with the U.N. resolutions); cf. Tali Levy, Note, NAFTA's Provision for
Compensation in the Event of Expropriation:A Reassessment of the "Prompt, Adequate, and
Effective" Standard,31 STAN. J. INT'LL. 423,424 (1995) (observing that in NAFTA, Mexico, a

long opponent of the Hull formula, has accepted the substance of the "prompt, adequate, and
effective" standard).
269. See Schachter, supra note 218, at 126.
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fact, he observes, the provisions are just as easily seen as contractual
concessions by the developing nations in order to help secure investment
from the developed countries.270 Thus, it could just as easily be argued that
the inclusion of compensation provisions within BITs counts as evidence
againstany consensus that the correct standard is "prompt, adequate, and
effective." After all, if there truly were consensus on this issue, why would
there be any need to spell out the standard in the agreement?
A consideration of the foregoing evidence leads ineluctablyto the
conclusion that there can be no non-arbitrary standard of compensation for
expropriation of alien-owned property drawing upon the positivistic
methodology of classical international law. The possible sources point in
too many different directions. Which sources one prefers over others will
almost certainly reflect which conclusion one wants to reach. The only
honest answer, therefore, is that there simply is no consensus on the
appropriate compensation requirement.271
5. A Reconceptualization of the Debate?
The interminable debate over the present standard for expropriation of
alien-owned property may rest on a mistake in the actual terms of the
debate. That is, it may be the tacit agreements, more than the obvious
disagreements, that have helped to perpetuate the inconclusive dispute over
"prompt, adequate, and effective," national treatment, and partial
compensation. Thus, an examination of the parameters within which the
debate has taken place might help to reformulate the rules of the game in
such a way as to facilitate a new, more fruitful approach.
Although scholars have disagreed as to their actual conclusions
regarding the proper standard for compensation for expropriation of alienowned property, they have agreed on a variety of crucial points. First, they
have all approached the problem with a positivistic methodology. That is,
they have agreed that the correct question to ask is what the law of
compensation actually is, and not what the law of compensation (given a
set of ethical premises) should be. They have poured over U.N. resolutions,
lump-sum settlements, arbitral decisions and BITs searching for a means

270. See id.
271. Tes6n argues that this problem can be solved by providing a justice-based hermeneutic
through which the ambiguous sources may be interpreted. See TES6N, supra note 182, at 146. This
position only makes sense, however, when there is broad agreement as to what are the relevant
sources. In the case of compensation for expropriation of alien-owned property, no such agreement
exists. Thus, even if different parties were to agree on an interpretive theory, they would be unable
to resolve their differences, because they would go about applying that theory to different "sources."
Indeed, this disagreement over sources appears to be ageneral weakness inTes6n's attempt to apply
Dworkin's jurisprudence to the international context: international lawyers simply do not agree
about the sources of international law to the same extent as domestic lawyers.
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of divining from all of that contradictory evidence some single consensus
that could serve as the basis for a conclusion regarding customary
international law.
Second, with few exceptions,272 they have all tended to accept the idea
that a country's expropriation of property from its own citizens does not
generally raise any issues under international law. Such actions are
implicitly considered to be matters of solely domestic interest. Instead,
scholars have focused exclusively on the issue of expropriation of alienowned property.
In other words, scholars have tended to treat the compensation for
expropriation issue under the rubric of the classical international law
model. That model was characterized by a focus on state actors, a lack of
concern for what a state does to its own citizens, and a positivistic
methodology. The latter two characteristics are undoubtedly present in
scholarly discussions of the compensation standard. And, because the
discussions are primarily concerned with how nations treat foreign
nationals, the first characteristic is present as well.273 An alternative to this
classical international law model exists, however, in the form of the human
rights model. Treating the expropriation issue under the human rights
model would provide a new set of solutions to the problem of the correct
standard of compensation.
Consuegra-Barquin has proposed that expropriation be treated as a
human rights issue,274 but his analysis fails to embrace fully what this
Article describes as the human rights model. In particular, he fails to move
beyond the positivistic methodology associated with the classical model.275
Thus, Consuegra-Barquin can be seen as straddling a middle position
between the classical model and the human rights model. He wants to be
able to apply the (nonexistent) international standards governing
expropriation to the nationals of the expropriating state, but he refuses (1)
to acknowledge the indeterminacy of that model and (2) to embrace the
moral discourse appropriate to the human rights model. As a result, even
if aperson were to embrace Consuegra-Barquin's approach, she would still
be left without any means of resolving the interminable debate described
in the prior Parts of this Article.
272. For one such exception, see Consuegra-Barquin, supra note 263, at 887-89.
273. This follows because a focus on the rights of only foreign nationals within states
corresponds with the view that it is their status as nationals of a different state that confers certain
rights upon the persons in question. If it were their status as a person that conferred the rights upon
them, then the distinction between foreigners and nationals would become meaningless and states
would be held to the same standard for the treatment of their own nationals as they were for the
treatment of aliens.
274. See Consuegra-Barquin, supra note 263, at 887-89.
275. See id. at 883 (listing the traditional positivistic sources for determining the content of

customary international law).
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Consuegra-Barquin is correct, however, in his observation that
property rights bear a close relationship to other human rights. Of course,
any attempt to demonstrate this will require an effort to outline a more
general theory of human rights. That is, however, the project of the next
Part. Nevertheless, even a superficial examination of the individual's
relationship to property reveals its connection to other human rights. Like
the freedom of religious worship and the freedom of expression, property
can easily be conceived as an essential feature in a person's attempts at
self-expression. Further, some control over certain external resources is
necessary in order to be able to enjoy any of the other, more commonly
recognized, human rights. After all, if a person cannot acquire food,
clothing and shelter, it would be extremely difficult to enjoy the freedom
of conscience. Thus, it is unsurprising that the 1948 Universal Declaration
of Human Rights stated, in Article 17, that everyone has the
right to own
276
property and to not be arbitrarily deprived of that property.
As Consuegra-Barquin observed, a human rights approach to the issue
of compensation for expropriation would effectively erase the strong
distinction currently drawn between expropriation of alien-owned and
national property within the context of international law. 2' This is not to
say that there could not arise cases where the two would be treated
differently. For example, if a law discriminated against foreign-owned
property in general, it might not violate international norms, as long as it
did not violate anyone's human rights. But the current tendency to
completely disregard a state's treatment of its own national's property,
within the international law context would be left behind.
Treating expropriation issues under the human rights model would
lead scholars away from a positivistic focus on what the customary
international law actually is and allow them to ask, as they have not
generally done, what the international standard should be. Such an
undertaking requires, first, the development of a theory of international law
and the role of human rights within that theory. Second, it requires the
formulation of a theory of property rights as human rights and an
exploration of the boundaries of those property-related human rights. Only
then will it be appropriate to evaluate how those property-related human
rights should be protected within the international arena. The next two
Parts therefore attempt to achieve these two goals. Part I1I.B describes a
natural law approach to international law. Part IlI.C then elaborates a
natural law theory of property rights as human rights and from that
elaboration seeks to establish an international standard for compensation
of expropriated property. Finally, the last Part takes the case study of the
276. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (11), U.N. Doc. A/810, at
71(1948).
277. See Consuegra-Barquin, supra note 263, at 889.
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Cuban revolution's property reforms to show how this standard can be
applied.
C. A NaturalLaw Approach to InternationalLaw
When searching for a comprehensive, ethically-grounded theory of
international law and human rights, one obvious place to begin is with the
natural law. After all, it was within the theory of natural law, as developed
by St. Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century and systematically
expanded by the Spanish scholastics of the sixteenth century, that the
modem notion of international law developed. 278 Although following the
Enlightenment's rejection of natural law methodology, international law
began to move away from its natural law roots,279 the concept of a law of
nations that provides universal minimum standards of conduct is most at
home in the moral universe of Thomistic thought.28 ' Further, the notion of
universal human rights is consonant with the Thomistic natural law
tradition. Indeed, as with modem international law as a whole, it is from
the milieu of natural law thought that the concept of human rights emerged
as well. 281 This Part will outline a natural law theory of international law
and human rights and then discuss why such a system is preferable to other
possible ethical bases and superior to the presently-dominant positivistic

278. See Myres S. McDougal et al., Theories About InternationalLaw: Prologue to a
ConfigurativeJurisprudence,8 VA.J. INT'LL. 188,215,227 (arguing that natural law has been the
most continuous influence on the development ofmodem international law). It is common to assign
credit for the development of the modem concept of international law to Hugo Grotius, who was
a Dutch lawyer in the natural law tradition during the 16th and 17th centuries. See, e.g., Hedley
Bull, The Importance of Grotiusin the Study of InternationalRelations, in HUGO GROTIUS AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 223, at 65, 71 (claiming that Grotius's work states the
classical paradigms of inter-state relations); David Kennedy, A New Stream of InternationalLaw
Scholarship,7 Wis. INT'L L. J. 1, 14-16 (1988) (discussing the tendency of modem historians of
international law to disvalue the thought of premodem scholars, like Francisco Suarez and
Francisco Vitoria, two 16th-century Spaniards). Grotius, however, is clearly writing in the tradition
of the 16th-century Spaniards, whose work he cites heavily. See Bull, supra,at 73 (describing
Grotius's work as following Suarez and Vitoria and pointing out that Grotius is rarely "strikingly
original"). The concepts of international law discussed in the work of Grotius werd clearly present
in the earlier Spanish thought. See BERNICE HAMILTON, POLITICAL THOUGHT IN SIXTEENTHCENTURY SPAIN 99 (1963) (discussing the views of the 16th-century Spanish Thomists on
international law).
279. See Bull, supranote 278, at 79 (describing the rise of positivism within international law
beginning in the eighteenth century).
280. This is not to say that international law outside of the context of natural law is incoherent.
It would be perfectly possible to base a system of international law on some other foundation (e.g.,
raw power). Nevertheless, as I will argue below, the notion of international law is best justified
within a system of natural law. See infra Part III.B.2.
281. See HENKIN, supranote 179, at 1 ("Individual rights as a political idea draws on natural
law and its offspring, natural rights.").
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approach.
1. An Overview of Natural Law Theory
a. Thomistic Natural Law
Before discussing the specifics of a natural law theory of international
law, it is important to provide an overview of the Thomistic theory of
natural law. Before the late seventeenth century, such an undertaking
would have been unnecessary, but, as Alasdair MacIntyre has shown,
modem philosophy is characterized by its rejection of the Aristotelian
teleology that underlies Thomistic natural law reasoning." 2 Moreover,
discussions of natural law within international law, indeed within legal
literature in general, rarely go beyond the construction of a superficial
straw man. Thus a brief description of Thomistic ethics is in order.
Fundamental to the theory of natural law is the notion that all human
beings have a telos, or end. This telos is a concept of human-beings-asthey-could-be if they realized their telos, which stands in marked
distinction to human-beings-as-they-happen-to-be.283 Aquinas argued that
the final telos of all human beings is happiness,28" which he says, consists
in the beatific vision of the divine essence.285 Clearly, such a theological
formulation would be an unacceptable basis for most international lawyers
in the world today, and if this were all St. Thomas had said on the matter,
his theory would provide very little to work with indeed. Fortunately,
however, his theory is far more flexible than this simple formulation of the
human telos implies, and it seems quite possible to structure it in such a
way as to be conceptually acceptable in the present, more secular age.
First, it is important to emphasize that while Aquinas views the
beatific vision as the form of perfect happiness, only attainable through
God's grace after death,286 he does admit the existence of an imperfect

282. See ALASDAIRMACINTYRE,AFrERVIRTUE52 (1981) [hereinafter VIRTuE]. Itis important
to recognize that the teleology necessary for Thomistic natural law is not Aristotle's biological
teleology, but rather a teleology of human ends: a notion of what it means for human beings to be
"good" that can guide our ethical reasoning. See id. at 183.
283. See id. at 50.
284. See ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Pt. I-LI, Q. 1, art. 8 (Fathers of the
English Dominican Province trans., Benziger Brothers, Inc. 1947).
285. See id. at Pt. I-II, Q. 3, art. 8 ("Final and perfect happiness can consist in nothing else
than the vision of the divine essence.").
286. Because of his belief that the true end of human beings is the beatific vision, Aquinas is

committed to the view that human beings cannot achieve their final end in this life, but must wait
until they die to encounter full happiness and perfection. See id. at Pt. I-II, Q. 5, art. 3 ("[I]t is
evident that none can attain true and perfect Happiness in this life."). This full happiness can only
be achieved through the grace of God and not by "man's natural power." See id. at Pt. I-II, Q. 5,
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version of this happiness that is attainable during our natural lifetimes and
through the exercise of our own rational capacities. 287 By focusing on this
latter, incomplete happiness, one avoids Aquinas's theological
assumptions. The fact that Aquinas considers earthly happiness to be
incomplete should not affect the analysis, because his basis for considering
it to be such is derived from his religiously-based belief in the afterlife. It
is only incomplete insofar as there is something additional which comes
later. Hence, although a nontheological understanding of the ultimate
human end would always be insufficient to Aquinas, this insufficiency
would be a relative one and does not imply that an ethic built up around a
nontheological world view would be incapable of adequately telling us
how we are to live.28 After all, Aquinas thought that the existence of God
was not self-evident,"s9 but he did believe the practical moral principles
needed to live a good life were available to all human beings, regardless of
their religious beliefs or culture. -9° Hence, to some extent, the two can be
separated without doing violence to either.291

art. 5.
287. See id. at Pt. I-l1, Q. 5, art. 3, art. 5.
288. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RAnONALrY? 193 (1988)

[hereinafter JUSTICE].
289. See JOHN FINNIs, NATURALLAW AND NATuRALRiGoHTs 48 (1980).

290. See, e.g., AQUINAS, supra note 284, at Pt. I-, Q. 94, art. 2 (arguing that the precepts of
natural law are self-evident to rational beings).
291. John Rawls has criticized Aquinas's teleological view of human beings as sharing one
end. See JOHNRAWLS, A7THEORYOFJUSTICE § 83, at 554 (1971). "Human goods are heterogeneous
because the aims of the self are heterogeneous," he says. Id. "Although to subordinate all our aims
to one end does not strictly speaking violate the principles of rational choice.... it still strikes us
as irrational, or more likely as mad. The self is disfigured and put in the service of one of its ends
for the sake of system." IMA sympathetic reading of Aquinas shows Rawls's criticism to be inapt,
however. The ultimate goal of (imperfect) human happiness is, for Aquinas, mediated by a series
of subsidiary goods that are necessary for the accomplishment of that goal. These subsidiary goods
are associated with his list of virtues. In order to be happy, a person must acquire the several goods
that correspond to the various virtues described in the Summa Theologica. Among these are the
cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, temperance, and fortitude. For an overview of Aquinas's
teachings on the virtues, see AQUINAS, supranote 284, at Pt. I-, Q. 55-67. Thus, although Aquinas
only recognizes one ultimate telos for human beings, he does acknowledge the existence of a
diversity of subsidiary goods, which all human beings should aspire to attain.
Rawls implies that these subsidiary goods are only "permitted" by Aquinas so long as their
pursuit does not lead the ultimate goal to be "hindered." See RAWLS, supra, at 554. But the
connection between subsidiary goods and the final end of human happiness is much more intimate
than mere noninterference or simple instrumental assistance. Human happiness necessarily involves
the right ordering of the human will implied by the possession of the various virtues. See AQUINAS,
supra,at Pt. I-I1, Q. 5, art. 7. This right ordering of the will is all we can aspire to in our mortal
lives. In a sense then, human happiness, at least insofar as we can achieve it on earth, consists in
the pursuit and acquisition of the various human goods. Rawls's attemptto drive a wedge between
the pursuit (or achievement) of these subsidiary goods and the pursuit (or achievement) of
happiness makes little sense within the Thomistic world view.
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Aquinas divides the moral principles of natural law into two broad
categories: primary precepts and secondary principles.29 Primary precepts
are self-evident principles that point directly towards various human goods.
In other words, precepts derive their status as good or evil from the
relationship they bear to the various subsidiary human ends. They take the
general form that "good is to be done and pursued, and evil to be
avoided." 293 Thus, an example of a primary precept is the assertion that the
preservation of human life is a good to be sought. Primary precepts are
beings and therefore cannot be "abolished from
self-evident to all rational
294
the heart of man.,
Secondary principles are the conclusions immediately following from
primary precepts. 295 They are more specific than primary precepts,
providing statements of rules of conduct as opposed to the general
assertions of good or evil. A secondary principle corresponding to the
example of the primary precept described above would be something like
the familiar "Thou shall not kill." While, like primary precepts, the
secondary conclusions are available to all rational beings, they can, unlike
the general precepts, be "blotted out" by passions and bad habits.
In general, as one moves from the extremely vague primary precepts
to more specific moral judgments, the chances of error and subtleties
induced by varying circumstances inevitably increase. As Aquinas says,
"the more we descend to matters of detail, the more frequently we

John Finnis provides a somewhat different answer to Rawls through his development of a
natural law theory that incorporates within itself a multiplicity of human ends. See FINNIS, supra
note 289, at 60-62, 81-92. It is possible to see within the ends proposed by Finnis traces of
Aquinas's virtues. Nevertheless, Finnis allows much more freedom than Aquinas for selecting
among the various human goods (although he emphasizes that commitment to one good cannot
involve discounting the ultimate value of other goods). See id. at 105-06. Moreover, Finnis does
not, like Aquinas, subordinate the various human goods to one ultimate good. It is unclear,
however, what such a subordination would entailin terms of the content of an ethical system. Finnis
could easily say that the achievement of excellence within his constellation of goods is essential to
human happiness or the fulfillment of human nature without in any way fundamentally modifying
his moral system. In the same way, it is not clear that Aquinas's subordination of the various virtues
to the goal of human happiness (whether in its earthly or heavenly form) represents an
impoverishment of the diversity of human excellence. It still leaves much room for a diversity of
priorities within that one overall conception of the good human life. Nevertheless, as Maclntyre
observes, some overarching notion of the overall human telos is necessary for avoiding a
"subversive arbitrariness" in the moral life. See VIRTUE, supra note 282, at 189. Finnis seems to
provide this overarching unity through his concept of the "life plan," which helps to provide a
person's life with the integrity and constancy that MacIntyre identifies as so crucial. See FINNIS,
supra note 264, at 105; VIRTUE, supra note 282, at 189.
292. See JUSTICE, supra note 288, at 195.
293. AQUINAS, supra note 284, at Pt. I-II, Q. 94, art. 2.
294. Id. at Pt. I-Il, Q. 94, art. 6.
295. See JUSTICE, supra note 288, at 195.
296. See AQUINAS, supra note 284, at Pt. I-Il, Q. 94, art. 6.
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encounter defects." 2" But this is not to say that all diversity is a result of
defect, for as Aquinas notes, at the practical level, the truth itself is not the
same for all, because different circumstances will yield legitimate
differences in how the same primary precepts are actually applied.298
Aquinas believes that people move deductively from the universal and
general primary precepts to the specific principles that can be applied to
actual situations in which they are called to make particular moral
decisions by using their faculties of conscience.2' Although the conscience
can be led into error by ignorance, passions, and bad habits, a person must
always follow his conscience, because the principles it presents
subjectively appear to the person as something good.3"o To act counter,
even to an erroneous conscience, is to embrace as the object of the will that
which appears to the person to be evil. In so doing, the person makes his
will evil?. But the person does not avoid sin merely by following an
erroneous conscience, for if a person's conscience is erroneous through
some fault of his own (for example, willful blindness or negligence in our
search for facts), he bears the blame for his erroneous conscience to begin
with.3°
A person can make himself less likely to culpably form an erroneous
conscience by cultivating good habits, or virtues.3 3 There are a diversity
of human virtues corresponding to a wide variety of subsidiary human
ends. And the operation of the virtues, the connection between having
certain virtues and performing good acts, is not so much mechanical as
creative. The person who is in possession of the virtue of courage orjustice
can apply those virtues quite naturally in absolutely new circumstances and
previously unknown ways.3"4
b. The Thomistic Categories of Law
The thinkers of the Thomistic renaissance in sixteenth and seventeenth
century Spain accepted Aquinas's theory of natural law and, with a few
alterations,305 systematized it into a holistic theory of law for all humanity.

297.
298.
rectitude
299.
300.
301.
302.

Id.at Pt. I-I, Q. 94, art. 4.
See id. ('"But as to the proper conclusions of the practical reason, neither is the truth or
the same for all.").
See JusTIcE, supra note 288, at 185.
See AQUINAS, supra note 284, at Pt. I-I, Q. 19, art. 3, 5.
See id. atPt. I-I, Q. 18, art. 3.
See id. at Pt. I-IT, Q. 19, art. 6.

303. See id. at Pt. I-II, Q. 55, art. 3.
304. See VIRTUE, supra note 282, at 177.
305. Finnis describes how the 16th-century theorists misread Aquinas to hold that the natural
law was morally binding only because it is endorsed by the will of a superior being, namely God.
See FINNs, supra note 289, at 45-49. Aquinas, however, held to such "voluntarist" theory. Rather,
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In particular, the thinking of Francisco de Vitoria, a Dominican friar
writing in the early sixteenth century, 6 and Francisco Suarez, a Jesuit
philosopher writing in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries," 7
helped Thomistic legal theory to achieve new heights of complexity and
subtlety. The elegance of their conception of the different categories of
law, along with their consideration of the significance of an international
community, make them important stopping-points on the path towards the
formulation of a natural law theory of international law.
The Spanish Thomists divided law into five, hierarchically arranged,
categories: (1) divine or eternal law; (2) natural law; (3) divine positive
law; (4) human positive law; and (5) ius gentium. These categories were
seen as interrelated in important ways. The following discussion analyzes
each of these categories and its relationship to the others.
For Aquinas, the eternal law is the very order of the universe itself.' 8
Ultimately, eternal law is the measure of all other laws, because it is the
law that emanates from the will of the creator. Aquinas says: "Since, then,
the eternal law is the plan of government in the Chief Governor, all the
plans of government in the inferior governors must be derived from the
eternal law.' '39 All rational creatures know the eternal law, though not31°
in
its entirety, by its reflection in the nature of observable creation itself.
This participation of rational creatures in the eternal law is what
Aquinas, and the Spanish Thomists following him, referred to as the
natural law.31 1 They saw natural law as accessible to all rational creatures
and therefore believed it to exist among Christians and non-Christians
alike. 2 While passions and culture can obscure the truth of more specific
moral principles, the most general principles of the natural law are
incapable of being disregarded by rational human beings. The converse
of the observation that all human beings are bound by the strictures of
natural law is the belief that all human beings are protected by a set of
he simply believed the primary precepts of natural law to be self-evidently true ends of human
existence. This self-evident truth led directly to the obligation to pursue such ends by virtue of their
status as ends. See id. at 46.
306. For a short biography of Francisco de Vitoria, see HAMILTON, supranote 278, at 171-76.
307. For a short biography of Francisco Suarez, arguably the greatest and most systematic
thinker of 16th-century Spain, see id. at 184-88.
308. See AQUINAS, supra note 284, at Pt. I-Il, Q. 93, art. 1.
309. Id. at Pt. I-I, Q. 93, art. 3.
310. See id. atPt. I-l, Q. 93, art. 2.
311. See id. at Pt. I-I, Q. 91, art. 2 ('This participation of the eternal law in the rational

creature is called natural law."); FRANCISCO SUAREZ, S.J., DE LEiBUS bk. II, ch. ii, para. 4 (1612),
reprinted in CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (James Brown Scott ed. 1944) (describing the

natural law as emanating from the eternal law).
312. HAMILTON, supranote 278, at 19-20; see also SUAREZ, supranote 311, at bk. II, ch. viii,
para. 5.
313. See AQUINAS, supra note 284, at Pt. I-II, Q. 94, art. 4.
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universal rights that cannot be abrogated by any human power. Hamilton
observes: "IT]he view of natural law as common to all men, and to men
alone, led.., to a firm belief that the Indians of the New World... had
natural rights of their own, the infringement of which no superior
' So important were
civilization or even superior religion could justify."314
these fundamental rights to Vitoria that he argued that states had the right
to intervene in the affairs of a colleague state when they observed the latter
violating the natural rights of persons within its borders (whether those
persons were subjects of the violating state or resident aliens).315
The general principles of natural law are subject to only very limited
change. First, as Aquinas points out, because its primary precepts cannot
be removed from the hearts of humans, the natural law cannot be changed
by subtraction.31 6 Nevertheless, it is possible to alter the effect of the
general principles of natural law by adding to them, or filling in their gaps,
so to speak. If the natural law is silent or indifferent on a certain issue (as
it often is), then it is possible to alter its effect by replacing that cipher with
a specific prohibition or prescription. 3 7 Further, the way in which general
primary precepts work themselves out in specific moral prescriptions may
come to change over time with changes in material circumstance.1 8
Divine positive law encompasses all ethical injunctions revealed
through Scripture. These revealed ethical truths serve to supplement the
conclusions of natural law. 319 Unlike Occam, 320 who earlier argued that
natural law was subject to the will of God, Francisco Suarez favored the
opposite position. It is impossible, Suarez argued, that divine positive law
should contain anything contrary to the natural law.32' Unlike the natural
law, divine positive law was seen as exclusively available to those who had
accepted the Christian religion. Thus, those not exposed to the Christian
faith could not be held morally responsible for failing to adhere to ethical
injunctions not present in the natural law but present in the positive divine
22
law.

3

314. HAMILTON, supra note 278, at 24.
315. See id. at 166.
316. See AQUINAS, supra note 284, at Pt. I-I, Q. 94, art. 5.
317. See id.; see also SUAREZ, supranote 311, atbk. II, ch. xii, para. 1 (addition to natural law
does not change it).
318. See id. atbk. II, ch. xii, para. 6.
319. See HAMILTON, supra note 278, at 5.
320. See id. at 25.
321. See SUAREZ, supra note 311, at bk. I, ch. ix, para. 3.
322. This belief served as the basis for Bartolom6 de las Casas's defense of the practice of
human sacrifice among Native Americans in the New World. See GUSTAVO GutriRREZ, LAS CASA
178-81 (Robert R. Barr trans., Orbis 1995). Such practices, he argued, were not explicitly contrary
to natural law, but rather only prescribed by divine positive law. See id. Hence, he concluded, the
Native Americans could not legally be subjected to conquest as a result of their practice of human
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Although divine positive law must be consistent with natural law, it
derives its authority from an independent source: God. Human positive
law, however, derives its authority from, and is completely subordinate to,
the natural law. Human positive law is necessary to fill in the gaps left as
a result of the very general nature of the natural law.323 To some extent,
human positive law has its own authority, but only because obedience to
human positive law (when that law is passed by a legitimate authority) is
itself enjoined by the natural law as a necessity for the maintenance of a
peaceful human society." Thus, an act that is not in itself evil under the
natural law may become evil if it is proscribed by positive human law.3 5
It is crucial to the legitimacy of such a law, however, first, that it be passed
by a rightfully constituted legislative authority, second, that it be in the
interest of the common good, and finally, that it not violate the principles
of natural law.
Legislative authority was seen by the sixteenth-century Spaniards as
resting ultimately in the community considered as a whole.326 Only through
a process of majoritarian delegation could this legislative power be
assigned to an individual or group of individuals.3 7 Once the power had
been delegated, however, Suarez believed it could be
passed on hereditarily
32
and only removed if the ruler lapsed into tyranny. 1
Second, in order for positive law to be just, it must be passed in the
interest of the common good.32 The requirement that laws be consonant
with the common good results from the belief, prevalent throughout
scholastic thought, that human beings are inherently social animals and
require society in order to achieve their proper end.33° Human beings can
only achieve their end of community life, however, if the laws of society
help to guide people toward the common good.
Finally, because positive human law's authority is ultimately traceable
sacrifice. See id.

323. See HAMILTON, supra note 279, at 43.
324. See id. at 52.
325. See SUAREZ, supra note 311, at bk. I, ch. ix, para. 5 ("[E]ven as an act not in itself evil
becomes evil through just prohibition of a superior, so an act not in itself either good or evil, will
become good through a law which justly prescribes it.").
326. See id. at bk. III, ch. 2, paras. 3-4.
327. See id. at bk. III, ch. 4, para. 2 ("Civil power, wherever it resides ... in the person of one
individual... has flowed from the people as a community... [I]t must necessarily be bestowed
upon... [the ruler] by the consent of the community.").
328. Once a leader declines into tyranny, the people are justified in establishing a new
leadership and engaging in just war against the tyrant. See FRANCISCO SUAREZ, S.J., DE BELLO §
8, reprintedin CLASSICS OFINTERNATIONALLAW, supranote 311, at 800,854; FRANCISCO SUAREZ,
S.J., DEFENSio FIDFA CATHOUCAE bk. VI, ch. iv, reprintedin CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra, at 661, 705.
329. See HAMILTON, supra note 278, at 44.
330. See, e.g., SUAREZ, supra note 311, at bk. I, ch. 3, para. 19.
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to the natural law, a human law that is itself contrary to the natural law
does not bind the human conscience. Suarez and Vitoria are insistent that
even a lawfully authorized legislator has no power to bind through unjust
laws.33 ' Thus, the natural law acts as a set of minimum standards, external
and universal constraints upon the lawmaking power of a sovereign. The
sovereign need not limit herself to passing laws that merely replicate the
commands of natural law. She is free to pass laws that fill in the substantial
gaps left by its quite general principles, but these interstitial laws must be
consistent with the principles enumerated in the natural law from which
they derive their binding force.
It is clear from this discussion that interstitial positive law, that is,
positive law that "fills in the gaps" and does not merely reiterate the
commands of the more or less immutable natural law, is subject to change
at the hands of the sovereign. Within the ample room provided by natural
law, the legitimate maker of positive law may revise prior positive law as
she sees fit, so long as her changes are in the interest of the common good.
Further, it would stand to reason that a new government in place following
the toppling of a tyrant would have substantial freedom, again within the
strictures of the natural law, to revise the unjust legal system that the tyrant
had put into place.
The final category of law discussed by the Spanish Thomists is what
they call the ius gentium. The ius gentium is the set of legal norms
governing interactions of different nations or peoples. Although /us
gentium is often translated as "international law," it is clear that the /us
gentium does not provide all of the content of what would today be
considered international law. Vitoria, for example, thought that when a
state's positive law violated the natural law in a particularly grave way,
another state was justified in intervening in defense of the violator's
citizens.33 Under such a view, the natural law as it relates to a state's
treatment of its own citizens must also be seen as contributing some of the
content of international law. Nevertheless, ius gentium, conceived of as the
norms governing the interactions among nations, does correspond to at
least part of what would today be called international law.
The willingness of the sixteenth-century Spaniards to conceive of ius
gentium as a binding law among the different nations derives in part from
their view of the human race as one large and universal community, united
by the common nature of the species.333 The existence of a universal

331. See id.
at bk. 1, ch. ix, para. 4; FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, DE INDis RELECrIO § 3, para. 2,
reprintedin CLASSICS OFINTERNAT7ONALLAW, supranote 311, at 101 ('If there were any human
law which without any cause took away rights conferred by natural and divine law, it would be
inhumane and unreasonable and consequently would not have the force of law.").
332. See RAMoNHERNANDEz, O.P., FRANCISCO DE VrroRIA 180-81 (1995).
333. See id. at 174; SUAREZ, supra note 311, at bk. II, ch. xix, para. 9.
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human community requires, for Suarez, that human beings develop a body
of law "whereby they may be directed and properly ordered with regard to
... intercourse and association. ' 334 This law is quite similar to the category
of human common law, but, unlike that law, it does not derive from the
law-making activity of a clearly-established sovereign.
Although Vitoria sometimes hints at the desirability of a world
government, 335 the absence of such institutions led the Spanish Thomists
to search for another source of the content of the ius gentium. For Vitoria,
the ius gentium may derive from a variety of sources. It can be based upon
the natural law, the consent of the majority of peoples, universal custom,
uniform laws accepted in all countries, or international agreement.336 For
Suarez, on the other hand, the ius gentium is more exclusively formed
through the universal custom of the world's peoples.337 Suarez observes
that certain universal customs reflect mere accidental correspondence in
the internal governance of states, while others reflect customs worked out
among states as to how they will treat each other. Only the latter group of
customs can limit the actions of a state.338 Suarez thinks the ius gentium
339

may change over time, so long as the changes do not violate natural law.
Nevertheless, although they differ in their descriptions, Vitoria and Suarez
agree that the ius gentium has moral force derived from the natural law.?

334. Id.
335. See FRANCISCO TrroS LOMAS, LA FILOSOIA POUTICA Y JURIDICA DE FRANCISCO DE
VrrORIA 179 (1993) ("El orbe todo, que en cierta manera forma una republica, tiene poder de dar
leyes justas y a todos convenientes, como son las del derecho de gentes [ius gentium].").
336. See id.
337. See SUAREZ, supra note 311, at bk. II, ch. xix, para. 8.
338. See id. at bk. II, ch. xx, para. 7.
339. See id. at bk. H1,ch. xx, para. 6.
340. See HAMILTON, supra note 278, at 166-67; Trros LOMAS, supra note 335, at 179 ("El
derecho de gentes, que o es derecho natural o del derecho natural se deriva."). As noted in the text,
Suarez takes a more complex approach, arguing that certain universal customs, such as those
situations in which countries just happen to agree on how to manage their own affairs, have no
morally binding force, and may be changed by any one nation at will. Other customs, which are
more closely related to the intercourse of nations, do have moral force and may be changed only
with respect to one's own citizens until a new consensus emerges that the old standard is no longer
the correct one. See SUAREZ, supra note 311, at bk. II, ch. xx, paras. 7-8. Of course, this latter
situation assumes that the changes made be consistent with natural law, because otherwise they
would be outside of the power of the legislator to undertake. Interestingly, Suarez seems to place
the rule of compensation for expropriated property within the first category, because he thinks it
can be unproblematically be changed. "It is a rule of the ius gentium," he says, "that one not be
deprived of his possessions.., without compensation, and still, through custom, arule might be
introduced that possessions may betaken without compensation." See id. atbk. VII, ch. iv, para. 6.
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2. Thomistic Natural Law and International Law
The picture of international law that emerges from this overview of
pre-Enlightenment Thomistic thought is one in which the gap between the
classical international law model and the human rights model makes little
sense. Instead of a situation where there are two different paradigms, each
embracing to some extent different notions of what gives international law
force and content, the Thomists saw one overarching system within which
all human law neatly fits. All law, whether dealing with what would today
be called international human rights, with the standards of conduct among
nations, or even with the domestic laws of a particular jurisdiction, are
based upon the one natural law, which places limits on its content and
which makes it worthy of obedience.
The conception of international law embodied in the writings of
Vitoria and Suarez is that of a body of natural law that transcends national
boundaries. This body of law includes within it a set of rights and duties
possessed
141 by each and every human being by virtue of a shared human
nature. No matter where a person happens to be located, she is seen as
protected by the rights inherent in human dignity, rights that limit the
freedom of action of all states throughout the world. Within this
framework of basic rights and duties derived directly from the natural law,
no distinction based upon nationality makes any sense. All persons, by
virtue of their humanity, are subject to the same consideration at the hands
of all states.342
Laid over these basic natural rights and duties are a set of international
customary norms constituting the ius gentium. Such customary norms may
serve to provide foreigners with special rights, duties or protections not
made available to nationals. Suarez speaks, for example, of practices
which, because of their status within the ius gentium, cannot be changed
with respect to foreigners until a new international consensus has been
reached. Such practices may, however, be suspended with respect to one's
own citizens without violating the ius gentium or the natural law.343 Thus,
the foreigner and her state can be seen as having some sort of right to be
treated according to certain international norms which may not be

341. See, e.g., HERNANDEZ, supra note 332, at 168 (discussing how Vitoria saw the rights of
citizens, based upon their human dignity, as limiting the power of the state).

342. This is not to say that there are not natural rights that do not distinguish between citizens
and visitors. Presumably the right to choose one's form of government is limited to members of
the community that will have to live under the government to be chosen. Visitors to such a
community at the moment of choice could be excluded from that choice without violating their
natural rights. "Basic natural rights" can be thought of as those natural rights that attach to a person
at any and all times and are in no way derived from her membership in a particular community.

These "basic" rights do not encompass the entire set of rights derived from natural law.
343. See SUAREZ, supra note 311, at bk. II, ch. xx, para. 9; bk VII, ch. iv, para. 7.
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abrogated by a single state, acting alone.
It is important to note, however, that the rights conferred by natural
law are not in any way dependent upon custom or common practice. They
are natural and universal and have their own normative force. The rights
conferred by ius gentium, on the other hand, derive their force from the
natural law (which necessitates some rules for the intercourse of nations
and thus gives certain common customs the force of law344), but their
content derives from custom.
Alasdair MacIntyre denies that the concept of universal human rights
T 5 His skepticism about the success
existed before the Enlightenment.
of
the Enlightenment's broader ethical project thus leads him to deny their
existence altogether. "There are no such rights," he says, "and belief in
them is one with belief in witches and in unicorns. 346 The reason there are
no such rights, he argues, is that "every attempt to give good reasons for
believing that there are such rights has failed" along with the rest of the
Enlightenment's attempts to provide an objective basis for our moral
intuitions.347
It is clear, however, that the notion of human rights is very much at
home in the natural law world view of Thomism. The belief that every
human being has the same fundamental telos creates in medieval natural
law thinking the basis for an egalitarian humanistic thought in which all
persons are endowed with equal dignity by virtue of their shared human
nature. In Aquinas's writings, what modem philosophers would call rights
tend to be expressed in terms of duties to maintain a certain standard of
behavior toward others. Thus, in his discussion of buying and selling, for
example, Aquinas argues that it is unlawful to sell a thing for more than it
is worth." Although he does not make the corresponding move and assert
a "right" to buy something at a fair price, it is easy to "translate" the duty
of all to sell at a fair price into a general "right" to not be deceived in a
commercial transaction. After all, no one could "be cheated" without
someone's moral wrongdoing-the universal duty not to cheat in effect
translates into a universal freedom from "being cheated."
The similarity of Aquinas's teachings to the notion of human rights is
more apparent in his teaching on necessity, where he says that those in
situations of material need are entitled to take what they need wherever
they find it, regardless of who previously owned the item 9 Suarez is more

344. See id. at bk. II, ch. xix, para. 9; VrroRIA, supra note 331, § 3, para. 2 (arguing that the
ius gentium "either is natural law or is derived from natural law").
345. See VIRTUE, supra note 282, at 66-67.
346. Id. at 67.

347. Id.
348. See AQUINAS, supra note 284, at Pt. 1I-II, Q. 77, art. 1.

349. See id. at Pt. II-II, Q. 66, art. 7.
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explicit in his assertion of the existence of "rights," defining "ius" both as
that which is just and as that which is due to each individual as a matter of
justice, "a certain moral power which every man has, either over his own
property or with respect to that which is due him., 350 Such a belief is also
implicit in Vitoria's writings, which take quite seriously the moral claims
of the indigenous Americans as human beings who as such were endowed
with rights and deserving of equal moral consideration.3 1 Catholic
theologian Avery Dulles is thus on solid ground when he says that
[w]hile we may concede that the idea of human rights did not
explicitly emerge until modem times, the concept of human
dignity, from which such rights follow is very ancient. As
philosophers such as Jacques Maritain have argued, the
medieval natural
law tradition implicitly contains the idea of
32
human rights.

Clear intellectual roots can be traced from the modem concepts of
international law and human rights back into the medieval notion of the
natural law.353 Scholastic thought had a forceful and obvious influence on
later writers, such as Hugo Grotius, 3 4 whose role in the development
modem international law is almost unquestioned. 311 Thus, it is important
to understand how international law, which developed in the context of a
natural law conception that saw an organic unity between human rights,
international norms, and all other types of law, came to be conceptually
separated from its natural law origins.
The dissociation between natural law and international law occurred
in the wake of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment rejection of

350. SUAREZ, supra note 311, at Bk. I, ch. ii, paras. 4-5.
351. See, e.g., VrroRLA, supranote 331, § 4, 15,23, 24 (arguing that before the arrival of the
Europeans in the New World, the Native Americans were the true owners of the land, which
therefore could not be taken away from them by the Europeans). The writings of Bartolom6 de las
Casas show an even greater sensitivity to the rights of the indigenous. Las Casas argued'forcefully
that the Native Americans had the right to continue practicing their own religion until they freely
chose to embrace the Catholic faith. See GUTitRREZ, supra note 322, at 188.
352. Avery Dulles, Human Rights: PapalTeachingsand the United Nations,AMERICA, Dec.

5, 1998, at 14, 17.

353. See, e.g., TrrOS LOMAS, supra note 335, at 174 (tracing the notion of international law
back into the thought of Vitoria); Dulles, supra note 352, at 17 (finding the origins of the concept
of human rights to go back at least as far as medieval natural law thought).
354. For a discussion of Vitoria's profound influence on Grotius, see HERNANDEZ, supra note
332, at 213-30.
355. See Kingsbury & Roberts, supra note 223, at 4-5. Until the late 19th century, Grotius's
works were cited as authoritative sources in judicial decisions, diplomatic practice, and scholarly
discussions. See id.
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Scholasticism, Aristotelianism, and the natural law in general." 6 This
rejection was accompanied by an embrace of positivism as the source of
international law.357 At the end of the twentieth century, the embrace of
positivism has not ended,358 although human rights law has provided a
beach-head for natural law approaches to the methodological and
substantive problems of international law.359 This Article asserts that the
divorce of international law from its natural law origins has resulted in the
same confusion regarding the grounds of international law that has
characterized the search for grounds in ethical reasoning following the
Enlightenment's rejection of natural law in the sphere of philosophical
ethics. 3' As Alasdair MacIntyre has argued in the context of philosophical
ethics, this confusion over grounds is unlikely to be resolved without a
willingness to return to the teleological methodology of the natural law.
Under a natural law conception of international law, the debate over
the compensation for expropriated property would not boil down to one of
minimum standards versus national treatment. National treatment itself
would be seen as constrained by minimum standards provided by the
natural law's notion of basic human rights. Instead, the crucial questions
would be: (1) What is the universal minimum standard for the treatment of
property mandated by the natural law? and (2) Are there any customary
norms regarding the treatment of alien-owned property that go beyond
these basic minimum standards?
3. The Benefits of a Natural Law Approach to International Law
The preceding Part observed an historical connection between the
emergence of the modem concept of international law and Thomistic
natural law, especially as it was developed by the sixteenth-century
Spanish scholastics. The factual observation of this connection is not
new 361 and is unlikely to persuade many people of the desirability of
rethinking the dominant positivist methodology of the present international
law system and reasserting a Thomistic, natural law understanding of both
356. See VIRTUE, supra note 282, at 49-59; Bull, supra note 278, at 79 (noting that beginning
in the eighteenth century, natural law fell out of favor and positivism became the reigning discourse

of international law).
357. See Bull, supra note 278, at 79.
358. See STEINER ET AL., supra note 174, at 316 (describing international law's positivistic
methodology); Dolzer, supra note 194, at 555-56 (arguing that international law scholarship is
based upon the positivistic hypothesis that international law is the practice of states).
359. See Bull, supra note 278, at 79; Dulles, supra note 352, at 14-15 (describing the growth
of human rights law as representing a school of thought incorporating "the medieval natural law
tradition").
360. See VIRTUE, supra note 282, at 49-59; see also supra notes 347-58 and accompanying
text (discussing the problem of obligation within a positivist notion of international law).
361. See McDougal et al., supra note 278, at 215.
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human rights and international law. Therefore, this Part will set forth
several different reasons for reasserting the relevance of natural law.
I do not mean to say that contemporary international law should look
to the sixteenth-century theorists for answers to specific problems, but
rather, that certain aspects of the conceptual scheme of the Thomistic
tradition of thought, 62 which has diverged from the discourse of
international law, may provide useful tools for resolving systematic
problems within the field of international law. These tools are not
anachronistic artifacts from the sixteenth century applied to present day
debates.3 63 Rather, they reflect contemporary thinking, within the
Thomistic tradition, on the problems of international law. After all,
law, even if many
Thomists have never stopped talking about international
364
international lawyers at some point stopped listening.
A reassertion of the natural law position would not, for example, seek
to eliminate international law's concern with sources. As in the domestic
context, human positive law has a role to play in the codification of natural
law precepts and in the provision of interstitial norms. The notion of ius
gentium, or customary norms governing the law of nations, provides a
model for such positive law. This interstitial positive law, however, derives
its ultimate authority and coherence from the natural law.
One reason for preferring a natural law approach to the present
positivist paradigm is the difficulty of making positivism bear the moral
weight required to sustain a system of international law in general, but
especially of human rights law. Substantial literature has developed around
the problem of how to justify the binding nature of international law.365

362. By "tradition of thought," I mean a tradition in MacIntyre's sense of a "conception
according to which the standards of rational justification themselves emerge from and are part of

a history in which they are vindicated by the way in which they transcend the limitations of and
provide remedies for the defects of their predecessors within the history of that same tradition." Cf
JUSTICE, supra note 288, at 7.
363. Cf. Benedict Kingsbury, A GrotianTraditionof Theory andPractice?Grotius,Law, and
MoralSkepticism in the Thought of HedleyBull, 17 QUINNWPIAC L. REV. 3,7 (1997) (discussing the
dangers of anachronistic readings of 16th- and 17th-century theorists of international law, either
by reading contemporary concepts back into their work or simplistically applying their insights to

present-day theory).
364. An important source of contemporary Thomistic reflection on international law is
provided by the papal encyclicals of the twentieth century, to which I will turn in a later Part when
outlining the details of a Thornist theory of property law. Cf. Dulles, supra note 352, at 15-17
(discussing the twentieth century papal encyclicals as important sources of insight on Catholic

thought concerning human rights issues).
365. See, e.g., James Leslie Brierly, The Basis of Obligation in InternationalLaw, in THE
BASIS OF OBLIGATION ININTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 3 (Sir Hersch Lauterpacht & C.H.M. Waldock

eds., 1958) (observing the need to find some basis for obligation in international law); Richard A.
Falk, New Approaches to the Study of InternationalLaw, 61 AM. J. INT'LL. 477, 486-87 (1967);
Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the InternationalSystem, 82 AM. J. INT'LL. 705 (1988); Oscar
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This is a debate that can only crop up once modem international law has
been cut off from the natural law system of thought within which it
developed.
The so-called "naturalistic fallacy" was used throughout the nineteenth
century by partisans of the positivist school of international law in order to
pillory the supposed logical incoherence of natural law. 366 The "naturalistic
fallacy" refers to the idea that no series of factual premises can lead to an
evaluative conclusion. It is often phrased in the catchy slogan: no "ought"
from an "is." Despite an historical (even etymological) connection between
the naturalistic fallacy and the natural law, it would appear that it is the
positivistic conception of international law that is guilty of deriving an
unjustified "ought" from an "is." For it is positivism that seeks to move
from a simple, nonteleological description of the practice of states to some
sort of binding "normative" assertion of the duty to abide by that practice.
That is, it moves from a series of "is" premises (for example, X is the
customary practice of states A, B, C, D,..., N, 0, P) to an "ought"
premise (such as, State Q ought to abide by X as well).367 MacIntyre has
shown how the naturalistic fallacy is only true of nonfunctional (that is,
nonteleological) concepts.16' The positivists, however, cannot claim that
international law is a functional concept, because such an admission would
amount to a concession to a teleological theory of law that closely
resembles natural law. 69 That is, they would have to admit the existence
Schachter, Towardsa Theory ofInternationalObligation,8 VA.J.INT'LL. 300,301 (1968) (listing
avariety of theories that have been proposed as the ground ofobligation in international law); Weil,
supra note 202, at 422 (observing that without some moral basis for obligation, international law
is "a soulless contrivance").
366. See Kingsbury & Roberts, supra note 223, at 34.
367. Tes6n points out an additional problem with this positivistic methodology: its inability
to resolve inherent ambiguities in the meaning of the sources to which it looks for content. See
TES6N, supranote 182, at 128-32. The question I am asking is even more fundamental, however.
Tes6n focuses on the question of how to interpret the sources of international law. My question is
how those sources can be seen as relevant in the first place.
368. See VIRTUE, supra note 282, at 55.
369. A notion of international law as a functional, goal-oriented institution lies at the heart of
the New Haven School approach to international law, developed in the 1960s by Myers McDougal,
Harold Lasswell, Michael Reisman and others. See Myres McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, The
PrescribingFunction in World Constitutive Process: How InternationalLaw Is Made, 6 YALE
STUD. iN WORLD PUB. ORD. 249, 250 (1980); W. Michael Reisman, InternationalLawmaking: A
Processof Communication,75 PROC. AM. SOC'YINT'LL. 101, 105 (1981); Schachter, supra note
365, at 308-11. Reisman describes international lawmaking as the product of a successful process
of communication of several signals, including policy goals, to a target audience. See Reisman,
supra, at 11. Within the context of such a process-focused theory, the search for the basis of
obligation in international law makes no sense at all, because effectiveness (i.e., the ability to instill
in listeners a sense of obligation) is one of the criteriafor successful international law-making. See,
e.g., Schachter, supra, at 311 (describing "effectiveness" and "legitimacy" as the criteria for
determining'the validity ofinternational law within the New Haven School approach). To the extent
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of a normative notion of what the content of international law should be (as
opposed to what the content happens to be at the moment), a notion that
would provide a source of legal content independent of actual state
practice. Absent such a conception, however, the naturalistic dictates that
mere assertions about this or that state practice provide absolutely no
reason for a state to adhere to such a practice. 70 Positivists are therefore
left with the embarrassing difficulty of trying to find some basis for
obligation within their theory of international law.37
Courts and scholars have proposed the notion of consent as a possible
grounds for obligation in positivistic international law. 72 This view,
however, fails to correspond to the actual positivist method of determining
the content of international law. International conventions, which
incorporate an element of consent, are but one of the criteria used by
positivists; others, like the views of scholars and the practices of states,
have nothing to do with consent.373 Further, as a logical matter, it is unclear
that consent by itself provides a way out of the naturalistic fallacy. Surely
the mere fact of consent to a practice or constraint at some point in the past
provides no obligation (without some other ethical principle, such as
that the New Haven School is only interested in process, it is a merely descriptive theory of how
law is made to bind. As such, it would suffer from the same problem of justifying obligation to
someone who happened not to succumb to the "process" of obedience-formation, someone able to
step back from the process and question the validity of legal rules it produced (e.g., by questioning
the moral value of the goals that motivate the communicators). There is some indication, however,
that the New Haven School favors certain policy goals, such as the promotion of "human dignity,"
over others. See MCDOUGALET AL., supra note 176, at 987; McDougal & Reisman, supra, at 273,
275 (favoring "human dignity" as the most appropriate policy goal of international law). Given this
preference, the New Haven School becomes a teleological system and needs to find a philosophical
foundation for its prescriptive content (that is, for the telos it favors). In this latter permutation, the
New Haven School analysis is more or less compatible with a natural law approach to international
law. Cf. Nigel Purvis, CriticalLegalStudies in PublicInternationalLaw, 32 HARV. INT'LL.J. 81,
86 (1991) (arguing that the New Haven school's embrace of "dignity" as a substantive policy goal
leads it to collapse into a form of naturalism). The process-theory would describe how legal norms
are made effective, while the natural law would provide guidance as to which norms should be
pursued.
370. See Brierly, supra note 365, at 65 ("Mhe ultimate basis of obligation to obey the law
cannot be anything but moral."); Weil, supra note 202, at 422.
371. Cf. Dolzer, supra note 216, at 555-56 (questioning how international law derives
obligation from observations of state practice).
372. See, e.g., The Lotus Case (France v. Turkey), P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 10 (1927), 18 ('he
rules of law binding upon States .. . emanate from their own free will."); Louis Henkin,
InternationalLaw: Politics,Values and Functions,216 RECUEIL DES COURS 9,45-46 (1989 IV)
(identifying consent as the only basis of obligation in international law); David Kennedy, supra
note 278, at 30-32 (noting the tendency of the doctrine of sources to favor consent as the basis of
obligation in international law); Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice, 178
RECUEILDES COURS 9, at 32-33 (1982 V) (discussing the view that consent is the basis of obligation
in international law).
373. See Brierly, supra note 365, at 17-18.
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"promise-keeping") to adhere to the practice or constraint in the future.374
But even if one were to grant that consent provided a sufficient basis
for an obligation of states to be bound by the terms of international law,
this would not provide a sufficient grounds for the notion of human rights
as they are presently conceived. Although some human rights scholars have
sought to ground the content of human rights in the consent of sovereign
states to being bound by specific human rights norms,3 7 5 such an
explanation is completely at odds with the actual language of human rights
discourse. That language is typically far more universal in its claims than
would be justified under any sort of positivistic theory. The rights
described in human rights documents are not rights assigned merely to the
lucky citizens of consenting nations. Instead, they are rights that
supposedly inhere in everyone, everywhere.376 Each of the first twentyseven articles of the American Declarationof the Rights and Duties of
"every human being," "every person," "all
Man begin with the words
'377
persons," or "all women.
Indeed, the attempt by some to ground human rights within the
traditional sources offends the very notion of human rights as inherent and
fundamental. As Martii Koskenniemi comments, "Some norms seem so
basic, so important, that it is more than slightly artificial to argue that states
are legally bound to comply with them simply because there exists an
agreement between them to that effect, rather than because . .
noncompliance would 'shock the conscience of mankind' and be contrary
to the 'elementary considerations of humanity."'378
Human rights are thought to inhere in the individual in a way that
transcends location or time, hence obviating the need for state consent to
exist. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example, declares
374. See FRANCK, supra note 3, at 43 (citing H.L.A. HART,TiE CONCEPT OFLAW, ch. 10 (2d
ed. 1994)); see also Brierly, supra note 365, at 11-12 (discussing the problems posed by the
withdrawal of consent for the consent theory of obligation).
375. See, e.g., Henkin, supranote 372, at 45-46 (arguing that all international norms must be
based upon universal consent).
376. See, e.g., American Declarationof the Rights and Dutiesof Man, art. 1-27, O.A.S. Res.
XXX, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. lJV/l.4 Rev. (1965) (describing the rights listed within the
document as the rights of "every person"); UniversalDeclarationof Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217
A (II), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948) (assigning the human rights to "[a]ll human beings" and to
"everyone"); European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms,reprintedin BASICDOCuMENTS ININTERNATIONALLAWAND WORLD ORDER, supra note

190, at 302, 302-09 (describing the listed human rights as the rights of "everyone").
377. American Declarationof the Rights and Duties of Man, art. 1-27, O.A.S. Res. XXX,
O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/ser. LJV/I.4 Rev. (1965). Conversely, it goes on to speak of the duty to
respect human rights as the duty of "every person." See id.
378. Koskenniemi, supra note 194, at 1946-47 (quoting Reservations to the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 23 (Advisory Opinion,
May 29, 1951; Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4,22 (Apr. 9)).
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in its preamble that the rights it discusses "derive from the inherent dignity
of the human person. 379 Jack Donnelly makes a similar claim: "From
where do we get human rights?" he asks, and then answers: "The very term
'human' rights points to a source: humanity, human nature, being a person
or a human being." 80 Rights based upon "the inherent dignity of the human
person" cannot be granted or taken away, but simply are. Such
universalistic talk about the dignity of human persons is completely at
home within the natural law and utterly out of place in a system based
upon state consent.
Human rights advocates who embrace consent as the basis of state
obligation to respect human rights are trying to have their cake and eat it
to. On the one hand, they want to embrace the notion that human rights are
universal and that every human person is deserving of protection. If a state
does not consent to protect the human rights of its subjects, any human
rights activist worth her salt would argue that it is under a moral obligation
to do so. On the other hand, human rights advocates embrace consent
because they want to avoid adherence to any single philosophical theory
for the justification for such a strong assertion.38' Clearly there is a
contradiction here. If human rights exist even in the absence of state
consent, they must have some prior philosophical basis. If,however,
human rights have no prior philosophical basis, then a state is under no
absolute obligation to respect the human rights of its subjects or to consent
to do so. Belief that states are under some consent-independent obligation
to protect human rights within their borders requires a commitment to the
belief that there is some philosophical basis for believing in the existence
of human rights.
Of course, this argument from the nature of human rights discourse
does not show that positivism is incoherent. It only demonstrates that the
positivistic conception of international law is inconsistent with a notion of
universal human rights. Thus, it only supports the following conclusion:
if human rights, then not positivism. While some may not mind
abandoning the concept of universal human rights, this conclusion should
be enough to cause many to question their commitment to positivism.
If the first reason for embracing a natural law conception of
international law is the normative impotence of positivism, the second
reason is the normative strength of natural law. Of the traditional theories
within moral philosophy, natural law alone provides a truly safe basis for
universal human rights. Whether one considers the arguments of
Utilitarians, Kantians, or Rawlsian liberals, the inherent weaknesses of the
379. UniversalDeclarationof Hwnan Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71
(1948).
380. DONNELLY, supra note 179, at 16.
381. See HENKIN, supra note 179, at 32.
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alternative positions leaves human rights intellectually exposed.
The difficulties utilitarianism encounters in trying to provide an
adequate theory of rights are widely acknowledged in the philosophical
literature.8 2 Classical utilitarianism measures moral worth on the basis of
an aggregation of utility. Actions that maximize overall utility are
considered morally more worthy than those that fail to do so. 38 3 It is
obvious that the aggregate nature of utility makes it difficult, if not
impossible, to defend "rights" in any individual sense. Ifrespect for one
individual's rights would result in a decline of overall utility (however
measured), then utilitarianism would recommend that the individual's
rights be violated.3 8'
Some utilitarians have tried to respond to these criticisms by dividing
moral thought into-two levels. At a critical, abstract level of reasoning,
utilitarianism would be used in order to select general rules or principles
(including rules favoring the respect for rights) that would operate at the
lower, rule-following level. Such efforts by these rule-utilitarians, such as
R.M. Hare, do not resolve the rights problem, however.38 These two-tiered
schemes, with utilitarian calculus confined to a higher level, have a
difficult time maintaining their two distinct levels of decision-making.
That is, because (as utilitarian theories) they must be committed to the
notion that rights may be overridden when the utility calculation dictates,
they tend to break down into classical act-utilitarianism if the moral agent
engages in utilitarian critical thinking too often.386 Thus, as Williams has
pointed out, the only way to keep this two-tiered system from breaking
down into simple act-utilitarianism is for the theorist to impose artificial
constraints on the frequency with which utilitarian thought may be
exercised. The more he restricts utilitarian thinking, the more secure the
rights his theory guarantees, but the more the rule-utilitarian does this, the
less utilitarian his theory becomes.'87 Utilitarian reasoning, even when
restricted to an abstract rule-making level, leads to insecure rights that are
subject to frequent changes.

382. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 95 (1977); BERNARD WILLIAMS,
MORALITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHIcs 91 (1972); R.G. Frey, Act-Utilitarianism,
Consequentialism,andMoralRights,in UTILITYANDRIGHTS 61,62,69,80 (R.G. Frey ed., 1984);
see generallyJ.L. Mackie, Rights, Utility, and Universalization,in UTILITY AND RIGHTS, supra,at
86, 86-105.
383. See, e.g., JOHNSTUARTMILL, UTILITARIANISM 7 (Geraint Williams ed., Everyman 1993)
(1861) (providing a hedonistic version of the utility-maximizing principle).
384. See Frey, supra note 382, at 62.
385. See R.M. HARE, MORALTHINKING39-43 (1981) ('The critical thinker considers cases in
an act-utilitarian or specific rule-utilitarian way, and on the basis of these he selects ...general
prima facie principles for use, in a general rule-utilitarian way, at the intuitive level.").
386. See Frey, supra note 382, at 80.
387. See WILLIAMS, supra note 382, at 91-94.
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Kantianism provides an appealing alternative to utilitarianism's
difficulties. Kant's categorical imperative states that persons are never to
be treated merely as means but must always be treated as ends, by which
Kant means free rational agents with intrinsic worth 8 Kant's theory
suffers from well-known problems, however. First, he argues to the
categorical imperative from an extremely rarefied notion of the human
person as a free rational agent. 8 9 The simplicity of this understanding of
human nature leads directly to the wonderful elegance of the categorical
imperative itself. Nevertheless, it leads Kant into serious difficulties when
he tries to derive practical moral principles. Kant's arguments in this
regard are, as MacIntyre correctly observes, "notoriously bad."39° The
transition from such a thin notion of the human person to the richness of
human moral life simply requires too many dubious steps and additional,
often questionable, assumptions. What Kant requires for his ethical system
is a richer notion of the nature of the human person, a fuller conception of
human beings as they could and should be: a teleology. He acknowledged
as much himself.391 Thus, while Kant's system, in the abstract, appears to
provide a more firm foundation for rights than utilitarianism, it puts the
content of any system of rights at risk because of its inherent vagueness.
Kant's system has been developed by several modem philosophers,
who have attempted to work past the problem of linking his vague
categorical imperative with specific moral conclusions. The most
formidable of these efforts has been presented by John Rawls' s philosophy
of"justice as fairness," as presented inA Theory of Justice and subsequent
articles." Rawls's argument, in simplified form, is that the only fair basis
for deciding upon the structure of society is behind what he calls the "veil
of ignorance. '3 93 Behind this veil, everyone is deprived of the information
about themselves that it would be "unfair" to take into account in the
formulation of the principles of justice: information such as one's social
status, inclinations, aspirations, wealth, etc. These items of information are
excluded, at least in part, because if they were included, then the principles
that emerge from the "original position" behind this veil of ignorance

388. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 96 (H.J. Paton

trans., Harper & Row 1964).
389. Kant admits that he can provide no good argument that this is indeed the nature of human
beings. In particular, he acknowledges an inability to prove that human beings are indeed free.
Nevertheless, he argues that we must accept the freedom of human beings as a prerequisite of
reason. See id. at 122-23.
390. VIRTUE, supra note 282, at 44.
391. See RAWLs, supranote 291, at 53 (noting that in his second Critique,Kant acknowledged

the need for a teleology in order to found a coherent ethics).
392. See id. at 18-19. Rawls considers the "original position" to be the "procedural
interpretation of Kant's conception of autonomy and the categorical imperative." Id.

393. Id.
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would not be seen as fair or worthy of universal consent. 94 Once situated
behind the veil of ignorance, Rawls thinks two principles of justice will
inevitably emerge: (1) "each person is to have an equal right to the most
extensive basic liberty compatible with similar liberty for others;" and (2)
social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are to the
greatest benefit of the least advantaged and attached to positions and
offices open to all.395

To claim that I can refute Rawls's encyclopedic theory here, in a few
pages, would be both foolish and arrogant. All I can hope to do is provide
the reader with a few reasons for questioning whether Rawls's theory is
consistent with either our beliefs about the nature of international law and
human rights or some of our intuitions about justice. I think that Rawls's
theory is of limited use in the international context. 3" Further, I think there
are reasons for questioning whether it succeeds as a theory of justice even
within a society like our own.
Perhaps the strongest criticisms of Rawls's theory are those aimed at
his assumptions regarding the knowledge of the decision-makers situated
behind the veil of ignorance. In particular, it is unclear why people should
not be allowed to take into consideration their conceptions of the good
when deciding upon the principles of a just society.3" Critics have argued
that Rawls's original position reflects the assumptions of the nature of the
person prevalent in the liberal individualist society that he seeks to justify,
one in which a person's beliefs about the good life are accidental
that can be abstracted from him without destroying his
preferences
398
identity.
Rawls has responded to this criticism by arguing that "justice as
fairness" does not seek to make any strong claims about the "essential
nature and identity of persons," but is rather an expression of the principle
of tolerance, which is a prudential requirement of the public conception of
justice in a pluralistic democracy. 3 9 Justice as fairness "presents itself not
as a conception of justice that is true," Rawls argues, "but one that can

394. See id.
395. Id. at 60, 83.
396. Cf. Mardi Koskenniemi, BookReview, 85 AM.J.INT'LL. 385,386 (1991) (reviewing LEA
BRILMAYER, JUSTIFYING INTERNATIONAL ACTS) (noting that Rawls provides few references to

principles concerning governments' international actions).
397. See, e.g., JUSTICE, supra note 288, at 3-4 (discussing the common criticism of Rawls,
which argues that his original position smuggles in the values of liberal individualism that it seeks
to justify).
398. See id; see also R.M. Hare, Rawls's Theory of Justice, in ESSAYS INETHICAL THEORY
145, 155 (1989) (accusing Rawls of tailoring the assumptions of the original position to reach his
desired conclusions).
399. John Rawls, Justice as Fairness:PoliticalNot Metaphysical, 14 PHIL &PUB. AFP.223,
223 (1985).
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serve as a basis of informed and willing political agreement between
citizens viewed as free and equal persons."' The original position makes
no claims about the metaphysical nature of the person, but merely
embodies in procedural form the belief that persons are free and equal. The
only alternative to this tolerance, Rawls argues, is moral autocracy.401
Unfortunately, as many have pointed out, Rawls's answer is not
completely satisfying. First, as a more limited criticism, it is unclear what
the value of Rawls's theory is for international law. Although Jack
Donnelly has attempted to harness a Rawlsian notion of liberalism as the
groundwork for universal human rights,' such a scheme seems
misguided. As Rawls admits, his notion of the original position only makes
sense once one has accepted the value of a commitment to pluralism. 43 But
it seems at least conceivable that there are homogeneous, autonomous
communities that can reasonably reject pluralism as a value for their own
society. A committed Rawlsian would argue that such a society must fail
to treat individuals as "free and equal persons,"' but it is difficult to see
why this is necessarily the case. If everyone within a particular society has
the same basic conception of the good, then society's refusal to allow
alternative conceptions does not entail a failure to give equal regard to any
member of that society, because there is no one who fails to hold the
dominant beliefs. In such a society, Rawlsian rights could be legitimately
denied without denying anyone equal dignity. The content of Rawlsian
rights can therefore be seen as based upon assumptions about the nature of
individual societies that are true for particular societies-societies in which
citizens hold a wide variety of conceptions of the good-but are not
universally true at the international level.
The result of this limitation is the implication that a fundamentally
political, pragmatic theory of justice, like Rawls's, seems to provide a
somewhat shaky basis for human rights that are seen as universal and
rooted in human dignity as such (regardless of the type of society in which
one lives). Human rights requires that the rights hold true for all persons
at all times and places. Rawls's theory seems incapable of providing a
basis for such rights.
Second, a more general criticism about Rawls's argument on behalf
of liberal pluralism is in order. As many critics of liberalism have pointed
out, Rawls's claims that justice as fairness provides rules for society that
are somehow neutral among belief systems, but that are not in and of

400.
401.
402.
403.
404.

Id. at 230.
Seeid. at238,245.
See DONNELLY, supra note 179, at 49-50, 66.
See Rawls, supra note 399, at 245.
Id. at 230.
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themselves a belief-system do not ring true. 4°5 In particular, belief systems
whose conceptions of the good include a notion of moral inculcation are
incapable of finding a truly satisfactory modus vivendi within the liberal
conception of justice as an individualist free-for-all.'
The Thomistic account of how the virtues are acquired provides an
example of such a system. For Aquinas, the virtues represent habits that
lead the virtuous to perform good acts. 7 In a sense, it is impossible to
perform good acts, and therefore to be good, without possessing the
requisite virtues. This conceptualization presents something of a chickenand-egg problem: how can one ever acquire the virtues if the virtues are
both a product and a prerequisite of the performance of good acts? The
answer seems to lie in the institutioii of moral education, through which the
young are taught how to be good. 8 To the Thomist, the only way in which
to make people good is to educate them in goodness, but this conception
is antithetical to the Rawlsian belief that people must be allowed freely to
choose among the various conflicting conceptions of the good. The
Thomist would answer Rawls by denying that, in the proper context, a
certain amount of moral authoritarianism is necessarily a bad thing.
Rawls can only impose a system of completely free moral choice by
doing some violence to the Thomistic theory of justice. Instead of a
"neutral" ground within which all theories of justice may freely compete,
what Rawls introduces through justice as fairness is a particular,
individualist theory of justice that itself competes with other beliefsystems. As such, he has more work to do to justify the precise nature of
his original position, which it now seems rational for a Thomist (along
with adherents of many other belief systems) to simply refuse to join.
Without his original position, however, Rawls's attempt to provide a basis
for individual rights falls to pieces.
In sum, neither utilitarianism, Kantianism, nor Rawls's "justice as
fairness" is capable of providing an adequate grounds for universal human
rights. Utilitarianism fails because it cannot provide an adequate basis for
justifying respect for human rights when this would entail even a modest
decline in overall utility. Kantianism fails because its notion of the person
is too vague to provide the basis for a concrete set of rights. Finally,
405. See Stanley Fish, LiberalismDoesn'tExist, 1987 DUKEL.J. 997,999-1000 (arguing that
liberalism's claim to objective neutrality among belief systems is false); see also JUSTIcE, supra
note 288, at 335-45 (portraying liberalism as atradition ofthought among, and in competition with,
many others, and as possessing its own conception of the good).
406. See Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, "He Drew a Circle that Shut Me Out": Assimilation,
Indoctrination,and the Paradoxof a Liberal Education, 106 HARv. L. REV. 581, 582-84 (1993)
(discussing the conflict between liberalism and belief-systems that require determinate moral
inculcation, like fundamentalism).
407. See supra notes 284-85 and accompanying text.
408. See JUSTICE, supra note 288, at 194.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol52/iss1/3

72

Penalver: Redistributing Property: Natural Law, International Norms, and th
REDISRIBUTING PROPERT CUBAN REVOLUTION

Rawls's Kantian "justice as fairness" fails because its notion of the original
position cannot obtain the consent of those whose theories of justice
involve the necessity of moral inculcation.
4. Objections to a Natural Law Approach
Natural law has historically been written off by scholars after brief
references to a series of stock objections.' These well-known objections,
however, prove to be unfounded and fail to provide persuasive reasons for
rejecting a natural law approach to problems of international law. This Part
will address the most common criticisms of natural law: that it is guilty of
the logical error of deriving prescriptive conclusions from purely
descriptive premises (thus committing the so-called "naturalistic fallacy")
and that it fails to take adequate account of the diversity of human beliefs
about morality.
The naturalistic fallacy has been wielded like a cudgel against the
natural law for centuries. The first clear formulation of this argument is
often attributed to David Hume in his Treatiseof HumanNature."' By the
nineteenth century, the argument was being used to disqualify natural law
as the basis of international law and was revered as a truth of logic." '
Although proponents of this line of criticism speak as if Thomistic
thinkers were not aware of the potential for problems in moving from
descriptive to prescriptive assertions, a careful reading of the scholastics
shows them to have been sensitive to this issue. The contours of the
"fallacy" are clearly laid out by Suarez in Book Two of De Legibus, where
the Jesuit observes that knowledge of facts alone cannot partake of the
obligatory nature of law: "[A] judgment pointing out the good or evil
involved in a particular thing or act must necessarily precede [an act];
nevertheless, such a judgment has not the character of a law or of a
prohibition, but is merely a recognition of some fact. 41 2
Suarez provides the solution to the problem of how to derive
obligation from the observation of facts by averring to the existence of God

409. See, e.g., JOHNHARTELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRusT: ATHEORYOFJUDICIALREViEW
48-54 (1980) (arguing against the cogency of natural law); cf.E.B.F.MIDGLEYTHENATURALLAW
TRADITION AND THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 140 (1975) (arguing that the postseventeenth century, secularized version of natural law predominant within international
relations-i.e., that of Groius-was weakened by its departures from the Thomistic tradition and
therefore an easier target for opponents).
410. See DAVID HUME, ATREATISEOFHUMANNATURE, bk. III,
Pt. I, § 1 (L.A. Shelby-Bigge
ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1978).
411. See Kingsbury & Roberts, supra note 223, at 34; VIRTUE, supra note 282, at 54 ("Some
later moral philosophers have gone so far as to describe the thesis that from a set of factual premises
no moral conclusion validly follows as a 'truth of logic.").
412. SUAREZ, supra note 311, at bk. II, ch. vi, para. 6.
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and his prohibition of all things declared evil by the natural law, "by a
special command and by that will whose decree binds and obliges us,
' As
through the force of His authority, to obey those [natural precepts]."413
Finnis points out, however, Suarez's voluntarist solution to the naturalistic
fallacy is unlikely to prove acceptable to those who demand a nontheological answer.4 14 Thus, we must look back to Aquinas's theory of
natural law in order to obtain a better solution.
Aquinas's solution can be described in a variety of ways. Finnis
describes it as involving the assertion that there are self-evident
propositions from whence the natural law derives its force. These involve
the rational necessity of certain means to attaining certain specified ends.415
MacIntyre, on the other hand, speaks of the importance of "functional
concepts" which contain within themselves a prescriptive reference to their
own telos.416 It is not clear that they are proposing two separate solutions.
Instead, the gist of both of their interpretations of Aquinas seems to be that
he would deny the existence of any unbridgeable gap between descriptive
and prescriptive assertions; or, put another way, he would emphasize the
existence of prescriptive facts.417
MacIntyre gives the example of a watch. To assert that something is
a watch is to assert that it ought to do certain things, like tell the time. If a
person asserts that this particular watch cannot tell time, his listener is
justified in drawing the evaluative conclusion that this is a "bad" watch.418
Similar assertions could be made about farmers, doctors, and other
"functional" concepts. It is Aquinas's view that the same can be said of
human beings in general. What is required is a view of human beings that
is analogous to our view of a good watch or a good doctor, that is, a view
of human ends. Once these ends are accepted, it is not a fallacy to assert
that they ought to be pursued, any more than it is a fallacy to assert that a
watch ought to tell the correct time.419 As MacIntyre observes, the
naturalistic fallacy only arises because of the rejection of natural law's
teleological reasoning.4 2

413. Id. at bk. II, ch. vi, para. 8.
414. See FINNIS, supra note 289, at 45.
415. See id. at 46; cf AQUINAS, supranote 284, at I-II, Q. 94, art. 2 (describing precepts of
natural law as self-evident principles).
416. See VIRTUE, supra note 282, at 54-56.
417. See id. at 57 (noting that for Aristotle, to say something is "good" is to make a factual-as
opposed to a purely "evaluative"--statement).
418.. See id. at55.

419. Indeed, as noted above, it is the international law positivists who are guilty of the
naturalistic fallacy. See supra notes 347-52 and accompanying text. By separating the content of
international law off from the human telos, they have eliminated any means of deriving obligation
from assertions of fact about state action or consent or human dignity.
420. See id. at 56 ("[The 'no "ought" from "is" premises' principle becomes an inescapable

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol52/iss1/3

74

Penalver: Redistributing Property: Natural Law, International Norms, and th
REMDJTRIBUING PROPERTY." CUBAN REVOLUION

The second objection commonly thought to be fatal to natural law is
the argument from diversity.421 Arguing as if natural law theorists were
completely ignorant of the moral diversity that exists in the world, critics
claim that differences both between cultures and between the same culture
at different moments in time demonstrate the implausibility of the claim
that there is any set of moral truths derivable from human nature as such.
While the problem of diversity raises important issues that should be kept
in mind while formulating a theory of natural law, these criticisms fall
short of their goal of disproving the possibility of natural law.
The problem of cross-cultural diversity was one with which the
theorists of the Middle Ages were well acquainted. Aquinas spoke of the
example of the ancient Germans, who, at least according to the
descriptions of Julius Caesar, did not believe that theft was immoral. 2
Aquinas explained such differences of moral opinion among entire cultures
by arguing that knowledge of the natural law could be "perverted by
passion, or evil habit, or an evil disposition of nature." 423 Suarez followed
Aquinas in this explanation, noting that the more specific a moral
assertion, the more susceptible it was to erroneous interpretation.424
Although it is certainly possible that some (often systematic) moral
difference results from sheer misunderstanding, even by entire groups or
cultures, this answer based upon error is insufficient. It is completely
unable to attribute intercultural diversity to any other cause than a failure
on the part of some cultures. Surely some moral difference is possible
without either party to the disagreement suffering from a conscience
warped by passions or bad habits.
Aquinas does hint at another possible answer earlier in the same
discussion about the universality of natural law. He says that, as to the
conclusions of reason regarding the content of the natural law, "neither is
the truth or rectitude the same for all." 4 5 This assertion implies the
possibility of a difference of opinion regarding the content of natural law
that is based upon something other than error. Aquinas discusses how the
same general principles (e.g., that a deposit should be returned) may vary
in its effects depending on the circumstances.426 An expansion on this
explanation would allow for true cultural diversity in the interpretation of
truth for philosophers whose culture possesses only the impoverished moral vocabulary which

results [from the Enlightenment rejection of Aristotelianism].").
421. See, e.g., ELY, supranote 409, at 48-54 (objecting to natural law in part on the basis of
observed moral diversity).
422. See AQUINAS, supra note 284, at Pt. I-I, Q. 94, art. 4.
423. Id.
424. See SUAREZ, supra note 311, at Bk. II, ch. viii, para. 7. Suarez did not think such
erroneous judgments necessarily led to guilt, because they were often unavoidable. See id.
425. AQUINAS, supra note 284, at Pt. I-HI, Q. 94, art. 4.

426. See id.
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the natural law without a commitment to the view that such diversity
implies error or bad habits.
Such an expansion of Aquinas's initial intuition was undertaken by
Bartolom6 de las Casas, a Dominican friar writing in the Americas in the
sixteenth century. The Spanish scholastics of the sixteenth century were
acutely aware of the wide range of cultural differences with respect to
moral beliefs. Writing after the Spanish discovery of the Americas, they
had access to an enormous amount of data about the beliefs and practices
of the inhabitants of the new Spanish territories. Faced with the sometimes
radical differences in morality between the Spaniards and the indigenous
Americans, Las Casas drew upon the notion of the flexibility of first
principles to develop an argument that the indigenous religions involving
human sacrifice were not in violation of natural law. 27 Las Casas's ability
to reach such a conclusion using plausible arguments based upon first
principles-the truth of which were commonly accepted by his
opponents-demonstrates the consistency of a given set of general natural
law principles with a wide variety of specific moral codes.
Martha Nussbaum has presented a similar argument in defense of
Aristotle's objective moral theory against the objection of moral diversity.
The commitment to such a theory, she argues, need not entail commitment
to the belief that there is only one correct model of the human life. Rather,
she says, belief in moral objectivity is consistent with the belief that there
are a variety of acceptable models.428
An analogy can be made to Noam Chomsky's theory of language
acquisition. Chomsky has noted the presence of deep structural similarities
between all of the world's languages and posits the existence of a
"language acquisition device" in the brain that allows children to learn the
language spoken around them, through a common process, regardless of
where they are.429 The idea that a diversity of moral codes can be based
upon a common set of self-evident principles derived from a common
human nature or condition is no more far-fetched than the notion that all
of the world's languages, in their diversity of lexicon and syntax, derive
from a common deep structure and are acquired according to a common set
of rules. John Finnis sees such an underlying moral commonality in his
exploration of the diversity of human moralities:

427. See GUTItRREZ, supra note 322, at 178-81.
428. See MarthaNussbaum, Non-Relative Virtues:AnAristotelianApproach,inTHEQUALITY
OFLIFE 242,256-57 (Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993).
429. See NOAM CHOMSKY, KNOWLEDGE OF LANGUAGE: ITS ORIGIN, NATURE, AND USE 3
(1986); STEVEN PINKER, THE LANGUAGE INSTINCT (1994). Chomsky's theory has been described
as the "dominant" one within linguistics. See, e.g., Shannon Brownlee, Baby Talk, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., June 15, 1998, at 48 (describing Chomsky's theory of language acquisition as the
dominant one within the field).
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All human societies show a concern for the value of human
life... and in none is the killing of other human beings
permitted without some fairly definite justification. All
human societies regard the procreation of a new human life as
in itself a good thing unless there are special circumstances.
No human society fails to restrict sexual activity; in all
societies there is some prohibition of incest, some opposition
to boundless promiscuity and to rape, some favour for
stability and permanence in sexual relations. All human
societies display a concern for truth.... All know friendship.
... All value play.... All treat the bodies of dead members
of the group in some traditional and ritual fashion.... [I]n
some form or another, religion is universal.430
Nussbaum also sees a deep commonality in the human condition:
Despite the evident differences in specific cultural shaping of
the grounding experiences, we do recognize the experiences
of people in other cultures as similar to our own. We do
converse with them about matters of deep importance,
understand them, allow ourselves to be moved by them....
[W]hen one sits down at a table with people from other parts
of the world and debates with them concerning hunger, orjust
distribution, or in general the quality of human life, one does
find in spite of evident conceptual differences, that it is
possible to proceed as if we are all talking about the same
human problem.431
Far from disproving the possibility of natural law, then, the argument
from diversity simply puts constraints upon how theories of natural law are
to be formulated. Natural law theories must confine their conclusions
within an appropriate generality that will allow the necessary flexibility to
account for significant diversity. John Finnis's theory of basic goods is an
example of such a highly flexible approach. 432 Nevertheless, as Finnis
demonstrates, a commitment to flexibility and an appreciation of the
richness of human moral diversity need not imply a morality without any

430. FINNIs, supra note 289, at 83-84.
431. Nussbaum, supra note 428, at 261. Nussbaum lists a set of areas of universal human
experience: mortality, the body, pleasure and pain, cognitive capability, practical reason, early
infant development, sociability, and humor. See id. at 263-65. A.J.M. Milne attempts to find the

basis for a set of universal moral principles in the common requirements of a shared human
sociability. See A.J.M. MNE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN DIVERSrrY: AN ESSAY IN THE
PILOSOPHY OF HuMAN RIGHTS 6 (1986).

432. See FNNIS, supra note 289, at 29-31.
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limits. Thus, Finnis is able to combine a highly flexible theory of natural
law with the principle that no one may arbitrarily disvalue any of the basic
goods he describes. 433 Appreciation of diversity need not descend into the
pit of complete moral relativism.
It is important to recognize that a recognition of an acceptable degree
of cultural diversity within the limits of natural law does not mean that all
moral codes are created equal. Although some diversity legitimately exists
within the bounds of natural law, some diversity also reflects outright
moral error. Nussbaum views different moral systems as in part reflecting
434
competing answers to the question of the content of the good human life.
Such a view makes it possible to criticize some moral "answers" as
mistaken while allowing for a wide range of legitimate moral diversity.
The same solution that helps resolve the problem of cross-cultural
diversity can be used to eliminate the challenge posed by cross-temporal
diversity. If the flexibility provided by the generality of natural law
principles can account for the diversity of moral systems across cultures,
it can also account for changes within the same moral system over time.
Such changes need not violate any principles of natural law and are likely
to reflect the emergence of different material circumstances that alter the
affect of the same natural law principles.435 Once again, however, such an
admission need not commit one to the view that all changes in cultural
morality necessarily take place within the bounds of natural law principles.
As Aquinas's first response the problem of diversity demonstrates, it is
possible for entire societies to err in their understanding of natural law.
Moral change therefore need not (although it still may) entail moral error.
Nussbaum provides a second possible answer to the problem of crosstemporal diversity in her belief in the possibility of a sort of moral
progress. Just as she views different societies as providing different
competing answers to the question of how to live a good human life, she
thinks that the answers favored in a particular society may be overtaken by
a superior set of answers. Indeed, Nussbaum thinks that the content of an
Aristotelian moral system must be always open to revision in light of new
circumstances and new evidence.436
This more tentative understanding of natural law implies that the

433. See id. at 105.
434. See Nussbaum, supra note 428, at 249-50 (,_guing that Aristotle's Politics"presents the
beliefs of the many different societies it investigates not as unrelated local norms, but as competing
answers to questions about justice and courage (and so on) with which all societies (being human)
are concerned").

435. See, e.g., SUAREZ, supra note 311, at bk. II, ch. xxii, para. 6 (arguing that while the
natural law itself remains constant, its effects at the level of specific prescriptions may change with
changing circumstances).
436. See Nussbaum, supra note 428, at 259-60.
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content assigned to universal human rights must likewise be somewhat
tentative. This is not to say that the force of human rights should be
weakened, but rather that human rights may provide a lower level of
universal protections than is commonly thought. Human rights advocates
must be sensitive to the possibility that their views about the content of
universal human rights may be merely the product of their own cultural
context.437 The human rights that emerge from a natural law conception of
rights may not be as robust and far-reaching as is often assumed.
D. A NaturalLaw Approach to the Problem of
Compensationfor ExpropriatedProperty
Before proceeding further, it would be helpful to summarize the
conclusions the argument has produced up to this point. First, this Article
has argued that the human rights model of international law provides a
useful starting-point in the search for the law of compensation of
expropriated property. It has noted the consonance between the human
rights approach with a natural law understanding of international law, in
which a set of universal minimum standards--defined by natural law-sits
beneath a body of customary norms which may not conflict with the
minimum standards. This Article then produced arguments intended to
demonstrate the desirability of employing natural law to arrive at the
minimum-standards content of international law and to refute the
traditional criticisms of natural law reasoning. The task that remains in this
Part is to set forth the specifics of a natural law approach to the problem of
compensation for expropriated property. The first step in this approach will
be to lay out a natural law theory of minimum standards in the area of
private property, the topic to which the next Part turns.
1. Natural Law of Property: Two Traditions?
A survey of various theories of property claiming the mantle of the
natural law tradition reveals two distinct groups of theories whose notions
of property yield strikingly different ethical conclusions. First, there is a
highly individualistic tradition of property theories, in which property
rights are extremely robust. Second, there is a line of more social theories
of property, in which property rights tend to be limited by the demands of
social life.4 38 This Part will explore each line of theories in turn. Although

437. See, e.g., Richard Falk, CulturalFoundationsfor InternationalProtectionof Human
Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS INCROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECriVS 44, 58-59 (Abdullahi Ahmed AnNa'im ed., 1991) (arguing that inflexible conceptualization of human rights norms amounts to a
form of "secular fundamentalism" and that therefore the struggle against human rights should be
limited to a struggle against "the intolerable").
438. I believe that the common distinction between individualistic and socialized property
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both strands can in some way trace their intellectual ancestry to Aquinas,
this Part will argue that the individualist strand represents such a distortion
of natural law reasoning as to remove itself from the natural law tradition
altogether. In contrast, the social theories of property reflect a more sound
understanding of the natural law (that is, one that is factually more
accurate) and are more faithful to the Thomistic heritage.
a. Individualistic Property Theories
After the Protestant Reformation, a strand of naturalistic property
theories developed in which property rights, understood as rights of the
individual, came to be viewed as nearly sacrosanct.439 These theories draw
upon the language of natural law and natural rights, but their content is
quite differerit from that of the theories of earlier natural law theorists (as
well as from that of subsequent thought in the specifically Roman Catholic
tradition). Thus, although they retain linguistic elements of the Thomistic
natural law tradition, these individualist theories are best seen as
embracing their own unique, non-Thomist conception of property.
An important transitional figure in this process of divergence from the
Thomistic tradition was Hugo Grotius, the late sixteenth-century Dutch
theorist.440 Grotius's theory of property draws upon the language and
methodology of the Thomist tradition," but the content of his theory is so
different from his predecessors that he is properly seen as a representing

theories is to a certain extent problematic. Theories commonly identified as social (e.g.,
redistributionist property theories) can also to a certain extent be characterized as individualistic
in that they value the needs of each and every individual. On the other hand, theories that are often
described as individualistic (e.g., highly utilitarian versions of liberalism) can also be characterized
as social in that they are willing to trade on the well-being of individuals in the interest of such
collective notions as aggregate utility. See, e.g., MATTHEW H. KRAMER, JOHN LOCKE ANDL THE
ORIGINS OF PRIVATE PROPERTY: PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLORATIONS OFINDIVIDUALISM, COMMUNITY,
AND EQUALIrY 126,207,210 (1997) (arguing that efficiency-basedjustifications of private property
require a renunciation of individualism because they are willing to subsume individual well-being
for the purposes of increasing aggregate measures of welfare). Despite these difficulties, but with
some qualification, I will use the "individualist" and "social" labels in the conventional manner.
439. I make no claims regarding the connection between the theology of Protestantism and the
content of post-Reformation individualist property theories, which tend to be endorsed by
Protestant theorists. Nevertheless, I find the parallels to be fascinating. For the classic development
of the thesis that the two are intimately connected, see generally R.H. TAWNEY, REUGION AND THE
RISE OF CAPITAUSM (1929).

440. I am not making any strong causal claims about the influence of Grotius's writings on
other thinkers. I simply mean that he represents a nice middle-point between the social theories of
the scholastics and the more purely individualistic theories, like those of Locke and Nozick, that
come later.
441. Cf.STEPHENBUCKLE,NATURALLAWANDTHE THEORYOFPROPERTY: GROTIUSTOHUME
3 (1979) (noting that for Grotius the theory of property was inextricably tied to conceptions of
human nature and society).
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a break from the earlier theories." 2 Grotius' s individualist revision of the
natural law tradition, which served as the basis for Blackstone's more
absolutist theory of property," 3 was followed in the seventeenth century by
Samuel Pufendorf and later by John Locke.4 More recently, this
individualist tradition has been re-articulated by Robert Nozick. 4 5
The individualist tradition can be characterized by three features. One
characteristic is its tendency to view private ownership in a positive light.
While the scholastics saw private ownership as a result of human sin,'
Grotius, Locke, and Nozick never cast such aspersions on private
property's pedigree, choosing instead to portray it as an unmitigated
good." 7 This idea of property as an unmixed blessing leads the adherents
of this property tradition to take a far less skeptical position regarding the
value of robust property rights.
The second characteristic of the individualist natural rights tradition
follows to a certain extent from the first: its increasing tendency to reject
limits on property rights derived from social obligation. The doctrine of
necessity, according to which an individual in dire need had the right to
take what he needed from the property of another, is central tO the
Thomistic theory of property." Although Grotius retains the doctrine of
necessity as a limit on a person's property rights (that is, he retains the idea
that a person in need has the right to take what he needs), he emphasizes
that every effort should be made to avoid situations of necessity, and
imposes upon the person in need a duty to pay back the original owner as
soon as he is able." Like Grotius, Locke retains a notion of the doctrine
of necessity within his theory, 450 but Nozick does away with it altogether,

442. See James Tully, A Framework of NaturalRights in Locke's Analysis of Property:A
Contextual Reconstruction, in THEORIES OF PROPERTY: ARISTOTLE TO THE PRESENT 115, 123

(Anthony Parel and Thomas Flanagan eds., 1979).
443. See 2 WmLiAM BLACKSToNE, COMMENTARmS *2.
444. See Tully, supra note 442, at 123, 125, 126-27.
445. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 174-82 (1974).

446. See supra notes 443-45 and accompanying text.
447. See, e.g., BUCKLE, supra note 441, at 11 (placing the origins of private property in the
necessity for humans to be able to use things, rather than in some human fault); JOHN LOCKE, Two
TREATISES ON CrviLGOVERNMENTbk. II, ch. V, § 27 (1690) (locating the origins of propertyin the
mixing of one's labor with objects previously in the common); NOZiCK, supra note 419, at 175-78
(following Locke's theory of acquisition).
448. See supra note 447 and accompanying text.
449. See HUGO GROTIUS, DEJURE BELUI AC PACiS bk. II, ch. 2, § VI.2, § VII, § IX, reprinted
in CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 311, at 1.
450. See BUCKLE, supra note 441, at 159. Locke's theory of property has been described as
an attempt to use a natural law justification of property while doing away with natural law limits
on property rights. See C.B. MACPHERSON,THEPOI/TICALTHEORYOFPOSSESSIVEINDIVIDUAUSM
199 (1962). Some attempts have been made to find strong social elements in Locke's provisos
regarding the limits of just appropriation, see, for example, GOPAL SREENWvASAN, THE LimIs OF
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refusing to acknowledge even a duty of charity towards those in dire
need.45 ' Such relatively unfettered property rights have a tendency to
correspond with a very positive attitude towards the market as a
distributive mechanism. 4 52 If property can almost never be taken away
against someone's will, it stands to reason that the only mechanism for
changing45 3 property distributions will be consensual transactions in the
market.
Finally, and for the purposes of this argument most importantly, the
individualistic strand of property thinking elevates the importance of
property rights to such a high level that the individualist theorists cease to
treat property as a means to an end and begin to treat it as an end in
itself.4 54 Thus, for Nozick, property rights trump every other potential right
to such an extent that he is willing to sacrifice even the lives of human

LOCKEAN RIGHTS IN PROPERTY

(1995) (arguing that Locke's theory results in highly limited

property rights), but these interpretations fail to square with the text itself. See BUCKLE, supra note
441, at 153-58. They certainly do not seem consonant with Locke's understanding of his own
theory. After all, Locke thought that protection of property was the primary purpose of government.
See Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., On the Political Characterof Property in Locke, in POWERS,
POSSESSIONS,AND FREEDOM23, 37 (Alkis Kontos ed., 1979). Further, Locke's proposals regarding
the treatment of the poor in England show him to be anything but a redistributionist. See
MACPHERSON, supra,at 221-48 (discussing Locke's beliefs aboutthepoor, including his belief that
the unemployed were morally depraved and that the poor and unpropertied did not possess the same
natural rights as the propertied); SREENIVASAN, supra,at 46-47 (discussing Locke's proposals for
reform of poor laws). To some extent, Sreenivasan's argument is that Locke's theory of property
in fact leads to limited property rights, regardless of what Locke himself thought. See id. at 106, 113
(disputing Locke's view that his provisos are consistent with the existence of a landless peasantry).
This may very well be true, but it does not cohere with either Locke's intentions or the dominant
interpretation of his theories down to the present day. These two factors lead me to place Locke
within the individualist property tradition.
451. See NOZICK, supra note 445, at 150-52 (describing a theory ofjustice in which holdings
are just if they were acquired justly regardless of any other factor, such as a person's necessity);
Shadia Drury, RobertNozick andthe Right to Property,in THEORIES OFPROPERTY, supra note 442,
at 301, 372 (arguing that Nozick would deny Aquinas's doctrine of necessity).
452. See MACPHERSON, supra note 450, at 264 (identifying the notion of human society as a
series of market relations as a central tenet of "possessive individualism," to which MacPherson
believes Locke adheres).
453. It is a short step from this position to the quasi-religious liberal capitalist view that gives
the market an almost mystical ability to yield "good" results. See, e.g., WLULAMJ. MCDONALD,THE
SOCIALVALUE OFPROPERTY ACCORDING TO ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 104-06 (1939) (discussing the
Smithian belief that social and personal welfare are best served by allowing the individual the
greatest possible freedom in his use and disposal of property).
454. See C.B. MacPherson, Propertyas a Means or End, in THEORIES OFPROPERTY, supra
note 442, at 3,4,6 (arguing that liberal, individualist theories of property differ from Thomistic and
Aristotelian theories by treating property as an end in itself rather than as a mere means); cf.
TAWNEY, supra note 439, at 248 ("[L]imitless increase and expansion, became the goal of the
Christian's efforts .... Not an easy going and open-handed charity, but a systematic and methodical
accumulation.").
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beings in order to protect the property rights of others. 455 The shift in the
individualist school from property as an means to property as an end is
important, because it demonstrates that the individualistic property theories
are based upon a radically different system of thought than natural law.
Thomistic natural law places the development of the human being at the
center of the ethical universe.456 By placing property above felicity, the
individualist school reverses the order of priorities within Thomism and
places itself outside that tradition of thought.
In addition to forsaking the natural law tradition, however, this notion
of property rights is unappealing in its own right. First, the arguments
presented on behalf of such absolute property rights are logically flawed.
Self-ownership of labor does not self-evidently translate into ownership of
the total value of the thing upon which one works.457 Second, such an
absolute emphasis on property rights is self-defeating. Although Nozick,
for example, bases his robust property rights on the need to take each
individual's moral dignity seriously,458 he ironically (or selfcontradictorily) demonstrates this commitment to individual dignity by
allowing individuals to pass completely out of existence, thus losing the
ability to be the subject of any rights at all, rather than alter a particular
property distribution.
The objector need not go so far, however. Even property distributions
that do not result in people's deaths are susceptible to the objection that
over-reliance on property rights can lead to the arbitrary denial of other,

455. See Drury, supra note 451, at 372; NOZICK, supra note 445, at 181 ("A medical
researcher who synthesizes a new substance that effectively treats a certain disease and who refuses
to sell except on his terms does not worsen the situation of others by depriving them of whatever
he has appropriated."); cf. EPSTEIN, supra note 207, at 319 (denying that duties to charitable
obligation have any place in the law, but are rather private matters of conscience).
456. See Anthony Parel, Aquinas' Theory ofProperty,in THEORIES OFPROPERTY, supranote
442, at 88, 91 (discussing how for Aquinas all goods are subsidiary to the fundamental end of
human beings, which is happiness).
457. There is no need for me to rehearse the many problems with Locke's labor theory of
acquisition. Several scholars have already explored the problems with this argument in great detail.
Sreenivasan, for example, has argued convincingly that the rights yielded by Locke's arguments are
not nearly as strong as Locke himself (and many of his followers) believed. See SREENIVASAN,
supranote450, at 95-96; see also KRAMER, supranote 438, at 113-17 (arguing that Locke's labor
theory of appropriation is less than convincing). Nozick's neo-Lockean arguments on behalf of his
entitlement theory have likewise been challenged on logical grounds. Several scholars have rightly
accused Nozick of a circularity in that his arguments rely on the presumption of the very private
property rights they wish to establish. See, e.g., Onora O'Neill, Nozick's Entitlement, in READING
NOZICK 305, 309 (Jeffery Paul ed., 1981); Cheyney C. Ryan, Yours, Mine, and Ours: Property
Rights and IndividualLiberty, in READING NOZICK, supra,at 323, 328 (arguing that to sustain his
argument against redistribution, Nozick must assume the property rights he wishes to justify).
458. See NOzicK, supra note 445, at 32.
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equally important, rights.459 Thus, for example, highly unequal
distributions of property may cheapen, and even threaten the very
existence, of the rights to political expression of those without property.
Finally, the individualistic notion of property fails to take seriously the
social nature of human beings. The dominant motif of individualist story
of private property is the isolated "man in nature." Thus, Locke's story of
the origins of private property begins with "man" in a state of a self-reliant
nature appropriating property by mixing his own labor with some
previously untouched resource.' Nozick, likewise, begins his discussion
of political philosophy by nodding in the direction of Locke's state-ofnature made up of atomized individuals.46 ' Such mythology views human
beings as naturally self-sufficient and self-interested, despite the fact that
there is no evidence that human beings have ever lived in any way but in
society with other human beings. 462 An alternative (and more plausible) set
of assumptions, which views human beings as naturally social, leads to a
different set of conclusions regarding the appropriate nature of property
rights and imposing duties of cooperation within which it would be
unthinkable to suggest that people have no obligation to provide for their
neighbors in need.
b. Aquinas' Social Theory of Property
Parallel to the individualistic theories of natural property rights, there
has survived a Thomist tradition of property as a fundamentally social
institution. Aquinas's theory was developed out of the synthesis of two
different strands of thought. The first was an extreme skepticism about

459. See Thomas Scanlon, Nozick on Rights, Liberty, and Property, in READING NoZIcK,
supra note 457, at 107, 123 ("[Nozick must] consider the consequence of enforcement of absolute
property and contract ights... and explain why the loss of liberty this involves for some people
is not worse than that which is involved in the alternative systems which he deplores."); Samuel
Scheffler, NaturalRights, Equality,and the Minimal State, in READING NOZiCK, supra note 457,
at 148, 164 ("[W]e have reason to wonder whether a highly inegalitarian society would be stable
with respect to the rights of all."); see also RAWLS,supra note 291, at 278 (arguing that in a society
characterized by excessive inequality ofwealth, equal opportunity is put at risk "and political liberty
likewise tends to lose its value, and representative government to become such in appearance
only"); cf. Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, Power and Wealth in a Competitive Capitalist
Economy, 21 PHIL & PUB. AFF. 324 (1992) (arguing that in a capitalist economy those with wealth
will have disproportionate power over those without it).
460. See LOCKE, supra note 447, at bk. II, ch. 11, § 4; ch. V, § 27.
461. See NOZICK, supra note 445, at 10-12.
462. See MCDONALD, supra note 453, at 137-38; Nussbaum, supra note 428, at 263-65. See
generallyCarolRose, PropertyasStorytelling: PerspectivesfromGame Theory,NarrativeTheory,
FeministTheory, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 37, 37-57 (1990) (discussing the need for cooperation in
order for a property regime to get off the ground, and criticizing traditional narratives of propertyorigins for adhering to excessively individualistic premises).
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private property inherited from the early Church Fathers. 463 The second
was a fairly robust system of Roman private property law. 4 4 By tying
together these two disparate views of property, Aquinas wove a middle
path between the strong respect displayed for property rights within the
Roman law tradition and the complete antipathy towards property of the
many heretical social movements of the thirteenth century (which
resonated strongly with the teachings of the early Church).465
In accordance with the dual sources of his thought, Aquinas developed
a dual notion of property, in which he distinguished between two different
perspectives: production and use. With respect to the former perspective,
Aquinas thought that private property was permissible, although not
required; while, with respect to the latter, he thought that property had to
be shared in common.4 In this division he followed Aristotle, who, in his
Politics,said that "property ought to be generally
and in the main private,
467
use].,
in
[i.e.,
respect
one
in
but common
Although perhaps on the whole less skeptical of the institution of
private property than the early Church fathers,468 Aquinas remained firmly
463. The hostility of the early Church Fathers pervades their writings. Basil criticized the rich
for their sense of ownership:
Tell me, what is yours? Where did you get it and bring it into the world? It is as
if one has taken a seat in the theatre and then drives out all who come later,
thinking that what is for everyone is only for him. Rich people are like that. For
having pre-empted what is common to all, they make it their own by virtue of this
prior possession. If only each one would take as much as he requires to satisfy his
immediate needs, and leave the rest to others who equally needed it, no one would
be rich-and no one would be poor.
MARTIN HENGEL, PROPERTY AND RICHES IN THE EARLY CHURCH: ASPECTS OF A SOCIAL HISTORY

OFEARLY CHRISTIANITY2 (1974) (quoting Basil). McDonald says of the early Church Fathers that
they could have been, with plausibility, "charged with Communism." MCDONALD, supranote 453,
at 11.
464. See MCDONALD, supra note 453, at 79.
465. See id. at 73-79; see also BEDE JARRE=, O.P., SOCIALTHMORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGES
125-28 (1966).
466. See AQUINAS, supra note 284, at Pt. II-H, Q. 66, art. 2. Aquinas gave three arguments on
behalf of the wisdom of allowing private property as to production: (a) private property encourages
greater effort and care among producers; (b) private property helps prevent confusion as to who is
responsible for what; and (c)
private property helps to ensure peaceful cooperation. See id. None
of these arguments tends to show that property must, as a matter ofjustice, be private. Rather, they
show that private property is likely to have certain beneficial effects. This emphasis on the utility
of private property, as opposed to its justice per se, is an important distinction between the
Thomistic view of property and the individualistic property theories.
467. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, bk. II, ch. v, § 5 (Ernest Barker trans., Oxford Univ. Press, 1946).
468. Aquinas, for instance, believed that private ownership was conducive to peace, see
AQUINAS, supra note 284, at Pt. I-I1, Q. 66, art. 2, while the Church fathers generally believed
private property to be the root cause of many human conflicts. See ROBERT M. GRANT, EARLY
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within the Christian tradition of limited private property rights. Unlike the
individualist property theories, Aquinas saw property as growing out of the
context of human sin.469 In a state of innocence, Aquinas thought that no
private property would be necessary. Unlike the Lockean tradition, which
saw the state of nature as one of atomized and self-sufficient and propertyowning individuals, Aquinas saw human beings' natural condition before
the introduction of sin as a state of peaceful and productive cooperation.470
Thus, in contrast to Locke's view that the state's primary function is to
defend the pre-existent, natural institution of private property, 471 Aquinas
believed that the state determines the specific nature of private property
rights, which are themselves only necessitated by fallen humanity's
inability to cooperate.
Because Aquinas viewed common sharing and cooperation as the
natural condition of human beings, he constrained private property rights
within limits aimed at preventing them from swallowing the original right
of common use. As A.J. Carlyle puts it, "[p]rivate property is allowed, but
only in order to avoid the danger of violence and confusion; and the
institution cannot override the natural right of man to obtain what he needs
from the abundance of that which the earth brings forth. 472
Thus, Aquinas was quite willing to restrict the freedom of "owners"
in their use of property. He had a strong theory of necessity, according to
which a person in need could take whatever he required from the
possessions of others. Such taking was not theft because whenever
someone found themselves in a condition of necessity, all property reverted
to its original common state: "In cases of need all things are common
property."473
Just as the individualist notion of property went along with a tendency
to trust the market mechanism as a means of justly distributing goods, the
social vision of property tends to correspond to a desire to place the market
within the bounds of morality. Thus, Aquinas believed that prices should
not be allowed to exceed certain limits of justice,474 regardless of the

CHRiSTiANITY AND SoCIErY 116 (1977). St. John Chrysostom said the following on this topic: "See
how there is no conflict over common property, but everything is peaceful. But when someone
ventures to seize something and make it his own, then jealousy enters in.... Then comes conflict,
then disgust." Id.
469. Cf. JARRETr, supra note 465, at 122 (stating that medieval thinkers located the origins
of private property in original sin and thought that "communism was a lost ideal left behind in the
garden").
470. See AQUINAS, supra note 284, at Pt. I, Q. 98, art. 1.
471. See LOCKE, supra note 447, at bk. II, ch. VIII, para. 95.
472. A.J. Carlyle, The Theory of Propertyin Mediaeval Theology, in PROPERTY: ITS DUTIES

AND RIGHTS 17, 126 (1915).
473. AQUINAS, supra note 284, at Pt. II-II, Q. 66, art. 7.
474. Aquinas determines the just price through what amounts to a labor theory of value. See
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market pressures that might lead to such a result.475 Although the notion of
the just price was in general consistent with prices fixed according to the
laws of supply and demand, 76 Aquinas thought the natural law prohibited
a seller from taking advantage of situations of desperation for buyers.477
The market therefore had to be kept within certain ethical bounds.4 78 In
addition, Aquinas thought it unlawful to charge interest for loaning money
and urged strict prohibitions on usury.479
At the fundamental level, the crucial difference between the Thomistic
tradition of property and the individualistic tradition is the tendency of the
latter to treat property as an end in itself,480 while Thomism insists that
property is only a means to other ends.481 Aquinas admitted that the use of
a certain amount of private property was necessary in order for a person to
be able to achieve her proper ends. 48" To desire property beyond what
was
483
needed to accomplish these appropriate ends, however, was to sin.
Suarez and Vitoria both substantially followed Aquinas's lead with
regards to his teachings on private property. Suarez believed the private
ownership of property to be the result of human sinfulness, thus casting a
cloud over the institution. 484 The sixteenth-century scholastics shared the
view that private property was not a requirement of nature, but merely
permissible under the natural law.485 What was merely permissible, but not
necessary, in the cooperative "state of nature" before the fall, however,
became necessary (as a matter of practicality) in the aftermath of human
sin. But because nature does not mandate any specific set of property
rights, their precise content is subject to change by the state.486 Further, the

JUSTICE, supra note 288, at 199.
475. See AQUINAS, supra note 284, at Pt. II-I, Q. 77, art. 1.
476. See, e.g., David Gerber, PrometheusBorn: The High Middle Ages and the Relationship
Between Law andEconomic Conduct,38 ST. Louis L.J. 673,718 (1994) (arguing that thejust price
was, in most cases, the market price).
477. See AQUINAS, supra note 284, at Pt. HI-11, Q .77, art. 1.
478. See MCDONALD, supranote 453, at 40 (discussing Aquinas's support for restrictions on
market transactions, because he feared that unfettered market transactions could easily lead to the
over-concentration of wealth and power in the hands of only a few).
479. See AQUINAS, supra note 284, at Pt. II-II, Q. 78.
480. See supra note 428-30 and accompanying text.
481. See Parel, supra note 456,at 93-94. For Aquinas, to treat property as an end was to
commit a grave sin. See id.
482. See id. at 92 ("For man needs in this life, the necessities of the body, both for the
operation of contemplative virtue, and for the operation of active virtue.").
483. See AQUINAS, supra note 284, at Pt. Il-II, Q. 118, art. 1.
484. See SUAREZ, supra note 311, at bk. II, ch. xxii, para. 2.
485. See id. at bk. II, ch. xxii, para. 14.
486. See id. at bk. H, ch. xx, para. 7 ("For example, a certain state might decree that... [its
citizens] shall not use money."):
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scholastics' view that property was merely permissible under natural
necessity led them to embrace Aquinas's notion of necessity
and the
487
propriety of other limitations on the right to private property.
Although modem scholars often assume that the pre-modem tradition
of limited property rights and skepticism towards the market died out in the
seventeenth century,4 8 the tradition of limited property rights has survived
into modem times, incorporated most explicitly into the Catholic social
teachings set forth in the papal encyclicals. Beginning with Rerum
Novarun 489 in 1889, the Popes have reiterated time and again the doctrine
of limited property rights. As with Aquinas, this doctrine of property has
been an attempt to weave a middle path between two contemporary
extremes: the radical views of both liberal capitalism and communism.
Thus, the Popes have emphasized two aspects of the Thomistic view. First,
they have reaffirmed the practical need for an institution of private
property. 49° The right to property that flows from this need, however, is a

[F]or it is a rule of the ius gentium that no one be deprived of his possessions,
even for the public service, without compensation, and still, through custom, a
rule might be introduced that possessions maybe taken without compensation....
[F]or since custom can establish the mode and conditions of ownership, it can
establish the principle that private possessions be held... as a kind of servitude
to the public welfare.
Id. at bk. VII, ch. iv, para. 6.
487. See id. at bk. 11, ch. xx, para. 5 (describing commercial behavior as subject to the norms
of ajust price range for goods).
488. See, e.g., James Q. Whitman, The Moral Menace of Roman Law and the Making of
Commerce: Some Dutch Evidence, 105 YALE L.J. 1841, 1854, 1858 (1996) (implying that premodem ideas about limited property rights and fettered markets are completely alien to the modem

reader).
489. POPELEOXIII, RERUMNOVARUM (1889), reprintedin CATHOLIC SOCIALTHOUGHT: THE
DOCUMENTARY HERITAGE 14 (David J. O'Brien& Thomas A. Shannon eds., 1992) [hereinafter
CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT].
490. See id.at 16; POPEPIUsXI,QUADRAGEsIMOANNO (1939), reprintedin CATHOUC SOCIAL
THOUGHT, supra note 489, at 42, 51 (affirming the existence of a right to private property); POPE
JOHN XXIII, MATER ET MAGiSTRA (1961), reprintedin CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note
488, at 84, 101 (providing the same); POPE PAUL VI, POPULORUM PROGRESSIO (1967), reprinted
in CATHOIC SOCiALTHOUGHT, supranote 489, at 240, 245 (providing the same); POPE JOHN PAUL
II, CENTESImUS ANNUS (1989), reprintedin CATHOLIC SOCiALTHOUGHT, supra note 489, at 439,
461 (providing the same). In some ways, the language of the Popes represents a break with the
Thomist tradition. Saint Thomas never spoke of private property as a natural right, but rather as a
permissible (and practically desirable) institution under the natural law. The Popes rephrase the
issue as one of rights: does the individual have a right to private property? It is possible, however,
to interpret the shift in emphasis in a manner consistent with Aquinas's more limited notion. First,
the Popes can be read as asking whether, as a practical matter, a right to private property is
necessary for human well-being. Their positive answer to this question can then be seen as
consistent with Aquinas's assertion of the practical superiority of private ownership over other
forms of property. See POPE JOHN PAUL II, supra note 489, at 461. Second, the Popes' emphasis
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modest one. Hence, the second aspect of Thomistic property rights that the
Popes have emphasized is that this right must be limited in nature,
subsumed as a means to the end private property was instituted to serve,
namely the promotion of human autonomy and dignity.49
Like Aquinas, modem Catholic thought has emphasized the dangers
of excessive faith in market mechanisms as the means of distributing the
goods of society. Pius XI observed that "the proper ordering of economic
affairs cannot be left to the free play of rugged competition. From this
source, as from a polluted spring, have proceeded all the errors of the
'individualistic' school." 4" Instead of unfettered market mechanisms and
property as an end in itself, the Popes have reaffirmed the Thomistic
commitment to a notion of private property at the service of human beings
and a market firmly under the control of humanistic moral norms.49 3
The Thomistic notion of limited property rights has not survived
exclusively within the Catholic tradition, however. Elements of it remain
even in the Anglo-American heritage of property law.4 94 Although the
individualistic school of property thought is certainly the dominant one

within Anglo-American property law, this tradition is, as Carol Rose has
noted, "subject to constant albeit ill-articulated intrusion from the

on the right to property must be seen in its historical context. The Popes felt compelled to
emphasize the right to property largely as a response to what they saw as the moral errors of
Communism.
491. See, e.g., POPELEoXIII, reprintedin CATHOLICSOCIALTHOUGHT, supranote489, at 17
(noting that the rights that accompany private possession are limited); POPE Pius XI, supra note
489, at 53 ("[W]hen civil authority adjusts ownership to meet the needs of the public good it acts
not as an enemy, but as the friend of private owners."); POPE JOHN XXIII, reprintedin CATHOLIC
SOCIALTHOUGHT, supranote 489, at 102 ('It is not enough, then, to assert that man has from nature
the right of privately possessing goods as his own, including those of productive character, unless,
at the same time, a continuing effort is made to spread the use of this right through all ranks of the
citizenry."); POPE PAUL VI, reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 489, at 245
("[P]rivate property does not constitute for anyone an absolute and unconditioned right."); POPE
JOHN PAUL II, reprintedin CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT supra note 489, at 461 ('The successors
of Leo XIII have repeated this twofold affirmation: the necessity and therefore the legitimacy of
private ownership, as well as the limits which are imposed on it.").
492. POPE Pius XI, reprintedin CATHOLIC SOCIALTHOUGHT, supra note 489, at 62.
493. See id. SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL, GAUDIUMETSPES: PASTORALCONSTITUTIONOFTHE
CHURCHINTHEMODERNWORLD (1965), reprintedin CATHOLICSOCIALTHOUGHT, supranote489,
at 166, 210 (arguing that economic growth must be kept under human control and not delegated to
the market); POPE PAUL VI, reprintedin CATHOIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 489, at 246
("[U]nchecked liberalism leads to dictatorship rightly denounced by Pius XI as producing 'the
international imperialism of money."').
494. See John Pocock, TheMobilityofPropertyandtheRise ofEighteenth Century Sociology,
in THEORIES OF PROPERTY, supra note 442, at 141, 163 (arguing that the tension between
commercial notions of property and the notion of property as subsumed to virtue has never
disappeared).
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traditional, quite divergent understanding.""49 Rose identifies these
"traditional," limited notions of property rights with the American tradition
of "civic republicanism., 49 6 James Ely agrees with Rose, arguing that the
absolute notion of property rights has never completely prevailed within
American law.497
2. Property for Dignity
Having set aside the individualistic notion of property rights in favor
of the Thomistic tradition of social property, the task now remains to fill
in some of the details of a Thomist theory of essential property lights. Such
essential rights would provide the foundation for a solution to the problem
of compensation of expropriated property. The essential rights mandated
by a Thomist theory of property would amount to the content of the
universal minimum standard of treatment of property-owners by states, that
is, the human rights standard for property ownership. I will call the
Thomist theory of minimum property rights "property for dignity. 4 98
Property rights are to be defined in terms of each andevery person's
overarching human dignity and not vice versa. Following Kant, I will
define dignity as the property a thing has when it has intrinsic value, when
it is, literally, price-less. 499 For Kant, this means that the possessor of
dignity, the person, is to be treated always as a free rational agent; always
as an end and never just as a means. 500 As was discussed above, 501 the
vagueness of Kant's categorical imperative draws in large part from his
minimalist notion of the person as rational agent. A fuller conception of the
human person would help to provide more guidance in the formulation of
concrete ethical guidelines for the treatment of such beings. Thus, the
dignity of the human person includes not only her rational nature, but also

495. Carol M. Rose, "Takings" and the Practicesof Property: Propertyas Wealth, Property
as Propriety,in PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND RHETORIC

OF OWNERSHIP 49, 52 (1994).
496. Id. at 61. The features Rose assigns to civil republicanism bear a close resemblance to the
Thomistic tradition of property thought. Both are suspicious of the market and of commerce, both
believe the use of property should be subject to virtues like liberality, and both favor widespread
ownership of property as a means of safeguarding human freedom. Cf. POPE PAULVI, reprinted in

CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 489, at 242-46.
497. See JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 4-5 (1998). Ely points to taxation, eminent domain, and nuisance

laws of examples of limitations on property rights commonly accepted by Americans, despite their
inconsistency with absolute notions of private property. See id.
498. Human dignity stands as the central element in Thomistic moral reasoning. See, e.g.,
GAUDIUM ET SPES, reprintedin CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 489, at 172-73.
499. See KANT, supra note 388, at 96.
500. See id.
501. See supra notes 368-69 and accompanying text.
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the physical needs that must be met in order to continue in existence as a
rational being, the ability of the person to deploy her rational nature in
order to form conclusions about intellectual, moral, spiritual and religious
issues, and to translate the conclusions of her rational nature into physical
reality by acting on the material world around her. It also includes other
aspects of human well-being, unrelated to reason as such, like family and
friendship, work and play, freedom and beauty. Put in more Thomistic
terms, personal dignity requires the ability to pursue one's human end, a
process that involves consideration and decision about the best ways to
arrive at that end as well as the ability to act upon those decisions by
pursuing that end through concrete action.
In this process of forming conclusions about ends and translating them
into reality, private ownership of property becomes essential to the pursuit
of the human telos. To illustrate this more clearly, one can imagine three
levels of human dignity within which the pursuit of the human telos
requires private ownership. First, there is the level of material human
needs. These are the material items needed for mere survival of the body.
They include such things as food and the clothing and shelter necessary for
survival in the geographic locale where a person is located. I will call this
level of dignity "physical dignity."
Second, there is the level of training and preparation needed to be able
to form intelligent conclusions about the human telos. Such a task requires
space (both physical and "spiritual" 50 2) for reflection as well as for
intellectual and moral training. The family plays a crucial role in this area
of development, because part of the demands of dignity for the adult is that
he have the ability to pass on to his children the conclusions he has formed
over a lifetime of searching and to raise his children in accordance with the
lessons he has drawn about the nature of human ends. 503 A material sphere
of property is necessary at this level to protect the family from intrusion,
thus protecting both the rights of the person to be educated and prepared
for life and the people who whose prerogative it is to do the educating."°4

502. By "spiritual" space, I mean a space free from the moral intrusion of others, a place where
one can seek and receive education without undue interference at the hands of those who do not
have responsibility for moral instruction.
503. This demand of dignity for the adult operates as a requirement of dignity within the
adult's sphere of moral expression (the third level of dignity). Of course, this right is notunlimited.
The parents' right to educate is just one right in an equation that includes both the rights of society
and the rights of the children themselves. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 241 (1972)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (balancing the rights of parents against the rights of children). Spelling out
the exact nature of the balance between these rights can be quite complicated, and is not a project
I will undertake in this Article. It is enough to assert that parents have some right in this regard and
thus the family requires some protective sphere within which it can operate without interference
from others. Private property provides such a sphere.
504. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (asserting the right
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This second level of dignity includes a higher level of material well-being,
because the resources needed to educate, be educated, and reflect are
greater than those required merely to avoid death. Moreover, the level of
material well-being associated with the demands of preparation will vary
as society changes. Thus, for example, the material well-being required for
preparation for life in a technologically advanced society, like the one in
which we live, will be different from those required for preparation for life
in a community of nomadic hunter-gatherers. I will refer to this second
level of human dignity as "developmental dignity."
Finally, the third level involved in the pursuit of human ends involves
the ability to put into practice those lessons learned through the ongoing
process of preparation and reflection. In other words, once one has formed
conclusions about how to live the good life, one must have the ability to
put those beliefs into actual practice. That is, one must have the material
goods needed to be able to actually structure one's life in a manner
consistent with the moral and intellectual conclusions reached after a
process of education and reflection. Activities involved in this level of
dignity include such things as the education of one's children, religious
worship, political participation, and work. They also include the expression
of the virtues, like friendship, liberality, and charity. All of these modes of
expression require some physical property on which to act. Friendship, for
example, is impossible if one does not have the ability to control the
disposition of material goods through which such friendship may be
expressed. 5 5
Economic and productive activity have an important place within the
life of the person, family, and community. How a person makes a living is
often a central aspect of her identity. Family or community-based
productive activity can likewise play an irreplaceable role in the upbringing
and education of children.5" The freedom, within certain limits, to engage
in self-directed work (in other words, work done under one's own direction
or in a manner determined according to one's beliefs) is an undeniable
aspect of human dignity. Not everyone will choose to engage in such selfdirected work, but everyone should be able to choose to do so. That ability
to engage in self-directed work requires the possibility of private control
over some means of production as well as some ability to control the
disposition of the products of one's labor. I will call this final level of
human dignity "expressive dignity."
To briefly recapitulate, the three types of requirements of human

of parents to direct the education of their children).
505. As Finnis points out, a person cannot invite his friend over to dinner if he has access to
no property beyond his own ration. See FnezS, supra note 289, at 144.
506. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 211-12 (describing the Anish belief in the educational importance
of manual labor over that of formal, high-school education).
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dignity (physical dignity, developmental dignity, and expressive dignity)
lead to the necessity of a body of private property available to the
individual and family. The three levels are not all equal, with the
requirements of survival trumping the other two, and the requirements of
education"0 7 taking precedence over those of expression. But, despite this
hierarchy, all three levels combine to form the requirements of human
dignity.
The acknowledgment of these three levels of human dignity leads to
the institution of a right to private property in the form of both personal
household property as well as the opportunity to acquire private property
in some means of production. Dignity requires that the right to household
or community property be sufficient to guarantee a humane standard of
living for the person, family, or community. Further, the property must be
sufficient to provide for the moral and intellectual preparation of children
over whom family or community-members have responsibility. Finally, it
must be sufficient to provide some means for moral and intellectual
expression." Under this final requirement, the property regime must
provide individuals or communities with some meaningful opportunity to
engage in self-directed work that is expressive of human dignity and to
own the means of production necessary for engaging in such work.
The "right" to own property is not limited to merely "negative" rights
not to be prevented from owning property that meets the criteria laid down
by the requirements of human dignity. Rather, human dignity implies the
provision of a certain standard of living" to each person as a right. This
standard of living requires the provision of material necessities, as well as
the property needed to be able to educate one's children properly. Such
provisions of property as a right are necessary to protect the rights of (1)
every human being to physical survival and (2) every person to receive
required moral and intellectual instruction necessary to be able to live a
good life in pursuit of the human telos.

507. This preference is not arbitrary, because it is plausibly argued that expression may be
delayed without permanent damage, while education may be delayed at the risk of the formation
of bad habits in the interim that will make further education far more difficult.
508. "Expression" is not an unlimited right. One's decision that her moral and intellectual
principles required her to have a 24-hour talk show on cable television would not translate into a
right to the property necessary for such an undertaking. Instead, what is meant by expression is a
person's ability to apply to his life the moral and intellectual principles he concluded to be true, in

a manner consistent with the dignity of other human beings.
509. This standard will vary from society to society, depending upon the level of well-being
achieved on the whole within each. It will also vary within the same society over time, as that
society's standard of living changes and items which were once considered luxuries come to be seen

as necessary for adignified life in the community. Thus, the fact that human beings once went about
in loin-cloths without suffering any loss of dignity does not imply that the minimum standard for
human dignity requires no more than that for life in 20th-century America.
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This "positive" right does not encompass, however, the property
needed for complete moral and intellectual expression, although it does
require that all persons have an opportunityto engage in such expression.
Further, a real opportunity must exist to engage in the type of meaningful
independent economic activity (that is, activity consistent with human
dignity)" 0 that will allow people to both express themselves through their
work and to procure the property they require for moral and intellectual
expression. Thus, a society would not violate the requirements of property
for dignity by failing to affirmatively provide people with the property they
need to engage in self-directed work. It would violate the requirements,
however, if people were in fact unable to obtain this property on their own,
through mechanisms established within the property system.
The positive right to the provision of material necessities for life and
education acts as a limit on the enjoyment by others of their expressive
property rights. Thus, to the extent that some people acquire more property
than others, they may be deprived of property in excess of their needs
under the physical and developmental dignity in order to assist those who
" ' Of
are unable to meet their own needs under these two levels of dignity.51
course, such interference would have negative effects on someone's
attempts to pursue her life plans. Hence, the fairest way to undertake such
redistribution would be through widely-spread taxes on the surplus of as
many members of society as possible, thus minimizing the disruption to the
life plans of any one individual or household.
An important question to ask at this point is what considerations apply
to communities, whether they be communities of belief, tightly bound
ethnic communities, or economic communities. It would seem that the
ability of the individual to engage in moral expression includes within it
the opportunity to come together in community (or to preserve the wellbeing of pre-existent communities). These communities must in turn have
some ability to engage in the moral inculcation of the young (an aspect of
an adult's moral expression) and to undertake their own moral expression
(derived from and dependent upon that of their members). 1 2 These
communities, therefore, must also be endowed with certain "rights,"
including the right to own properties. The types of organizations that are
510. See POPEJOHNXXIII,reprintedin CATHouc SOCIALTHOUGr, supranote 489, at 97-98
("[I]f the organization and structure of economic life be such that the human dignity of workers is
compromised, or their sense of responsibility is weakened, or their freedom of action is removed,
then we judge such an economic order to be unjust, even thought it produces a vast amount of
goods whose distribution conforms to the norms of justice and equity.").
511. SeeMCDONALD, supranote453, at39 ("We should surrendereven conveniences in order
to supply necessaries for others, and as to luxuries we should consider ourselves as having no claim
to them so long as there are others who lack the necessities or conveniences of life.").
512. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (acknowledging such community rights
with regard to the rearing of children).
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capable of asserting property rights under the pretext of dignity are those
that involve the coming together of persons for the purpose of collective
activity, whether it be collective worship, collective political expression,
or collective work. Further, as these organizations become larger and more
bureaucratic, their claim to be participatory organizations essential to the
dignity of their members becomes more and more suspect, and,
consequently, their claim to dignity-based property rights more and more
tenuous.513
Importantly, the type of economic organization implied by the coming
together for collective work is not the modem corporation, but rather some
type of cooperative, in which ownership and governance is exercised by
the very people who have come together voluntarily to express themselves
through collective work.51 Thus, the ability to come together in
cooperative economic organizations is part of the fundamental property
rights implied by human dignity, but the formation of organizations along
the lines of the modem corporation is not."-' This is not to say that a state
would be wrong to allow corporations to form. Rather, it means that the
state does not violate anyone's dignity by not allowing corporations to
form, or by limiting corporations' property rights in the interests of
restricting their economic and political power. The exact nature of
corporate property rights is thus generally subject to -unfettered
determination at the hands of the state.
As the example of corporate property shows, the standard mandated
by human dignity is a somewhat flexible one. 516 Rather than an inflexible
set of rules for what a property regime must be, the natural law, propertyfor-dignity approach sets forth a series of minimum standards all property
regimes must meet in order to meet the demands of the natural law. Thus,
for example, Suarez believed that, over time, a state could adopt the
custom of expropriation without compensation without violating anyone's

513. See MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS 21, 24,26 (1985); see
also FINNIS, supra note 289, at 146-47 (discussing the decreasing ability of organizations to serve
their members as they grow larger and thus more distant from their membership).
514. In the Cuban situation, this distinction would correlate with the difference between state
farms and CPAs or other cooperative economic organizations. See supra notes 101-07 and

accompanying text.
515. For a discussion of the appropriate moral standing of corporations, as well as persuasive
arguments as to why corporations should not be treated as possessing the same rights as "natural
persons," see generally DAN-COHEN, supra note 513. It is possible that some small corporations
would sufficiently resemble cooperatives that they would have a plausible claim to certain property
rights. My purpose at this point is not to lay down a legally specific principles, but merely to
establish certain broadly applicable ethical rules.
516. See Parel, supra note 456, at 107 (arguing that aThomistic theory of property does not
necessitate any one particular property regime).
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natural rights. 517
Beyond the minimum standards, each sovereign state has virtual
plenary power to determine the specific content of its property regime. The
only limitation on this power is the possible existence of a positive
international consensus that certain additional property protections are
required. Thus, within the limits of the requirements of the ius gentium, a
state might lay a system of socialized property on top of this basic matrix
of essential private property rights. In such a system, individuals and
families would be allowed to own homes and family-owned businesses;
small businesses would be allowed to join together into private
cooperatives; churches and small voluntary organizations could own
property; but large (non-cooperative) productive enterprises would be
owned by the state, their governance a matter of state control (although
with some requirements of worker participation imposed by the
requirement to respect the dignity of each worker).
On the other hand, a state might choose to implement a free market
system over the system of property rights imposed by the natural law. In
this case, most property would be allowed to be privately owned, although
again there would be limits on enterprises' managerial prerogatives as a
result of workers' dignity-rights. Further limits would be mandated by the
necessity to ensure that the distribution of property did not result in the
deprivation of anyone's human dignity. Clearly, however, the minimum
standards imposed by property for dignity are consistent with very different
decisions about how to structure one's society.
The notion of property for dignity set out in this Article is similar to
the idea of property for personhood developed at length by Margaret Jane
Radin. 518 Drawing upon Hegel's Philosophy of Right, Radin argues that
certain categories of property are required in order for an individual to be
able to express, and thereby realize in the world of concrete individuals, his
personhood. 519 Because these categories of person-forming property are
constitutive of personhood itself, they are not properly viewed as means to
an end, but rather as ends.520 As a result, they are subject to a stronger
moral claim within Radin' s theory than what she calls "fungible" property,
or property that does not play a central role in the expression of one's
personhood.521
There are several similarities between the conception of property put
forth by Radin and that proposed in this Article. Both, for example, put the
human person at the center of the inquiry into the nature and extent of
517.
518.
519.
520.
521.

See supra note 321 and accompanying text.
See Margaret Jane Radin, Propertyand Personhood,34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982).
See id. at 972.
See id. 959-60 (contrasting personal property with "instrumental" property).
Id. at 978.
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property rights. Further, both posit a hierarchy of property rights based on
the centrality of the property in question to the needs of the person who
owns it. Nevertheless, there are important differences that distinguish
Radin's notion of "personal property" from property for dignity.
First, Radin's method of distinguishing personal from fungible
property is quite different from thb several layers of human dignity
discussed earlier in this Part. There is a strong element of subjectivity to
Radin's theory that introduces a serious weakness into her discussion. The
subjectivity arises from the impossibility of making wide generalizations
about how each autonomous person is going to define herself through her
personal property. For some, their wedding rings will be essential attributes
of their self-identities. For others the essential property will be military
uniforms, or expensive sports cars or family-owned businesses (even
relatively large ones). Indeed, it seems plausible to argue that a person can
latch on to almost anything as non-fungible personal property.5 2 -I might,
for example, have my identity bound up with my solid gold mansion or
with my collection of Rolls Royces or some other set of luxuries which
would, under the property for dignity approach, be subject to redistribution
in order to meet the needs of others.
In order to avoid this problem, Radin introduces an external check on
a person's ability to claim attachments to material objects. In order to avoid
what Radin considers to be undesirable reliance on natural law solutions,
she introduces the idea of an authoritative consensus as the means for
distinguishing a healthy attachment to material objects from fetishism, with
the former being subject to heightened moral protection, while the latter is
not.5 "3 Thus, presumably my attachment to my solid gold mansion would
be condemned as fetishism, while someone else's attachment to their
wedding ring would not. "[A] 'thing' that someone claims to be bound up
with nonetheless should not be treated as personal vis-il-vis other people's
claimed rights and interests where there is an objective moral consensus
that to be bound up with that category of 'thing' is inconsistent with
personhood or healthy self-constitution." 4
Unfortunately, Radin's solution seems somewhat confused. First, she
claims that the consensus is an "objective" one, implying that it is not
relative to any particular perspective. But this would appear to subject her
solution to the objection from moral diversity that has been urged
incorrectly against natural law. It would seem that some moral
communities may claim to have their personhood bound up with one type

522. I say "almost" anything because it would certainly be difficult to argue that my identity
is bound up with thisparticularpile of one million dollars opposed to the one sitting next to it, and
that my identity as a person would be destroyed if one were taken away and replaced with the other.
523. See Radin, supra note 518, at 969.
524. Id.
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of "thing," while other moral communities would argue that such a
consideration amounted to fetishism. Unlike the natural law, however,
Radin cannot solve this problem by reference to general principles, because
what she is seeking is a consensus regarding quite specific moral
judgments about the particular types of property that may be bound up with
the person. Hence, a group of wealthy Wall Street investment bankers
might claim that their mansions in Greenwich, Connecticut, constitute an
essential part of their personhood, while someone suffering from famine
in the Sudan would understandably object to such an attachment as
fetishistic.
Radin must therefore either admit her standard to be fundamentally
subjective and find some way of restricting the content of the community
to which she will turn for her consensus (for example, the relevant local
community, the nation, the religious group, etc.), or she must find some
truly objective basis for distinguishing healthy identifications from
fetishistic ones. Natural law would have no such problem, because of its
reliance on flexible principles and because of its appeal to an objective
notion of a human nature or telos. Natural law is sensitive to the existence
of moral consensus as potential evidence of the content of natural law, but
it has the ability to account for widespread error in a given population.
Although Radin rejects natural law as a basis for her distinction
between personal and fungible property, at times she appears to smuggle
such a notion into her theory. In one article she speaks of the category of
personal property being limited by an ethical vision of "human
flourishing."52 Further, her analogy of inappropriate and appropriate
attachments to the example of a sick person and a healthy person 26 is
remarkably similar to the teleological distinction between human nature as
it happens to be and human nature as it could and should be.527
A second crucial difference between Radin's theory and a natural law
theory of property is that Radin is willing to treat at least some property as
non-instrumental.528 Strictly speaking, natural law never treats property as
an end, but always as a means to the more important end of human
flourishing. 29 Thus, natural law would not agree with Radin's prohibition
530
on the exercise of eminent domain with respect to personal property.

525. Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Current in the
Jurisprudenceof Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV.1667, 1688 (1988).
526. See Radin, supra note 518, at 969.
527. See MACINTYRE, supra note 282, at 50.
528. See Radin, supra note 518, at 959-60.
529. See, e.g., POPE PAULVI, reprintedin CATHOUC SOC-iALTHOUGHT, supranote 489, at 245
("All other rights whatsoever, including those of property and of free commerce, are to be
subordinated to this principle [of the common good].").
530. See Radin, supra note 525, at 1687.
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Because Radin's category of personal property does not correspond to the
property required for human survival-which, under natural law, would
not be expropriable-natural law would endorse the expropriation of
personal property when doing so is necessary to supply others with the
means of survival.531
Indeed, Radin's notion of property as constitutive of personality is
problematic in and of itself. While there is certainly property that is very
dear to me, property that I would be extremely reluctant to give up in even
the most extreme of circumstances, it would be false to assert that this
property constitutes my very personhood. There is not a single piece of
property such that if it were taken away from me I would lose either my
status as a real person or my identity as the same person I was before I lost
the property.
A final difference between Radin's theory and the natural law notion
of property for dignity is that the latter appears to provide more protection
for commercial property. Although Radin admits the possibility that
commercial property could constitute personal property,532 she often speaks
as if commercial property in general is more likely than other forms of
property to engender fetishistic attachment.533 In contrast, because the
natural law views productive behavior to be part of expressive dignity,
commercial property in general does not labor under any disability with
respect to expropriation by the state. Commercial property that is central
to the expression of a person's dignity falls under the dignity-based right,
although it may be expropriated as a last resort to meet the needs of a more
important demand of dignity (such as, physical dignity).534 Nevertheless,
both Radin's theory and property for dignity would allow the provision of
minimal protections for corporate-owned commercial property. For the
natural law, this is not because such property is commercial, but rather
because it is not central to the dignity of any real person.

531. This would only be true, however, in the exceptional circumstance where the state could

not meet the need of the person by redistributing property not implicated in human dignity (e.g.,
corporate property).
532. See Radin, supra note 518, at 1010-11 (discussing Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226
(1964)) (implying that the owner of a small restaurant interested in excluding black people from the
premises had some personhood basis for claiming the right to do so).
533. See, e.g., Radin, supra note 525, at 1689 (pointing out that, from the perspective of
personal property, thereis adifference between home ownership and factory ownership). Fetishistic
attachment does not constitute the basis for the heightened protection due to personal property.
Thus, a category ofproperty more likely to engender such attachment is also less likely to be worthy
of any heightened protection.
534. Property affected by dignity concerns may be taken by the government for other reasons
as well (e.g., to acquire the land necessary for a highway project or some other public work). Unless
such takings seek to accomplish a well-formulated policy ofredistribution of property, they should
be accompanied by full compensation.
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3. Summary of the Natural Law's Minimum
Standard for Property Rights
Before moving on to apply the natural law property standard to the
case of the Cuban revolution's property reforms, it would be useful to
summarize what the content of that standard is. First, property for dignity
recognizes a universal positive right to the property necessary for survival
and education, and a universal, although limited, negative right to property
for the expression of human dignity. Although property regimes must
provide room for private property consistent with the demands of dignity,
the individual property rights mandated by human dignity are limited by
the claims of others to survival and/or education, when those needs cannot
be satisfied by the redistribution of property not related to human dignity.
Finally, the property for dignity approach provides no
universal norms
535
property.
corporate-owned
of
protection
the
requiring
The minimal property rights guaranteed by the natural law, propertyfor-dignity approach may be supplemented by international consensus
along the lines of ius gentium, or international custom. Mere accidental
common practice is not sufficient to establish a requirement of ius gentium,
however. There must be a consensus that a certain level of protection is
required in some way, a consensus that states are not free to violate the
norm in question. As was discussed above, there presently appears to be no
universally accepted set of norms regarding compensation for expropriated
property.536 There is, however, a consensus that expropriations must be for
a public purpose and that they must be carried out in a nondiscriminatory
manner.537 Further, as with all action taken by governments, the natural law

535. Such a conclusion may prove troubling to some, but it should not. Corporations are
normally in a very strong position to protect their own property interests. In some cases, the size
of multinational corporations exceeds that of the economies of many of the nations in which they
operate. Further, their influence within their home state will mean that they will normally receive
the full support of their government in pressing claims against expropriating host states. The
Guatemalan revolution provides a good example of how the U.S. government is willing to go to
great lengths on behalf of large U.S. corporations. See, e.g., BLASiR,supra note 70, at 89. Further,
in the case of the Cuban revolution, despite the fact that no U.S. corporations received
compensation from the Cuban government, they made up most of their losses in the form of special
tax breaks provided to them by the U.S. Congress after the expropriations occurred. See Susan
Ferndndez, The Sanctity of Property:American Responses to Cuban Expropriations,1959-1984,
CUBAN STUD., Summer 1984, at 21, 23-26. Some companies actually managed to earn a net profit
out of the expropriation. See id. at 26. Finally, international capital markets are quite protective of
the interests of large corporations. Countries that expropriate property without compensation will
find it very difficult to raise capital on international markets or to attract direct foreign investment,
problems that have plagued Cuba in its efforts to deal with the loss of Soviet assistance.
536. See supra notes 229-46 and accompanying text.
537. See supra notes 185-88 and accompanying text.
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requires that expropriations be undertaken in the interest of the common
good.538
Aside from these constraints, local states are free to develop whatever
norms they see fit with respect to property not falling into the protected
category of property for dignity. All things being equal, the choice of
which property regime to institute, as long as not violative of minimal
human rights or an international norm (for instance, a bilateral treaty
recognizing the corporate property of another state), amounts to an
undeniable right of sovereignty. This represents an extension of the right
of societies to choose their own forms of government.539
IV. APPLYING THE PROPERTY-FOR-DIGNITY STANDARD TO THE
CUBAN CASE: THE THREE GROUPS REVISITED

Under the guidelines set forth in the preceding Part, there are several
questions to ask when assessing a property reform. First, are there people
who are being denied their human dignity under the present property
regime (with a special emphasis placed on violations of the physical and
developmental levels of dignity)? A negative answer to this first question
does not prohibit property redistribution, but a positive answer mandates
it.
The second question to ask is whether the proposed reform will
actually help to move society closer to a situation in which no one is
denied her human dignity. This question involves two aspects. First, will
the reform respect the dignity of those who lose property (i.e., are those
who lose property reduced to a situation where their dignity is violated)?
A reform that takes everything from those who previously had more than
they needed, leaving them in a situation of destitution, would not be
justified under the natural law conception of property for dignity. It would
impermissibly trade on the dignity of one person in order to remedy the
denial of dignity to another. Second, will the reform improve the situation
of the worst off?. A reform, for example, that tended to take property from
the poorest members of society, in order to redistribute it to the wealthier,
would not move the society closer to a situation in which the dignity of all
was respected.
When property belonging to foreign nationals is involved, two
additional questions need to be asked. First, is the law undertaken to serve
some public purpose? Second, does the law discriminate unreasonably
against property belonging to nationals of a specific state? Inappropriate
answers to either of these two questions indicates that the law under
consideration violates the ius gentium.

538. See supra notes 307-09 and accompanying text.
539. See supra notes 307-09 and accompanying text.
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A. Cubans Who Remained in Cuba
Cubans who remained in Cuba were subjected to a series of
redistributive measures that expropriated property from a steadily larger
number of people over the course of the first decade of the revolution.
Beginning with the First Agrarian Reform of 1959 and ending with the
expropriations of small businesses during the Revolutionary Offensive in
1968, many Cubans who remained in Cuba lost substantial amounts of
property. In order to assess how the members of this group were affected,
this Part will go through each successive stage of the Cuban property
reforms and briefly discuss their merits under the property for dignity
standard.
1. First Agrarian Reform
The First Agrarian Reform law sought to remedy a situation of
latifundiain rural holdings where the vast majority of rural Cubans were
consigned to lives of almost total deprivation while a small minority of
landholders maintained enormous tracts of underutilized land. The
distribution of properties was such that the large landholdings of the few
guaranteed that the remaining land could not generate a living for the
remainder of the rural population. Further, those who worked the land
often did so under onerous tenancy arrangements whereby they forfeited
a large portion of their production to wealthy landholders. Health and
education in rural areas were virtually nonexistent and the rural poor
lacked any means of improving their economic condition.54 ° In short, there
was, before the First Agrarian Reform, a large group of Cubans being
denied the property required for all three levels of dignity. Some type of
reform was therefore mandated by the natural law.
By focusing its expropriations on landholdings of over thirty
caballerias,the First Agrarian Reform law aimed to expropriate properties
that were, if owned by individuals or families, loosely covered by the level
of expressive dignity or, if corporate owned, not covered by dignity
considerations at all. Because large landholders were left with substantial
holdings (up to the thirty caballerfamaximum), they were not denied their
rights under the expressive level of human dignity. They emerged from the
expropriations with substantial (albeit reduced) opportunities for selfdirected economic activity. Finally, the redistributive provisions of the
First Agrarian reform emphasized the grant of the expropriated properties
directly to those who worked the land. Thus, the law, as written, satisfied
the requirement that it remedy the situation in which people were being

540. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol52/iss1/3

102

Penalver: Redistributing Property: Natural Law, International Norms, and th
REDISTRIBUTING PROPERTY" CUBAN REVOLUTION

denied their dignity.
Although tens of thousands of previously landless Cubans received
title under the law, some scholars claim that the primary beneficiary of the
First Agrarian Reform was the Cuban state, which acquired title to close
to one half of the expropriated landholdings and put them to use as state
farms." ' As a general rule, substantial participation in the economy by the
state is not itself violative of the natural law. It may become a violation,
however, if the presence of the state is so overpowering that it leaves no
real opportunity whereby people can enter into the private sector and
engage in self-directed work. Limitations on alienation of farmland under
the First Agrarian Reform created a situation where those who did not
receive redistributed land might have found it more or less impossible to
enter into the rural sector as a private farmer. 42 Thus, it is probable that
some people's rights were violated under the First Agrarian Reform, but
it is important to emphasize that it was not the people who lost their land.
Rather, the people wronged were those who desired the opportunity to
engage in small-farming, but were denied that opportunity by the postreform structure of the agricultural sector.
2. Second Agrarian Reform
Many of the same considerations covering the First Agrarian Reform
also hold true for the Second Agrarian Reform Law of 1963. Assuming
that by 1963, many of the factors leading to the denial of dignity to the
rural poor had been removed, it is possible to classify the Second Agrarian
Reform as a revolutionary reform that sought to change the basic rules of
the game within Cuba's agricultural property regime. Rather than a
remedial measure aimed at raising people out of inhuman living
conditions, its goal was a fundamental restructuring of rural Cuban society.
The question, then, is whether the second reform, which limited rural
landholdings to an upper limit of five caballerias,managed to accomplish
this task without violating the rights of those whose land was taken.543
This is a far closer case than with the first law, because virtually all of
the land affected by the second law was implicated by some dignity
concerns. Nevertheless, beyond the provision of opportunity for private
economic expression, it is up to the state (within the limits of justice
established by the common-good requirement) to determine how the
wealth of society is to be distributed. Because the ownership of five
caballerfas provides sufficient opportunities for self-directed work and

541. See GHAI ET AL., supra note 97, at 11.
542. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
543. For a discussion of the terms of the Second Agrarian Reform, see supranotes 90-95 and
accompanying text.
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does not leave those working the farm unable to earn a dignified (albeit
modest) living, the rights of those who found their farms reduced to the
new upper limit were not violated.
The new limitations of rural ownership would not violate the rights of
farmers as long as those with hopes of acquiring land had some
opportunity to do so. As with the first reform, to the extent that the
prohibitions on transfer of property prevented those who remained without
land from ever acquiring it, the law violated their rights. For the same
reason as the first reform, the second reform failed to provide adequate
opportunities for self-directed agricultural production. Thus, like the first
reform, the second reform violated the rights of those who wanted the
opportunity to engage in small-scale private farming.
3. Urban Reform
The Urban Reform took title from people who owned homes for rental
and gave the properties to those who were living in the rental units.5" 4 As
such, it sought to expand the range of ownership of property that falls
under the physical and developmental levels of human dignity. It did so by
taking property from within the expressive level of dignity (to the extent
that those who lost properties were individuals and not corporations). The
question, then, is whether those who lost all of their rental properties were
left without any self-directed economic opportunity, thus violating their
right to expressive dignity.
This raises the difficult question of whether the complete denial of the
ability to pursue a single, specific profession can violate a person's dignity.
In general it does not. What the expressive level of dignity requires is that
human beings be given a real opportunity to express themselves through
self-directed economic activity. Although this requires the opportunity to
be able to select from a range of meaningful activities and enjoy (within
limits) the benefits of that employment (such as through a small family
business), it does not entail that every possible profession be available for
such work. The state may legitimately bar certain forms of employment
from the range of options open to each person, as long as a wide range of
possibilities remain. Its reasons for doing so may vary: first thejob may be
seen as immoral or harmful to the person undertaking it, as with, for
example, prostitution; second, the job may be seen as necessarily within
the purview of the state, like ajudge or police officer; finally, certain jobs
may be determined to be best carried out by the state from the point of
view of justice, as with doctors in a system of socialized medicine. A
plausible argument may be made that the state may properly decide that

544. For a discussion of the terms of the Urban Reform, see supra notes 109-11 and
accompanying text.
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abuses within the private housing market are necessarily so severe that the
only solution is to socialize the profession of landlord. 545 Thus, by itself,
the Urban Reform does not appear to have violated anyone's rights.
4. Revolutionary Offensive
During the Revolutionary Offensive of 1968, virtually all small private
businesses were expropriated by the Cuban government. 46 It is not clear
that redistribution was even the goal of this expropriation. The effect of
this action was not to better the situation of any Cubans who were living
in a state of misery but rather to foreclose the possibility of private selfemployment in virtually any field to almost all Cubans. Thus, the
possibility for self-directed economic expression was almost completely
eliminated. This action clearly violated the dignity rights of those who
were expropriated as well as Cubans whose property was not expropriated
but who, thereafter, were unable to open a small business.
5. Recent Reforms
Some of the excesses of the Cuban revolution's property reforms have
begun to be remedied in the past few years as the country has enacted a
series of reforms aimed at easing the post-Soviet economic crisis through
an expansion of the private sector. Openings to foreign corporate capital,
a large part of the government policy,547 are not relevant to the inquiry
required by the natural law conception of property. Of more interest are the
semi-privatizations of state farms, the expansion of opportunities for selfemployment, and the creation of farmers' and artisanal markets.
As the discussion of the justice of the Revolutionary Offensive and the
agrarian reforms indicated, the Cuban government erred in its early
reforms by not leaving open sufficient opportunities for self-directed
economic activity. In the agrarian case, the failure to redistribute sufficient
land directly to farmers and the restrictions on alienation of property
combined to freeze people out of private agriculture. Reforms in the 1970s
aimed at the stimulation of private cooperatives 548 and the more recent
semi-privatization of state farms in the form of UBPCs 549 takes the Cuban
government far closer to the demands of natural law in the agricultural
area. The opening of farmers' markets gives those engaged in agricultural

545. This is not to say that such a course of action is the wisest or best one, but only that it is
within the power of the state to make the decision without violating anyone's rights.
546. For a discussion of the Revolutionary Offensive, see supra notes 140-41 and
accompanying text.
547. See supra notes 152-57 and accompanying text.
548. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
549. See supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text.
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production a greater opportunity to seek their own customers and to earn
a fair price for their produce, thus augmenting their ownership rights over
the product of their labor.
In the case of small businesses, the opening to self-employment and
the creation of artisanal markets in recent years is hopeful, but still
probably does not go far enough. Heavy taxes and onerous licensing
requirements on self-employment have served to strongly discourage
Cubans from exercising their right to self-directed economic activity.5
Moreover, restrictions on which professions can be pursued go beyond
mere efforts to prevent the practice of immoral professions, but seek
instead to prevent competition with the state. For example, architects and
engineers cannot practice their profession on their own behalf. The Cuban
government should open up a wider variety of professions to selfemployment and make some effort to ease entry into the private sector.
6. Remedies?
Several possible remedies exist for the Cuban government with respect
to the Cubans who remained in Cuba and suffered violations of their
economic human rights. These Cubans fall into two groups: those who
failed to receive adequate economic opportunity as a result of excessive
domination of the economic sphere by the state and those who had
properties unjustly taken away from them in the 1968 Revolutionary
Offensive. The remedies appropriate to each would be somewhat different.
It would seem that the most appropriate remedy for those denied economic
opportunity would be its provision. Thus, the government should ease
entry into both private agricultural production and self-employment.
Onerous burdens on the entry into either of these areas should be removed.
For example, the government might lift burdensome restrictions that
essentially prevent the transfer of rural property. Further, it could ease the
licensing requirements and heavy taxes exacted from those seeking selfemployment in favor of income-based taxes that take from people in
proportion to their earnings.
Those who lost properties unjustly to the state as part of the 1968
Revolutionary Offensive should have those properties restored to them to
the extent that such restoration is feasible (for example, if the properties
are still not occupied). Any visitor to Havana knows that a great deal of
commercial property is vacant. It is thus likely that small business-owners
who lost properties could have those properties restored to them without
any disruption. If properties are occupied, the government could grant
similar, vacant properties to expropriated owners. Alternatively, it could

550. See James C. McKinley, Jr., In Cuba's New Dual Economy, Have-Nots Far Exceed
Haves, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1999, at A6.
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compensate expropriated owners with tax credits or financial assistance in
the establishment of a new business. In any event, no one should have
physical properties returned to them unless they plan to use them for
engagement in small business activity.
B. Cubans Wo Left Cuba
All Cubans who left Cuba in the early years after the revolution lost
any property they left behind to the state under Ley 989.5' These properties
were sometimes left in the possession of friends and neighbors, but were
also often redistributed by the State. Although some who left were guilty
of crimes under the Batista government, by far the majority were simply
Cubans who feared life under the new regime. Those whose property could
not legitimately have been taken under criminal sanction should not have
lost their entire estates simply for leaving the country. Human rights are
human rights, regardless of whether a person is present in his home country
or not. Thus, the confiscatory measures aimed at emigrating Cubans
violated their human rights to property ownership.
The question, then, is the extent of their harm. Cubans who left were
only harmed to the extent that the properties confiscated would not have
been redistributed by subsequent redistributionist measures consistent with
their human rights. Thus, for example, emigrating Cubans who lost rental
properties or large plantations could not claim that they were wronged by
such measures (except perhaps rural landowners, who are entitled to their
five caballeriasunder the Second Agrarian Reform). Those who lost small
businesses, however, would be entitled to some remedy, since the
.subsequent nationalization of small businesses was unjust.55 2 Emigres are
also entitled to some remedy up to the amount of their personal property
(homes, clothing, furniture, etc.).
The question of remedies for Cubans who left Cuba is a very thorny
issue, both in Cuba and among the 6migr6 community in the United States
and elsewhere. Cubans living in confiscated properties in Cuba often
express fears about the return of the former owners, while in Miami,
rumors abound of former property owners prepared to take back their
expropriated properties, by force if necessary. If the lost property has been
occupied for a sufficient length of time, however, the balance of factors
would seem to favor some sort of monetary compensation or compensation
in vacant properties, to those who left properties behind, rather than

551. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
552. Thereis an interestingproblemraised by small businesses, however. Those who left small
business behind would likely have lost much of their business even if the Cuban government had
not confiscated their holdings. A small business whose owner is absent from the country for a long
period of time is unlikely to thrive.
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restitution of the precise property.
The preference for some alternative to direct restitution of taken
property is based on the temporal dimension to property ownership. This
temporal dimension is widely recognized." 3 As time passes, separation
from property translates into a diminution of the importance of that
property in the execution of the life plans (the pursuit of the human telos)
that lies at the center of natural law property rights. The property that was
lost is replaced by new property that takes over the function of creating the
cocoon of family privacy and providing the means for economic creativity.
The converse occurs for those who moved into the expropriated property.
As time goes by, the property comes to play a more and more central role
in the formulation and execution of their life plans. Thus, to take back
property that was left behind forty years ago from someone who has
occupied it for that period of time would appear to be unjust. A better
solution would be to provide some form of compensation to the injured
party, either monetary or in the form of a vacant piece of property.
The example of reunified Germany provides a useful illustration of
how the overzealous restoration of four-decade-old property claims can
lead to inhuman dislocation. 554 Marc Fisher describes how people who had
owned homes for over two decades in East Germany feared their loss in the
wake of a law favoring restitution of confiscated properties. The law not
only discouraged investment in the former East Germany (as a result of
uncertain land titles), it also greatly set back the process of national reunification. Fear of losing their properties to former owners fostered a
strong antipathy towards West Germans among residents of the East.
Fisher even argues that the policy of land restoration led to a jump in the
suicide rate in the East.
C. U.S. Corporations
Most of the property lost by U.S. citizens as a result of Cuban property
reforms was owned by North American corporations. 5 Certainly North

553. As the laws of adverse possession demonstrate, Anglo-American law recognizes the
significance of water passing under the bridge with respect to property rights. Cuban law before the
revolution, and until the enactment of the new Civil Code in 1987, recognized the right to both
good faith and bad faith adverse possession. See E.F. CAmuS, 3 CODIGO CIVIL EXPuCADO 575-84
(1949). When the Spanish Civil Code was replaced in 1987, the notion of bad faith adverse
possession was omitted, and the period of time required for good faith adverse possession was
significantly reduced. See Freer, supra note 206, at 916; Ley No. 59, 16 dejulio de 1987 (Codigo
Civil de 1987) arts. 184.1-190.
554. See MARC FISHER, AFrER THE WALL: GERMANY, THE GERMANS AND THE BURDENS OF

HISTORY 177-81 (1995).
555. See id.
556. See Fermdndez, supra note 535, at 23 (observing that 89% of the value of the properties
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American individuals who lost property falling within the universal human
right to property (e.g., homes or family-owned businesses) would have
some claim for compensation or other restitution under the property for
dignity theory. Nevertheless, U.S. corporations have no such rights under
the natural law and, therefore, in the absence of an international norm, they
have no basis for their claims for compensation.
The only international norms that provide clear protection for U.S.
corporations are the requirement that property be taken for a public
purpose and the requirement that the expropriating state not discriminate
against property owned by nationals of a particular country. States have
557
wide latitude to determine what constitutes a public purpose.
Nationalization for the purposes of property redistribution meets the public
purpose requirement. Nationalization aimed at reducing domination of the
economy by foreigners would also probably meet the public purpose
requirement. This is particularly true in a case, like Cuba, where that
domination was facilitated by a neo-colonial relationship with an imperial
power that used its hegemonic influence over prior, corrupt governments
558
in order to facilitate its economic penetration of the national economy.
With respect to discrimination, the Cuban nationalizations present a
very close case. On their face, the confiscatory measures aimed at
properties belonging to U.S. nationals clearly discriminated.559 Further, as
with the public purpose requirement, there ought to be some leeway in the
discrimination requirement when a state emerging from a situation of neocolonial domination seeks to rectify imbalances within its national
economy that resulted from interference by a single foreign power. Any
attempt by the Cubans to establish economic independence would
necessarily need to be aimed at the United States, because it was the
United States alone that had used its domination of the Cuban political
system over the first half of the twentieth century to gain a dominant
position in the local economy. To say that a nationalization process could
not discriminate in such circumstances would be to say that a colonized
nation can never truly shake off its legacy of colonial domination.56
Even if the Cuban nationalizations of U.S. businesses were properly
characterized as illegally discriminatory, the issue of remedies would

lost by U.S. citizens was the property of U.S. corporations).
557. See supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
558. See supra Parts I.C-II.D.
559. See, e.g., Ley 851, 6 de Julio de 1960 (authorizing the confiscation of all properties and
businesses owned by U.S. nationals).
560. Of course, during the U.S. War for Independence, the property of many loyalists and
British nationals was confiscated without compensation. See, e.g., Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14
U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) (discussing the confiscations of British and loyalist property that
occurred in Virginia during the War for Independence).
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present another set of problems. Subsequent to the "discriminatory"
nationalizations of U.S. businesses and properties, virtually the entire
Cuban economy (both foreign and Cuban-owned) was nationalized as well.
Thus, even if U.S. nationals had not lost their properties in discriminatory
nationalizations, they would definitely have lost the same properties at a
later point in time through nationalizations that were non-discriminatory.
V. CONCLUSION

The exploration ofthe Cuban property reforms is interesting in its own
right. It is the story of a nation struggling to assert its sovereignty against
a neighboring imperial power and to break with a past of dire economic
inequality. Many of the Cuban government's reforms after 1959 were
consistent with the demands of natural justice, but many went too far and
became themselves the source of new injustices. Although recent actions
by the Cuban government have moved in the direction of rectifying these
excesses, this admittedly preliminary exploration of the requirements of the
natural law in the field of property law has hopefully shed light on the need
for additional efforts at expanding economic freedom in Cuba.
In addition to the intrinsically interesting issues ofjustice raised by the
Cuban reforms, the story of the Cuban revolution is also important for the
light it sheds on persistent problems within the international law. The
traditional international law of compensation for expropriated property is
in a state of disarray. A different approach, based upon a human rights
model and a natural law methodology, may help to clarify the issues
involved. The approach advocated in this Article, however, should not be
limited simply to the issue of expropriated property. The moral, human
rights model of international law may be used as an overarching model for
understanding all of international law. A natural law approach to the
international law helps to unite the entire field into one common
methodology, bringing together human rights law and customary
international law into a single paradigm of minimum universal standards
combined with a set of international customs that augment those minimum
standards but may not conflict with them.
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